Bringing
Development Back,
into Microfinance
by Maria Otero
Microfinance is the provision of financial services to low-income,
poor, and very poor self-employed people. From its inception in the
1970s, microfinance has evolved in astounding ways, incorporating
into its practice social and economic development concepts, as well
as principles that underlie financial and commercial markets. This
combination has led to the creation of a growing number of sustainable microfinance institutions around the developing world. As
microfinance continues to evolve as a development strategy, it will
be successful only if it is able to strike the right balance between the
two frameworks--development and finance--that underlie its practice.
The purpose of this paper it to explore three points at which
microfinance intersects with development, to argue why these three
intersections make microfinance compelling from the perspective of
development, and to explain why practitioners, donors and others
involved in the microfinance field tend to forget the connection
between the two.
As the approach to development has shifted over the last decades
(from the emphasis on developing infrastructure and financing large
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capital intensive projects in the 1960s, to the focus on meeting the
basic needs of people in poor communities in the 1970s, to the priority on structural adjustment and stabilizing economies in the
1980s, to today’s attempt to construct a sustainable development
framework against the background of increasing globalization) two
related and underlying debates have remained constant:
• First, are development efforts affecting poverty levels? Are
they reaching the poor? All development approaches, regardless
of their shortcomings, have attempted to address poverty, to
alleviate it, to eradicate it. While spirited, and at times fierce,
debates on the relative merits of various development
approaches prevail, no task has commanded a higher priority for
development institutions and professionals than that of reducing
global poverty.
• Second, what is the role of foreign assistance (i.e., donor
funds) in development? The major issue has focused on when
external resources--in the form of capital or technical expertise--should be introduced into a development project to make
it work. The dominant approach throughout development has
been to introduce donor money at the beginning, the middle,
and the end of any project--to inject it whenever possible, and
to bring in the expert to solve the problem.

These two areas of debate that have dominated development are also
very applicable to microfinance and help frame the discussion
below.
As a way of defining the relationship between microfinance and
development, it is useful to identify how microfinance directs itself
toward development objectives. This paper suggests that there are
three points at which development and microfinance intersect, and
that it is microfinance’s ability to connect in all three of these
points that make it so compelling as a development strategy.
...........................................................................
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Reaching the Poor
The first point of connection is microfinance’s objective to alleviate
poverty, that is, at the client level. Indisputably, microfinance, at its
core, combats poverty. Clients of microfinance institutions are
poor city dwellers housed in slums or squatter settlements, often
living in appalling overcrowded settings, lacking access to basic services such as health. Their survival tool kit lacks education or skills
that are essential to enter the mainstream economy. Many of them
are women, poorly trained and playing dual roles of provider and
caregiver. These poor people are more exposed to the threats of contamination, bad sanitation, and disease than the rest of the population. When disaster strikes, in the form of inflation, earthquakes, or
other outside forces, they are the most exposed.
Rural clients are landless or land poor; Their land is often unproductive or lies outside irrigated areas. Many farm in arid zones or on
steep-hill slopes land, that are ecologically vulnerable. Opportunities for off-farm employment are few and must be self-generated,
with many rural poor mixing, many earning activities to generate
the cash they need to survive. They live in large households, their
children are especially susceptible to disease, and many suffer from
malnutrition. Many poor depend on their children for work and
must weigh the opportunity cost of sending children to school
today against present and future benefits.
Conceptually, microfinance addresses one constraint faced by the
poor: their shortage of material capital (i.e., the input necessary to
generate income). Capital investment, from savings or borrowed
money, takes a critical place in the economy of all human actors,
regardless of their level of income. Microfinance creates access to
productive capital, which together with two other forms of
10
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capital--human capital, addressed through education and vocational
training, and social capital, built through creating representative,
local organization building, promoting democratic systems, and
strengthening human rights--enables people to move out of
poverty.1 Microfinance enables poor self-employed people to create
productive capital, to protect the capital they have, to deal with
risk, and to avoid the destruction of capital. It attempts to build
assets and create wealth among people who lack them. For the very
poor, microfinance becomes a liquidity tool that helps smooth their
consumption patterns and to reduce their level of vulnerability.2
At a more subtle but no less important level, which is much
harder to measure, increasing material capital strengthens the sense
of dignity a poor person possesses, and contributes to empowering
him or her to participate in the economy and society. With a source
of income, a person can provide for the family, improve the household’s access to basic needs, and plan for the future. When these
conditions are present, a person who was part of the marginalized
sector of the society becomes better equipped to be an active citizen.

Building Institutions
The second point of intersection between microfinance and development occurs at the institutional level. Microfinance seeks to create private institutions that deliver financial services to the poor.
These institutions become part of the infrastructure of the country;
that is, they are distribution channels for deploying services that
respond to the material capital needs of poor. Creation of such distribution channels that provide access to services to the poorer sectors is one of the greatest challenges that governments face. Even
governments that want to allocate increased resources to address the
needs of the poor encounter a daunting challenge: the lack of effective
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distribution channels or the infrastructure necessary to convert economic growth into improved well-being among the poorer sectors.
In this setting, microfinance proposes to create private, sustainable institutions that specialize in delivering financial services to the
poor. Against a broader development backdrop, these institutions
become a means to an end, not an end in and of themselves. They
constitute part of the not-yet-attained and long-sought-after instrumentalities needed to incorporate the poorer sectors into the economy. They put capital in the hands of those who otherwise would
not have it, and they enable people with few assets to save.
It is for this reason that institutional sustainability becomes so
crucial to microfinance. If microfinance institutions are not financially solid, unable to cover their costs, and incapable of delivering
financial services over the long term, they become a transitory
means of reaching the poor and lose their punch as a component of
a broader development strategy in any setting. This major link
between microfinance and development begins to unravel, unless
microfinance institutions attain self-sufficiency in their operations.

Deepening The Financial System’s Reach
The final intersection between microfinance and development
occurs at the intersection between microfinance and the financial
systems in a country, accomplished when a microfinance institution
becomes a regulated institution that is part of the financial system.
This connection is made possible by the recognition in the last
decade that healthy financial systems are an important piece of the
development puzzle, and that financial sector improvement and
reform should be a priority in all developing countries.3
When microfinance institutions become part of the financial system, they can access capital markets to fund their lending portfolios
12
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which allow them to increase dramatically the number of poor people they reach. They can also capture savings, providing another
important financial service to the poor, and access deposits as
another source of capital.4
By inserting themselves into the financial systems of their country, microfinance institutions deepen dramatically the reach of
financial systems to populations previously excluded from banks
and other financial institutions. One essential means of alleviating
poverty becomes the creation of a broader and deeper financial system which does not restrict the allocation of capital to a tiny group
of elites, but instead integrates the poor as a market segment and
reallocates resources from other sectors.
This last intersection with development is, in relative terms, a
recent one for microfinance, made possible only after attaining the
creation of financially viable institutions. Once it was demonstrated
that microfinance institutions could manage risk effectively and
that they would not become a systemic risk to the system, their
incorporation into financial systems became possible.
When microfinance intersects with development at the three
points suggested above, it has the capacity to create structural
changes in the way in which capital is made available to a population. It is addressing the seemingly intractable problem of creating
the infrastructure to reallocate resources and to create wealth
among poorer sectors. More than that, it is changing the dimension
of a system within an economy--the system that moves and reallocates capital in the economy. Microfinance operates at its best when
it intersects with development in these three points. Many microfinance institutions, either because they have not become sustainable,
or because they operate in an unfriendly regulatory environment,
are not able to complete these three points of intersection.
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Within the field of microfinance, observers, donors, and practitioners often tend to forget that the three above dimensions of
microfinance are the essential points of intersection with development, and that all three must be present to make microfinance a
powerful development tool. There are several reasons why this relationship between microfinance and development is often forgotten.
First, some of the key debates within the microfinance field are
focused on the wrong issues. Perhaps the best example is the ongoing controversy between reaching the poor and the sustainability of
microfinance institutions, a debate that has polarized the field along
these two dividing lines. Elisabeth Rhyne calls this the ying-yang of
microfinance, and rightly points out that “only by achieving a high
degree of sustainability has microfinance gained access to the funding they need over time to serve significant numbers of their
poverty-level clients. This image reveals that there is in fact only
one objective--outreach. Sustainability is but the means to achieve
it.”5 By focusing our debate in this way, one is pitting one point of
intersection of microfinance to development (reaching the poor)
against another (creating sustainable institutions). The basic flaw to
this debate is that it ignores that microfinance needs both points of
intersection to development--reaching the poor and achieving sustainability. Otherwise, it begins to disintegrate as a compelling
development approach.
The second reason microfinance forgets its relationship to development is that many of the biggest challenges in microfinance
remains at the institutional level. Building permanent, sustainable
institutions that deploy financial services to the poor and the very
poor, and are directly linked to or are part of the financial systems
remains an enormous undertaking which has not been achieved by
many microfinance institutions. For this reason, the focus in the
14

Volume 1 Number 1

Bringing Development Back into Microfinance
last few years has been on developing the managerial, technical, and
systems capacity within institutions to move them towards sustainability. The focus has been on the means, not the end. The level of
urgency regarding institutional viability is visible in the priorities
set by donors, the focus on tools, the establishment of performance
standards, and other interventions designed to advance the field in
this area. Whether these institutions come out of the NGO experience, involve traditional banks, or introduce new approaches such
as joint ventures, is not the important issue. What is important is
that the focus remain on creating microfinance institutions that
reach the poor sectors of society and at the same time achieve financial permanence.
One of the reasons attaining institutional viability has been difficult is because many microfinance practitioners have become
entrenched in the methodology or approach they have developed to
reach the poor. As such, many have focused on defending their
approaches and have diverted their attention from the essential
component of advancement: innovation. Breakthroughs in any
human activity have been achieved when new ideas have been introduced and have been accepted by society. However, in microfinance, the current receptivity to innovation has been severely
constrained because of the widespread efforts to defend existing
approaches, or because replication is occurring using models that
have not evolved. Yet for the field to advance, continued innovation
is a necessity.
The microfinance field’s lack of focus on innovation is reminiscent of the example of how typewriter keyboards were designed.
The QWERTY keyboard that we use today is named after the six letters in the upper row of the keyboard. These were laid out in 1873,
employing a whole series of tricks that would force typists to type
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as slowly as possible, such as scattering the most common letters
over all keyboard rows and concentrating them on the left side.
These counterproductive features were purposely designed by manufacturers because typewriters in 1873 jammed if adjacent keys were
struck in quick succession.
When improvements in typewriters eliminated the problem of
jamming, experiments with an efficiently laid out keyboard in 1932
showed it could increase the typing speed by 95%. But by then the
QWERTY keyboards were securely established, as typists, teachers,
and manufacturers crushed all moves toward keyboard efficiency.
These lessons of efficiency and innovation should not be forgotten
in the field of microfinance.6
The final reason behind the disconnect between development and
microfinance occurs because the best practice in microfinance has
fused two separate fields into one: development and finance. These
two disciplines operate from separate paradigms, communicate
using different terminology and concepts, and have previously not
been asked to exist together in an approach that attempts to deliver
services to the poor.
Merging these two ways of thinking and creating a level of compatibility between them that arrives at a good marriage and that
unites them to form a new way of thinking is the challenge microfinance is facing today. Those who come from a finance discipline
pull hard in their direction; those working from a development
framework pull hard in theirs. The first point of intersection
between, development and microfinance--reaching the poor--is
familiar and comfortable to the development camp, while the last
point of intersection--integrating into the financial system--is logical thinking for those from finance.
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Using a literary analogy helps illustrate the difficulty microfinance faces in addressing this issue. In his novel Anna Karenina, Leo
Tolstoy says that happy families are all- alike, but every unhappy
family is unhappy in its own way. In order to be a happy family, it
must succeed in many different respects. The marriage must work,
there must be agreement about money, there must be agreement
about raising the children, religion, in-laws, and other vital issues.
Failure in any one of those essential respects can doom a family to
unhappiness, even if it has all other ingredients needed for happiness.
This Anna Karenina principle can be extended to understanding
why the linkage between finance and development will be possible
only if it avoids many separate possible causes for failure.7 In other
words, if these two are not combined in a way that effectively integrates the major principles of each, microfinance efforts will fail,
each in their own way. One will fail because it will gradually forget
its target market as it seeks quick profits; another will fail because
it ignores the basic principles of finance; still others will insist on
only one model to achieve these intersections. Microfinance will be
strengthened if it recognizes that the answer to the capital needs of
marginal populations is developing cumulatively, based on innovative efforts centered in the three intersections between microfinance
and development, rather than on isolated, heroic acts that engage
one or two experiences. If microfinance professionals lose sight of
these intersections and neglect to focus microfinance on all three,
the field will drift toward the landfill of failed development efforts.
Microfinance professionals know more about how to make capital
available to poor people than they did fifteen years ago. They have
taken the bold step in the last five years of adding one crucial intersection point between microfinance and development: integration
into the financial system. While one can never avoid all crises
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microfinance institutions will confront in delivering credit and savings services, one can make these less frequent and less severe.
Additionally, one can use the knowledge being acquired to meet and
address new situations that will continue to arise.
For microfinance to continue its path toward becoming a successful development strategy, it must display these three dimensions: a
relationship to the poor, a reliance on permanent institutions, and a
connection with the financial system of a country. These three
dimensions of microfinance are not a discussion about the trade-offs
of one over the other; without all three, the strong points of intersection between microfinance and development will fade into oblivion and microfinance will become either a set of highly profitable
financial institutions that have abandoned their market, or a set of
insignificant donor-dependent and localized credit programs.
Keeping the collective eyes of microfinance professionals on these
intersection points is the huge challenge of this field today.

Notes
1.

See Vernhagen, K. (1999). Towards a Misereor Sector Policy: Financial
Systems Development. Draft. Vernhagen distinguishes these three types of
capital and their shortage for the poor. Combating poverty is a battle
against these three shortages of capital. Microfinance directly addresses
one of these, the shortage of material capital.

2.

These findings are emerging from work conducted by Jennefer Sebstad and
Monique Cohen, “Microfinance, Risk Management and Poverty,” prepared for the World Bank’s World Development Report 2000 on Poverty,
1999. Data from four countries demonstrate that finance for the poor
serves to reduce their risk, especially when they face personal emergencies.

3.

It was not until 1989 that the World Bank dedicated its World Development
Report to financial systems in developing countries.

4.

There are countries where the regulatory system is not conducive to the
regulation of microfinance institutions. Issues related to the supervision
and regulation of microfinance have become a leading topic of research
and analysis in the microfinance field. See especially Valenzuela, L. &
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Young, R. (1999, September). Consultation on Regulation and Supervision
in Microfnance: A Workshop Report. DAI. Microenterprise Best Practices
Project. Draft.
5.

See Rhyne, E. (1998, July). “The Yin and Yang Microfinance: Reaching
the Poor and Sustainability.” The Microbanking Bulletin, Calmeadow.
pp. 6-8.

6.

The

QWERTY

example is widely as’ an example of what kind of circum-

stances crush innovation in business. See Diamond, J. (1999). Guns, Germs
and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies. Norton and Co, pp. 248-249. See
also Liebowitz, S.J. & Margolis, S. (1999). Winners. Losers and Microsoft:
Competition and Antitrust High Technologies. The authors argue that the
QWERTY

7

keyboard is efficiently laid out.

See Diamond, J. Guns, Germs and Steel, pp 131-156. The author develops
the Anna Karenina principle to explain why some animals were domesticated and why some remained wild.
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Measuring
Transformation
Assessing and
Improving the Impact
of Microcredit
by Susy Cheston
and Larry Reed
ABSTRACT: The question of impact assessment is one that continues to
plague microcredit practitioners. Some contend that existing impact
assessment studies are meaningless, while others maintain they are
absolutely necessary. The authors of this paper advocate a renewed
focus on the transformation of clients and their communities, as well
as a new impact assessment model to support and document this focus.
They outline the key principles for conducting impact audits that
include measurement of transformation among clients. They also
review a series of practitioner-oriented impact assessment tools and
outline future challenges for practitioners, donors, and academics in
improving performance through impact assessment.

“Hey, mister, what are you looking for under that light?”
“My keys.”
“Why, did you lose them there?”
“No, I lost them across the street.”
“Then why don’t you look for them across the street?”
“Because the light’s better over here.”

Measuring Transformation
It’s an old joke, but it aptly illustrates the current state of the
practice related to impact measurement and microcredit. The microcredit movement exists to alleviate poverty. Yet the only performance indicators used to gauge the effectiveness of microcredit
programs measure the profitability of the lending institution and
the quality of its portfolio. They don’t tell us whether our clients
become less poor due to the services we provide.
Why do we rely solely on these financial performance measures if
they don’t tell us if we’re achieving our objective? Because they are
much easier to calculate reliably. We spend our time investigating
the well-lit areas, while the object we’re searching for remains in the
dark.

Our Purpose
This paper aims a small band of light on the subject of client impact
measurement for microcredit. We examine the need for good impact
measurement tools, describe some of the challenges we face as we
try to come, up with such, identify elements of an ideal impact
assessment, and describe some tools that can help us measure our
impact. We also try to get a few jabs in at those who keep telling us
that impact measurement is not important.
We recognize that the subject of impact measurement has been
hotly debated and frequently studied by experts, most recently by
the USAID Assessing the Impact of Microenterprise Service (AIMS)
project and in a series of virtual meetings organized by the World
Bank’s Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest (CGAP). We commend the work these organizations are doing and encourage them to
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....
Ms. Cheston is the executive director of the Women’s Opportunity Fund. Mr. Reed is the
Managing Director of the Opportunity International Network. Additional assistance
was provided by Vanessa Harper, Lauren Hill, Nancy Horn, Suzy Salib, and
Margaret Walen.
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continue. Meanwhile, this paper focuses on what we as practitioners need: tools that will help us design better lending products and
assist us in managing institutions.
Right up front we need to admit to two biases. First, as practitioners we need information that can reliably help us make good
decisions. We don’t have much time or money to spend on making
sure the data are 99.44% pure. We appreciate the work that academics and others do to further the theory and practice of impact
assessment; but for us, the test will always be whether these tools
yield data that help us make better decisions.
Second, as old hands at this work, we still believe that the purpose
of microfinance is to alleviate-poverty. We choose to do this work
because we want to help encourage a process of transformation in
the lives of our clients and their communities. We readily acknowledge that in order to do this, we need to develop large-scale institutions that operate profitably. However, our first purpose is the
transformation of the individual and her community rather than the
transformation of the institution.
We acknowledge that this business of finding out whether we have
achieved our objective can be rather messy, since poverty includes
social, spiritual, and political, as well as economic, dimensions.
Nevertheless, that is how we want to measure our success: by
whether or not people improve their lives through our programs.
We know it is a murky task, but we would rather spend our time
trying to bring light to this subject than searching in the well-lit
areas that cannot tell us whether or not we have achieved our goal.

The Problem With Measuring Impact
On its face, the case for measuring the impact of microcredit seems
obvious. If we seek to alleviate poverty, especially when we use
22
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scarce public funds to do so, surely we need to find some way to
determine whether we are achieving our objective. After all, credit
is a two-edged tool. To a borrower, credit means debt, and debt can
destroy as easily as it can build. If we seek to help people lift themselves out of poverty, we will want to know that they were poor
when they started borrowing and that they were less poor as a result
of borrowing. We don’t want to see them stuck, cycle after cycle,
earning low returns. Just knowing that we increased the debt of 100
million people will not tell us that we accomplished what we set out
to do, even if we delivered that debt in a financially viable manner.
Yet the case is not so clear-cut, and some of the leading thinkers
in the microcredit field have challenged the usefulness of expenditures on impact measurement.
Elisabeth Rhyne (1992) writes the following:
For the most part, evaluations of credit programs are still based
on the old-view ideas about causality. They are centered on the
presumption of a direct line of causation between receipt of
credit by individual borrowers and a particular desired response,
for example, changed borrower income resulting directly from
receipt of a particular loan. (p. 2)

The basic line of argument against more extensive impact measurement has been as follows:
1.

Most impact studies do not pass academic muster. Studies that
show changes in income, assets, or employment prove that
something is different in the lives of the client, but they do not
prove that the lending program caused the change. Without
measuring changes in the lives of people who did not receive
loans (such as through the use of control groups), you cannot
attribute impact to the credit that has been provided. Also,
most studies take place at one point in time and rely on the
often unreliable memories of clients to determine their status
before receiving a loan.
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2.

Proper impact studies cost too much money. Rigorous impact
studies with control groups and information baselines are
expensive. They require outside experts or well-trained staff
members to organize the study, set up the baseline information
retrieval system, train the local enumerators to collect the
impact data, write the program to collate the data, and then
carry out the analysis of the final results

3.

It is too expensive to carry out this sort of analysis on a regular basis. Most microcredit institutions struggling to become
financially viable cannot afford to pay a team of experts (either
outside consultants or full time staff members) to carry out
proper impact studies on a regular basis.

4.

The marketplace provides reasonable proxies for impact data.
If the clients of a microcredit organization pay the full cost of
the service they receive, pay back their loans on time, and
come back regularly for more loans, then the program must be
having a positive impact. (Client payback = client perception
of value = client satisfaction = positive impact.) Testing those
assumptions does not produce information that justifies the
large costs involved.

5.

Impact measurement, then, becomes the last bastion of those
unwilling to face the harsh realities of the marketplace. Impact
studies often get used to justify development expenditures for
institutions that do not meet marketplace standards of profitability and high portfolio quality. The fuzzy world of impact
can easily be used to disguise poor financial performance.

The Problem With Not Measuring Impact
While this argument has a certain logical consistency, it still fails to
answer the question whether the money spent on microcredit actu24
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ally achieves the objective of transforming lives out of conditions of
poverty. It also does not provide any assistance in assessing different types of microcredit delivery systems. For example, say we have
two microcredit institutions, both equally profitable and “serving
the same number of clients, but with widely differing impact., While
the one provides financially sustainable credit, it has marginal and
scattered impact on its clients. The other not only provides the
credit, but also builds leadership skills and social networks among
its clients in a way that brings widespread positive change to their
communities. Financial measurements provide us no way to differentiate between the two institutions. We would need some way to
assess transformational impact to discover the difference.
To us, measures of profitability and portfolio quality are important measures of the institutional health of an organization, but
they do not measure client health or well-being. As one of the
accounting professors we interviewed for this paper put it, “Using
profit and loss to measure the impact of microcredit is like using a
speedometer to measure the temperature.”
But why would someone try to use a speedometer to measure the
temperature? Only if there were no thermometer or the only temperature gauges available were too big, bulky, and costly to be used
on a regular basis. Unfortunately, that is the position of the impact
measurement field today. It has developed very sophisticated tools
for showing where impact happened, but most of us who work in
this field find the tools too expensive or time-consuming to employ
on a regular basis.
If we are going to develop tools we can use, those who manage
microcredit organizations need to take a more prominent role in the
impact discussion. We feel it’s time for practitioners to get into the
game and reclaim impact assessment as an essential tool of management.
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The Need for a New Paradigm for Measurement
For this paper we have reviewed over 100 impact evaluation documents, including over 50 actual tools, looking for tools we could
recommend. We came away from this exercise struck by how little
there was that we could recommend. This is not because the impact
studies were not well done, but because they were not replicable or
because they seemed too costly. In addition, many of the studies
shared one or more of the following common weaknesses:
1.

They often rely on participant memory to produce baseline
data, rather than collecting information when a client enters a
program.

2.

They provide information for only one point in time, and
cannot tell whether impact is increasing or decreasing over
time.

3.

They rely on too short a time period to allow impacts to manifest themselves.

4.

They don’t compare the changes in clients and nonclients.

5.

They require specially skilled people to carry out the research
or interpret its results.
Their data and procedures are so specific to one institution

6.

that they cannot be used by other institutions.
Developing an instrument to reliably measure impact on a regular
basis will require that we change the paradigm we use when we
think about impact measurement. The current paradigm is the
donor-initiated academic impact study, whose objective is to prove
whether or not the programs funded by the donors did any good.
This has produced shelves full of custom-designed, point-in-time
studies that cannot provide trend analyses and cannot be compared
to any other impact studies. In other words, this paradigm produces
26
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information whose primary function is to justify donor money that
has already been spent or to direct the spending of new donor
money.
The fact that the word “studies” most often follows the word
“impact” shows how dominant the academic paradigm has become.
We don’t seem to talk about impact measures, impact monitoring,
or impact analysis as often as we talk about impact studies.
We do have some use for these studies. We quote liberally from
them (as long as they are in our favor) when we apply for funding.
However, we rarely use them when we are doing our planning.

A Different Paradigm: The Impact Audit
David Hulme (1997) talks about a continuum of objectives for
impact assessment ranging from proving impacts for the purposes of
measuring the results of an investment to improving the practice of
a microcredit institution. Impact measurement tools that focus on
improving, rather than proving, may incorporate some of the tools
already in use, but will use them differently. Impact measurement
tools that get used by management on a regular basis will take a different focus:
1.

They will be incorporated into the regular routine of data collection in an organization.

2.

Staff members will collect and analyze the data.

3.

The data collected and analyzed will remain consistent over
time and location, allowing for trend analysis and comparisons
of different geographic areas.

4.

They will include a point of comparison with people in the
same community who do not receive loans.

5.

The results will be reviewed on a regular (at least annual) basis
and become a key part of the planning process.
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6.

The analysis will seek to provide input to the question “How
can we improve the positive impact and promote transformation?” rather than the question “Was there any impact?”

7.

Outside experts--ideally local ones--will be brought in to verify the accuracy of the data, make recommendations for
improvements in the collection process, and help in developing control group comparisons.
This type of ongoing impact monitoring suggests a different para-

digm, an impact audit as an internal tool of management. It most
resembles the process of a financial audit, which involves all of the
steps listed above. In a fanancial audit, staff members collect financial data on a regular and consistent basis. They use this data to generate trend analysis and center profit comparisons. This
information gets incorporated into the regular planning process,
helping the organization improve its profitability. On an annual
basis the organization calls in outside experts (auditors) to verify the
data and suggest ways to improve the accounting and management
procedures. When an entire industry holds the same impact assessment standards, organizations are able to compare their performance with similar organizations.
Using the paradigm of the financial audit also helps us think about
how much an institution should, be willing to spend to measure its
impact. Our simple rule of thumb is that it should be willing to
spend as much to track and audit its impact as it does to track and
audit its finances. Or, put another way, measuring whether it is
achieving its objective should be at least as valuable to an institution
as measuring whether or not it is earning enough money to stay in
business. In a microcredit program with up to 10,000 clients, this
might cost roughly US$10,000 to US$20,000 for staff time, tracking
systems, and outside “auditors.” We expect that an investment in
28
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this type of impact monitoring should pay off financially as an institution becomes more efficient in delivering the type of impact it
desires and creating more benefit for its clients. This sort of thinking does not apply only to nonprofit or socially-motivated activities. Increasingly, businesses are turning to the “social audit” and
the “balanced scorecard” as a way to determine whether their work
has a positive impact on their employees, customers, and communities (Kaplan and Norton, 1992; Zadek and Evans, 1993).
One of Opportunity International’s partners in India, The Bridge
Foundation (TBF) in Bangalore, has shown us the value of this type
of impact audit. Initially, TBF gave loans to individuals in urban
areas. Work was initiated through churches and community leaders,
who helped to identify honest clients. From this point, TBF did its
own analysis to determine business expertise and potential. In these
initial stages, TBF’s work was geared toward employment generation--creating job opportunities for the target group through “labor
intensive projects.”
However, experience and an impact audit resulted in a change in
the methodology. In 1991, after reviewing the data it had gathered
on the impact of its work, TBF decided that employment generation
was not creating jobs for its target group, the extremely poor;
instead, clients were employing skilled people outside of the target
group. As a result, TBF shifted its focus to income generation, and
raising levels of family income through “family projects.” Further,
since 1991, TBF has made a major shift in its program by moving
out from the urban to the rural sector, and now most of its clients
are located in the interior villages of the four southern states of
India.
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Impact Tools for Managers
As managers, we want to use impact data to make critical strategic
decisions. We want to know such things as which client sectors to
work with, which of our lending products are working, what barriers our clients are facing, why repayment rates have dropped, why
people are leaving our programs, which clients are receiving more
benefits and which ones are receiving less, and how best to expand
our programs. To that end, we want tools that
•
provide analysis of trends over time,
•

provide results that can be compared with previous impact
data,

•

can be implemented by existing staff with a clearly defined role
for outside experts,

•

become part of the regular information system of an institution, and

•

cost no more than what it costs to track and audit financial
information.
These criteria tend to blur the lines between impact monitoring

and impact evaluation. Impact monitoring is the assessment of the
performance of a project against its internal targets by gathering
information on a regular basis, ongoing or current. It can be useful
in making management decisions such as whether or not clients can
handle larger loans. Impact evaluation is assessment of the changes
resulting from a project against its main objectives at a particular
point--retrospective. It brings intentionality to the question
whether we are fulfilling our mission, and how we might make midcourse corrections. Our view is that these need not be seen as distinct activities, but rather as two necessary components of an
ongoing impact auditing system.
30
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In the following section we list the most promising impact-assessment tools we found in our review. While no single tool meets all
the criteria we listed above, these could be used in various combinations to develop an impact audit system.

Recommended Tools
Tool: Integrated Learning System
Developer: Helzi Noponen
Implementing Organization: Friends of Women’s World Banking,
India, with funding from the Ford Foundation
Description: An internal, decentralized, integrated monitoring,
evaluation, management, and training system that can be used for
decision making at all levels, including clients, field workers, and
donors.
Sample Questions (asked through accompanying pictures):
•
Have I improved my shelter?
•
Have I improved my production processes?
•

Have I improved access to health care?

•

Am I satisfied with my conditions?

Key Strengths:
•
An integrated system that is incorporated into the ongoing
data collection work of clients, loan officers, and managers
•

Useful information to all decision makers involved in the
process, including clients

•

A picture basis, so it can be used withilliterate clients
The Integrated Learning System (ILS) is based on a pictorial diary

compiled by the clients, who feed the information into a summary
diary kept by the microcredit self-help group, then in turn to the
area organizer, the program manager, and finally the intermediary
provider of funds. At each level, the participants collect data, assess
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change, analyze the reasons for change, alter their strategies based
on their learning, and document progress and share learning.
A test group of illiterate handloom weavers used their pictorial
diaries to reflect on their lives, lobby for electricity, and lobby for
a clinic for work-related illnesses. Self-help groups used them, along
with related training modules, to monitor and improve their organizational functioning in such areas as leadership and keeping
accounts. Field staff used them to ensure good stewardship of
resources by directing training to areas of identified need. They also
reported that the extent of child labor was far greater than they had
realized, and they therefore created a child-labor program. In addition to the impact-evaluation data, the system creates a flow of best
practices and learnings, and in itself can serve as a tool for client and
staff empowerment.
The ILS can be adapted by using the Stakeholder Analysis Manual
to determine appropriate domains of inquiry and indicators, and
then hiring a local-artist to adapt the drawings. The implementation
cost of the ILS is essentially in the staff training and processing time,
transportation costs to travel to training sessions, and the cost of
printing or photocopying diaries and manuals. (Three-year client
diaries cost about US40¢.) Because this is an integrated system, the
essential requirement is commitment by the NGO to staff involvement at all levels.
Tool: Client Monitoring System
Developer: MSI--Lorraine Blank and Russ Webster
Implementing Organization: Workers Bank, Jamaica
Description: An Access database that provides baseline data on
health, education and financial status of individual lending clients at
the time of the first loan and at subsequent points thereafter
32
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Sample Data Collected (note: this tool uses data-recording format):
•
Durable/nondurable household goods in the household.
•

Current bill payments

•

Cash resources

•

Average value of food expenditures

Strengths:
•
Low-cost system for tracking key impact indicators over time
•
Impact monitoring integrated into loan application system
•
Storage of information in computer database to allow for a
wide variety of reports and comparisons between various input
factors (loan size, business type, location, etc.) and subsequent
impact (changes in assets, education, health, etc.)
MSI has worked with the Workers Bank of Jamaica to develop an
impact-monitoring database that is incorporated into the loan-application system. As clients apply for a loan, the loan officer interviews the borrower and enters the data directly into a computer.
The data requested in the interview includes information needed to
assess the loan as well as information on the client’s income, assets,
patterns of expenditure, etc. The entire interview process takes
about 20 minutes. When clients reapply for loans, the data is collected again. This allows for tracking changes in these indicators
over the time that the client borrows from the Workers Bank.
Tool: Practitioner-Led Impact Assessment
Developers: SEEP, under the direction of then Executive Director
Elaine Edgcomb, with Barbara MkNelly, Carter Garber, and Nancy
Horn (as a part of the USAID AIMS project)
Implementing Organization: ODEF/Honduras, a Partner of
Katalysis; and Kafo Jiginew/Mali, a Partner of Freedom from
Hunger
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Description: A multicomponent impact analysis including a crosssectional comparison of clients and nonclients; in-depth interviewing of samples of multiyear clients; a survey of ex-clients; and focus
group interviews on client satisfaction.
Sample Questions:
•
In the last four weeks, did you earn income in some way other
than working for others?
•

When you are deciding to undertake a business, what factors
do you consider?

•

During the past two years, were any repairs, improvements, or
additions made to your home that cost more than US$50?

•

Compared to the last school year, did your household spending on school and school expenses for this current school year
decrease, stay the same, or increase?

Strengths:
•
Use of control groups to help in attributing impact
•

Integrated mix of tools looking at different aspects of impact
At Kafo Jiginew, the impact survey was administered with three

sample groups--one-year clients, two-year clients, and incoming
clients. The test was carried out over a three-week period by staff
who were assigned to clients they did not know. Kafo’s costs (for
salaries, per diem, etc.) totaled US$2,800; Freedom from Hunger’s
costs were US$8,700 for salary, expenses, and car rental for the
trainer and driver. A total of 197 person-days were used, including
planning, pretesting, data collection, software installation, data
entry, and analysis.
The assessment does a good job of proving positive impact at multiple levels, including enterprise, household, individual, and community levels. In addition, it provided Kafo with feedback on such
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issues as clients’ actual use of the loan funds, which will help it better shape the program.
Tool: Client Exit Survey
Developer: compiled by Carter Garber for the USAID AIMS
Project, based on the Women’s Opportunity Fund “Trust Bank
Client Exit Interviews.”
Implementing Organization: AGAPE/Colombia, a member of the
Opportunity International Network
Description: A standard interview given to group loan clients when
they leave the lending program
Sample Questions:
•
What are the main reasons that you are leaving or have left the
program?
•

What did your loans help you do in your business?

•

In what ways did the loan help your family?

•

Could you name the two things you liked best about the program?
While these questions are very limited in scope, we thought it use-

ful to include a tool that is an easily implemented first step in determining client satisfaction with the program. It consists of 5 to 15
minute surveys given by loan officers to clients as they leave the
program. When AGAPE/Colombia used the tool, they learned
about changes in client income, use of the loans, and loan sizes.
Based on their findings, they decided to focus on training clients in
how to invest their loans and on strengthening initial business
assessments.
Using a similar approach, FINCA/Nicaragua produced a Report
on Client Targeting, Turnover, and Program Impact, by John
Hatch, Todd Manwaring, Meredith Terrell, and Judd Horn(1998).
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However, the survey tools were used among new clients, departing
clients, and ex-clients. The results indicated the distinct issues in
product satisfaction and client impact for each group.
Tool: Impact Assessment Study
Developer: Monawar Sultana and Ashok Nigam
Implementing Organization: Family Development Fund, Egypt
(UNICEF/Egypt 1998)
Description: Measures improvements in material well-being, access
to basic social services, improved status of women, and institutional
sustainability of the program using individual interviews with
structured questionnaires, focus group interviews, and case studies.
Sample Questions:
•
How often does your family eat vegetables or fruits?
•
In the last two years, has anyone from your family borrowed
money from somewhere besides the project loan?
•

How would you treat your children if they had diarrhea?

•

Did the relationship with your husband (or in-laws) change
after getting the loan?

Strengths:
•
Good combination of tools to confirm and check data
•

Use of control group
This study used a multitiered approach to collect different types

of data on clients. The first tier, shallow and broad, was the interview questionnaire. This went to a random sample of clients and a
control group. Loan officers carried out the interviews, and the
entire study occurred over a 30-day period. The second tier, the
focus group interviews, involved open-ended discussions with 107
women in eight centers. The final tier, the in-depth case studies,
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involved individual interviews with eight borrowers from the same
group.
Among the many interesting findings was that income from the
credit activities is mostly spent on children’s education and family
subsistence, and that after taking the loan, the number of borrowers
whose children did not go to school dropped from 23% to 16%,
although most borrowers preferred to educate their sons rather than
their daughters. Among the recommendations for improving the
program was that more emphasis should be given to targeting
women from the younger age group, in order to meet UNICEF’s
objectives to improve the condition of children.

Other Tools of Interest
Tool: Mbeya Credit Facility Client Impact Evaluation, by Corey
Huntington for Mennonite Economic Development Associates
(MEDA), Tanzania, September 1996. Clients participated in group
discussions and in-depth individual interviews about economic and
social impacts experienced by individuals and their households,
resulting in such positive findings as women’s increased financial
independence, and recommendations such as the need for more
appropriate client training. Cost was US$3,700.
Tool: Group Guaranteed Lending and Savings Program in the West
Bank and Gaza, by Khalid Nabris for Save the Children/West Bank
and Gaza Strip, September 1997. This is an interesting mix of qualitative and quantitative data, including a questionnaire survey with
borrowers and another survey with dropouts; focus group discussions with borrowers, borrowers’ husbands, and borrowers’ children; and workshops with field staff.
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Tool: Measuring Client Success: An Evaluation of ACCION’s Impact
on Microenterprises in the United States, by Cristina Himes with Lisa
J. Servon. The US Issues Series Document No. 2, April 1998. The
loan application form collects baseline data for new and repeat
loans, thereby providing longitudinal data on the business as well as
personal consumption and income. This keeps costs down, although
it also means the system does not track clients who have-left the
program, and-data are kept irregularly. In-depth interviews were
also conducted about the gains that individuals, families, and communities experience as a result of the business and the microcredit
program.
Tools: Those used by ADEMI-BANCOADEMI, as described by Pedro
Jimenez. March 1998. Since its start, ADEMI has collected data
related to its clients’ business growth as part of every loan and
reloan application. Indicators include cash, equipment, assets, sales,
profits, salary of owner and employees, expenses, savings, and number of employees. ADEMI now has data on over 44,000 enterprises
collected since 1983, and has been able to use the data to prove the
macroeconomic impact of its lending and to lobby for attention to
the microenterprise sector.

Putting the Tools to Work
A good program of impact measurement and monitoring will not
rely solely on one tool, just as business managers use a set of measures to help them assess current financial performance and predict
future growth. While business people often refer to “the bottom
line” as the final measure of their performance, there are, in fact,
many measures that businesses use to assess their performance.
These include earnings per share, market share, internal rate of
38
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return, net present value, and the most recent business measurement
tool, economic value added. Businesses add to these numerical tools
a wide range of subjective measures to assess customer satisfaction
and behavior, including surveys and focus groups.
The same will be true of a good regimen of impact analyses. It will
start with a good base of information that is tracked regularly in a
form that can be assessed in many different ways (such as the database used by the Workers Bank of Jamaica). As much as possible,
the tools for this base of information should be standardized so that
the information can be audited on a regular basis. On top of this
will come other forms of impact tracking, including surveys and
focus groups, that give decision-makers more depth of understanding and a feel for the conditions, values, and experiences of their
clients.

The Challenge Ahead
For impact measurement to become as common and expected as a
financial audit, all of us in the microcredit community will need to
take it much more seriously.
•
Practitioners will need to reclaim impact measurement as an
essential tool of management. We will need to take the initiative in discovering, developing, testing, and refining tools that
tell us whether we are achieving our objective. We can no
longer wait on donors or professors to do our impact analysis
for us.
•

Donors will need to apply funds and expertise to this area, as
USAID has in the AIMS project. They should work with practitioners to develop replicable tools that can be used to analyze
and improve the performance of microcredit institutions in
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transforming the lives of their clients, and they should reward
institutions that implement the tools.
•

Consultants--especially local consultants--will need to
develop expertise in applying these tools and auditing their use
so that practitioners can come up with standardized tools that
produce consistent and reliable data useful for practitioners.

•

Academics will need to work with practitioners to find ways
that the tools they have already developed can be adapted to fit
into an ongoing monitoring system. They can also help analyze the data that comes in from institutions employing different lending methodologies in different parts of the world.

•

Clients should become not just objects of study, but users of
the data generated. Clients should be able to see the impact of
their participation on their own lives, compare it with the
impact on others, and make suggestions for how the microcredit institution can improve its ability to assist in the process of
clients’ transformation.
One practical step: Scott Parrott of the National Institute for

Social Science Information (NISSI) has offered to create on his web
site a research library of impact evaluation tools for microenterprise
development organizations. As a first step, we plan to provide NISSI
with the tools we have reviewed in order to make them widely
accessible.
Working together, we may all be able to shine some light on this
field of impact measurement and find ways not only to measure
impact, but also to improve our ability to transform the lives of the
clients we serve with microcredit.
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Notes
1.

For the purpose of this document, the 1997 Microcredit Summit, and the
Summit’s nine-year fulfillment campaign, any reference to microcredit
should be understood to refer to programs that provide credit for selfemployment, and other financial and business services (including savings
and technical assistance) to very poor persons.

2.

For this paper we make a distinction between impact and transformation.
For us, impact is any change, positive or negative, that results from an
intervention. We define transformation as a deeply rooted change in
beliefs, values, attitudes, actions, relationships, and structures manifested

3.

in a sustained higher level of existence of an individual or community.
While control groups may be the most common way to determine causality in impact assessment, they also produce logistical and ethical difficulties for microcredit institutions. On the logistical side, it is costly and time
consuming to track data on people who do not receive credit and other
financial services. The ethical dilemma arises when one looks at using
impact assessment as an ongoing management tool. It would be wrong to
continuously withhold credit from people who might be able to use it just
so that we can prove the value of that credit. Here are some ways that
microcredit institutions have tried to get around these difficulties:
•
Use data generated by the government statistical office to develop
profiles of the average household in a community and how it has
changed over time, and compare this to changes among clients.
•

Encourage a university to have students carry out ongoing research

•

Develop comparisons between new applicants and clients who have

among people who could serve as a control group.
been with the organization through several loan cycles, using new
applicants as a proxy control group.
The person trained in statistical methods will quickly recognize weaknesses in each of these approaches. For management purposes, however,
these methods can give enough of an indication of causality to provide useful information for decision making.
4.

Note that we do not focus on the question of who we are reaching in this
paper, because that is addressed ably in another paper for the 1999 Meeting
of Councils by Anton Simanowitz and Ben Nkuna of the Small Enterprise
Foundation and Sukor Kasim of the Center for Policy Research, Universiti
Sains Malaysia, entitled “Overcoming the Obstacles to Identifying the
Poorest Families, Especially the Women: Using Participatory Wealth
Ranking (PWR), the CASHPOR House Index, and Other Measurements in
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a Way that Assures Identifying the Poorest Families, Especially the
Women in those Families, and that Encourages Their Participation in
Programs.”
5.

In order not to duplicate good work being done elsewhere, we will not
report on other AIMS projects we found interesting, but rather refer read-

6.

ers to the AIMS home page.
Note that other evaluations looked interesting to us, but we did not
include them because we-did not have complete documentation or because
we did not find them replicable
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The Impact of
Outcome-Based
Assessment on
Microenterprise
Programs
by Margaret A. Johnson
Umasundari Akella
and Julie Lalande
ABSTRACT: The changing environment in the nonprofit sector has subjected microenterprise programs to a new paradigm that emphasizes
rationality principles. These principles ask practitioners to increase
their outcomes while minimizing costs and to demonstrate that they
are doing so with outcome-assessment measurements. This paper presents a case study of what happened to 11 microenterprise programs
that adopted outcome assessment. Factors affecting the adoption of
outcome assessment were changing norms in the nonprofit sector,
demands from state legislators for information on program outcomes,
and mandates from funders. A funding formula was implemented; program responses included going along, adopting practices to fit the formula, embracing outcome assessment as a way towards program
improvement, and possibly eliminating ineffective programs.
Unintended consequences and ways to avoid them are discussed.

What is the impact of an increasingly rationalized, fiscally
conservative environment on community-development programs
that target low income residents? In the United States, more and

The Impact of Outcome-Based Assessment
more not-for-profit microenterprise programs struggle with stakeholders in justifying their expenditures. The struggle begins with a
dilemma over the mission of microenterprise programs. Various
stakeholders, such as funding agencies and legislators, often view
microenterprise programs as economic-development programs that
are low-cost lending programs that should be able to use loan repayments to cover expenses. Service providers that serve poor and low
income populations often design microenterprise programs that use
a holistic approach to meet the complex needs of their poor and low
income clients. These programs have expenses typical of other jobtraining programs. The contrasting views of the programs can strain
budget-allocation decisions. These tensions have intensified with
changes in the funding environment for social services. These
changes include asking social service agencies to do more with less
and to demonstrate that they are doing so by adopting outcomeassessment measurements. How do these tensions become resolved,
and what are their effects on microenterprise programs?
This paper presents a case study of the negotiation process
between a state funding agency and the 11 private, not-for-profit
microenterprise programs for which it provided limited administrative support. (These microenterprise programs were one of several
programs, each housed within 11 social service agencies that had a
broad mandate to provide social services to poor and low-income
residents.) The case study examines the pressures faced by both the
state funding agency and the program staff to reduce their budgets
and demonstrate program success. The case study was guided by the
social science concepts of institutional isomorphism and resource
............................................................................
Ms. Johnson is an assistant professor in the Department of Sociology at Oklahoma State
University. Ms. Akella is a doctoral candidate at the State University of New YorkStonybrook. Ms. Lalande is a doctoral candidate at York University in Toronto.
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dependency. Data included participant-observation at quarterly
meetings for three years, review of organizational records and program history, and in-depth interviews with key members of the
state funding agency and the directors of the 11 microenterprise
programs.

Institutional Isomorphism and Resource
Dependency
Institutional analysis focuses on the way organizations mirror and
incorporate the norms and standards of their environment (Meyer
& Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott & Meyer, 1994).
Organizational change is seen as a response to shifts in the ideology,
professional standards, and cultural norms of the field or sector in
which an organization is situated. Institutional isomorphism predicts that organizations within an organizational field will become
more similar to each other over time as they respond to pressures
from others in their field to adopt fieldwide norms and policies
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). In addition, institutional isomorphism
combines with resource dependency issues to predict that organizations that are dependent on a single source of support for resources
will have higher levels of isomorphism, and more specifically, that
the more an organization interacts with the state, the greater the
extent of isomorphism (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991). These concepts
inform the analysis of this case study because (1) a key, external
pressure on the microenterprise programs was the trend in the nonprofit sector toward use of outcome-based assessment, and (2) the
rate at which the microenterprise programs adopted these practices
was directly impacted by their reliance on state and federal funding
that mandated outcome-assessment measurement.
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Below is a discussion of key changes in the nonprofit sector that
have affected microenterprise programs in the United States and
worldwide. This section is followed by background information on
this case study.

Movement Towards Outcome-Assessment
in the Nonprofit Sector
Social service delivery in the nonprofit sector has undergone
tremendous change, and two elements are of particular note here.
One is a paradigm shift among program funders and social service
providers to focus on outcomes of social service delivery, rather
than the services provided. Many funders and organizations, such as
the United Way, are making funding contingent on the ability of
social service agencies to demonstrate the impact of their programs
on clients and the community. The key idea behind this movement
is the goal to use social services to empower people to change the
circumstances of their lives, rather than to provide services as crises
occur.
Related to this paradigm shift is a general rationalization movement, and more specifically, application of business principles to
nonprofit practices. While nonprofit and business practices have
always overlapped, the application of the business model to the
nonprofit sector was previously viewed as limited, since the sectors
were seen as having very different goals. Now the principle of rationalization is being applied to the nonprofit sector with the same
vigor as the business world. In the private sector, rationalization, an
ultimate goal, refers to minimizing costs while maximizing profit.
In the ideal model, all policies, procedures, and activities are conducted with this principle in mind. For the nonprofit sector, the
principle of rationalization is applied with a slight twist. Here the
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goal is minimizing costs while maximizing outcomes. The movement towards outcome measurement provides the tool to measure
the degree of rationalization. In these terms, microenterprise programs that demonstrate a high degree of rationality also have the
highest effectiveness ratings.
This new paradigm, which emphasizes rationality and outcomes
coupled with development of outcome-assessment measurements,
manifests itself acutely in microcredit programs. Microcredit programs more closely resemble a business model when compared to
other social service programs. Microcredit programs make loans;
banks also make loans. Rightly or wrongly, program funders and
other stakeholders make these comparisons when designing, administering, and evaluating microcredit programs. Moreover, from the
beginning, microcredit programs were not typical social service
delivery programs. The principle of institutional isomorphism suggests that as outcome-based assessment and rationalization principles become widespread in the nonprofit sector, microcredit
programs will be pressured to adopt them as well. The discussion
below provides evidence of the development of outcome-based
assessment for microenterprise programs.
In the United States, the MICROTEST project is an excellent example of the movement toward outcome-assessment measurement.
MICROTEST is a “working group of microenterprise practitioners
and researchers that . . . have a long-term mission to improve the
quality of microenterprise services and the stability of microenterprise organizations over time by perfecting and promoting the use
of measures to regularly measure performance” (quoted from
MICROTEST literature). MICROTEST is incorporated into FIELD
(Microenterprise Fund for Innovation, Effectiveness, Learning, and
Dissemination), which describes itself as a research and develop48
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ment fund that “seeks to identify and support promising models for
microenterprise development . . . and to document the strengths,
weaknesses, and costs of these different institutional models”
(FIELD 1999 Request for Applications). Programs that receive
FIELD funding must agree to use MICROTEST and its standardized
performance measures to track performance across the different participating programs.
On a global level, Planet Finance is promoting the Impact
Knowledge Management (IKM) program, a standardized assessment
tool developed for use all over the world to evaluate the social and
economic impact of microfinance institutions on their clients and to
evaluate the microfinance institutions’ abilities to target poor
clients (Planet Finance n.d., Section 1.1). IKM aims to improve the
effectiveness of microcredit programs by measuring the impact of
the programs on clients and on reducing poverty.
The microcredit programs of this case study received Community
Services Block Grant (CSBG) funding. All programs receiving CSBG
funding were placed under a mandate to implement Results
Oriented Management and Accountability (ROMA). The emphasis
of this evaluation program was to have agencies measure outcomes
of individuals, communities, and neighborhoods rather than the services provided. For example, this approach has agencies ask how
this program changed people’s lives, as opposed to how many people were served.
The CSBG Task Force on Monitor and Assessment believes that
monitoring and assessing community services programs should
focus on the results they achieve for their customers: low-income
people. These results should be directly connected to the goals and
objectives of the program.
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What is Going on Here?
Times are changing. Federal and state programs are being asked to
do more with less. To compete successfully for declining resources,
programs must be able to demonstrate that they can deliver the
greatest impact for the least cost (National CSBG Monitoring and
Assessment Task Force, 1996).
The language of the task force well illustrates the paradigm shift.
Use of the business model is apparent in referring to clients as customers, while the rationalization process is evident in the linking of
goals to results and emphasizing doing more with less.
MICROTEST, IKM, and ROMA are three examples of evaluations
that impact microenterprise programs. They each embody rationalization principles, although to varying degrees. They are rationalized in the sense that the evaluation procedures specifically link
program goals with program outcomes, and these program outcomes are linked to comparisons of other programs and funding. It
certainly is not a new phenomenon for program evaluation to be
concerned with whether or not an organization has met its goals. In
fact, a general principle of evaluation is to ask, “Did the organization accomplish its goals?” The difference here is the emphasis
placed on standardized measures for purposes of comparing programs and allocating funds. Both MICROTEST and IKM have explicit
goals to design standardized measures so that programs can be compared. This is evident in a FIELD request for applications that states,
“Grantees must also agree to participate in MICROTEST in order to
track performance consistently across programs.” Planet Finance
literature outlines a standardized IKM rating. “Every [microfinance
institution] will be evaluated separately using the same framework”
(Planet Finance, n.d., Section VI). This evaluation will result in a
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standardized IKM rating. While data collected using the IKM framework or MICROTEST could be used by funding agencies to inform
their decision making, the programs are not currently linked to
funding allocations. In contrast, ROMA is structured to allow practitioners to choose their outcomes, but it forces the rationality principle by mandating outcome measurements and linking them to
funding. The preference is for rationalized outcome measurements—measurements that specify dollar cost per outcome, e.g.,
administrative expenses per loan made.
For social service agencies, funding and outcome-assessment measurements have become more closely linked. This linking is amplified by a fiscally conservative environment that asks agencies to do
more with less. This is the environment in which the 11 microenterprise programs of this case study found themselves.

Description of the Case Study
The Entrepreneurship and Training Program (ETP) was started in a
midwestern state in 1989, placing it among the first microenterprise
programs in the United States. In 1997 ETP added four programs for
a total of 11 programs that served the entire state. In addition, during this study, two of the older programs were operating with new
directors. The administrative budget for the programs ranged from
approximately US$25,000 to US$35,000. The ETP programs were
housed within social service agencies that provided a broad range of
services (e.g., weatherization, child care, job training, transportation programs, emergency food assistance) to low-income residents.
The microenterprise programs served clientele that were within
125% of the federal poverty line and that wanted to start or expand
a small business. The program provided intensive training, lending,
and on-going mentoring during business start-up and expansion. In
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most counties, it was the only program providing these services to
low-income residents.
For three years, the principal investigator attended ETP quarterly
meetings, conducted pro bono training sessions, and provided ad
hoc support and consultation to the ETP programs. During this
time, a conflict was building between the state agency that provided
the administrative funds and the service providers. The state agency
was dissatisfied with the number of loans that were made, and the
service providers were concerned about the level of funding and the
way that they were being evaluated. More specifically, the funding
agency felt the program was having only limited success because of
the small number of loans it made per administrative dollar spent.
In contrast, the social service providers argued that they spent a
great deal of time on training and mentoring, yet they felt that the
funding agency did not value this work. The service providers
argued that their clients benefited from the training even if they
decided not to start a business or take out an ETP loan. At that time,
the ETP program was evaluated primarily on these measures: the
number receiving services, the number of loans made, the repayment rates, the default rates, the number of business/jobs created,
and the dollar cost per job created.
During this conflict, the federal agency that was the original
source of the funds mandated new evaluation procedures for
all programs that received CSBGs. As mentioned, this new evaluation program, called ROMA (Results Oriented Management
Assessment), called for agencies to demonstrate how their programs improved people’s lives and communities.
It was in this context that the principal investigator was brought
in more formally and under contract to help them design outcome
assessments. The overall goal was to measure more accurately and
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comprehensively the ETP program activities and to develop a series
of outcome measurements that would meet the ROMA requirements
and help the service providers better communicate programs, activities, and successes with stakeholders, especially legislators.

Research Methodology
In addition to the participant-observation at meetings, interviews
were conducted with staff from the state funding agency, with ETP
program directors from each of the 11 programs, and on the state
level, with executive directors of the social service agencies. The
ETP interviews collected information on the background of the ETP
program, its mission and goals, the size of the program in terms of
staff and operating budget, description of its clients, the various
components of the ETP program, the types of training and services
provided, the successes and weaknesses of the programs, its partnerships with other agencies, suggestions for outcome measurements,
and evaluation of current program assessment by the state funding
agency. The in-depth interviews with the state funding agency
focused on the strengths and weakness of ETP, the funding agency’s
role in the ETP program, the most important contributions of ETP,
and the future of ETP.
The information was analyzed with the qualitative technique of
successive approximation (Neuman, 1997). In successive approximation, the researcher begins with general ideas and questions about a
phenomenon and then examines the data to refine these. This
process continues in a cyclical fashion until the researcher constructs an empirically grounded set of concepts. This process led to
organizing the findings around the external and internal pressures
that affected the ETP program and the funding agency, the internal
negotiations between the funding agency and ETP program staff,
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and anticipated effects of change on the programs. Each of these is
discussed below.

Findings
These findings specify the process through which the principle of
isomorphism and resource dependency worked. Institutional isomorphism effects occurred because of the changing paradigm in the
nonprofit sector toward a model that was more rationalized and
focused on outcome assessment. This new paradigm affected both
ETP programs and the state funding agency, and was implemented
through various players. Resource-dependency issues affected the
speed at which this new model was implemented.

External Pressures
External pressures occurred both formally and informally. The formal requirements of ROMA mandated a movement towards outcome-based assessment. The push to construct outcome-assessment
measures that were rationalized came, in part, through the legislative process. In the background section we described the growing
conflict between the state funding agency and the ETP program
staff. A primary, original source of this conflict was state legislators
and a reorganization of key state agencies. During the appropriations process, the state funding agency had to undergo a line-by-line
budget justification with the state legislators. This included testimony about the ETP program. The desire of the state legislators for
rationalized outcome measures was underscored. Specifically, state
legislators were concerned with the administrative cost per job created. The state funding agency staff members have stated that when
legislators and their staff call about the program, they ask the state
funding agency about the number of loans made, the number of
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government subsidized loans, the number of clients that got off subsidies, the number of female heads-of-household that participated,
and the loan default rate. In regards to the allocation process, a
funding agency staff member described this process:
Legislative staff call at the end of the year. We give the budget in
October. They question us about why we need it and why we
deserve it. Sometimes it sails through, sometimes they question
it. Last year they held hearings about the budget and we had to
explain each piece. They asked about [ETP] and specifically how
many loans had been made. There were four hours of testimony
from [ETP] participants. My impression was that the legislators
liked the program, but not the results. They kept our base allocation, but did not give us any extra funds even though the
money was available.

The state legislators desired information on program outcomes to
inform their decision making on appropriations. In turn, the state
funding agency wanted the ETP program staff to provide them with
the information that would convince the legislators that this was a
cost-effective, worthwhile program. As one state funding agency
staff member underscored, “When a legislator calls and asks how
many female, single-headed households received loans, we need that
information, and we need it written down and documented.” While
anecdotal stories of business successes were persuasive for the legislators, the rationalized outcome measures were not.

Internal Negotiations
In meetings between the funding agency and the ETP program staff,
these concerns were discussed. The ETP program staff argued for a
broader description and assessment of their program. The ETP staff
stated that the majority of their time and effort goes into training,
mentoring, and follow-ups and that many of their clients never
receive a loan. For example, here is a general description of one of
the larger programs as given by the program director:
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The business training lasts for ten weeks, with meetings occurring twice per week. During the training, clients develop a business plan, hear from experts, and work on estimating their costs
for starting a business. About sixty people will graduate, and one
to three will take out a [ETP] loan at that time, although more
may come back to the agency at a later time. [ETP] services the
loans through a local bank, and the [ETP] program acts as a guarantor.

The program director contended that clients benefited from the
training even though they might not have received a loan. Thus it
was important to measure the impact of the training, rather than
placing primary importance on the number receiving loans and on
administrative costs per loan. However, since no client tracking
occurred at that time, the agencies could not provide the state funding agency with specifics on program outcomes for the vast majority of their clients who did not receive a loan. Thus, in turn, the
state funding agency could not provide this information to the legislators. The program directors indicated that possible outcomes
included that the training better prepared their clients for the workforce, it helped clients decide whether or not starting a business was
appropriate for them at that time, and it provided clients with the
information they needed to start a business, even if they decided to
receive financing elsewhere. The state funding agency did not resist
this broader approach to outcomes. In fact, they were open to having the ETP staff decide on the evaluation measurements. Thus the
funding agency stipulated that programs would have to be evaluated, but the agency gave considerable latitude over which measurements would be used.
In terms of evaluation, a secondary issue of concern to the ETP
staff was that not all programs were providing the same information
to the funding agency. Concern existed over the reliability of some
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of the measurements in the form that they were using to file quarterly reports with the funding agency.
At this point, the principal investigator received funding from the
state agency to develop a wide range of programmatic outcomes that
would accurately represent the range of activities of the ETP program, and to create standardized assessment tools and measurements
that would help ensure the reliability of the information across the
11 programs. The project was designed so that the principal investigator would work with the ETP program staff to develop comprehensive outcome measurements which the staff felt reflected the
mission of the ETP program and their activities. In turn, this information could be used to help explain the program to various stakeholders and to demonstrate its variety of successes beyond making
loans and creating jobs. The project progressed well, but then took
on another meaning when a funding crisis ensued.
This funding crisis intensified resource-dependency issues.
Funding became a trump card that determined the pace at which
outcome measurements would be implemented. The four new programs were left out of the baseline-appropriate budget of the state
funding agency. The funding for these programs was included in a
separate, special appropriations bill. The baseline bill passed, but
the special appropriations bill did not. The end result was reduced
funding for the ETP programs. To cope with the situation, the funding agency and the ETP program staff reached a compromise. In
exchange for providing funding to all 11 programs, the social service
agencies would speed up implementation of outcome measurements
and move towards outcome-based funding within six months. The
ETP staff could still decide on the outcomes, but these decisions
would be critical, since the outcome measurements would be used
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to construct a funding formula. The formula would determine the
amount of funds each program would receive.
At a meeting between the funding agency and the ETP staff, they
agreed to compose a list of six outcome measurements from which
each agency would choose three. These six measurements would be
used to construct a funding formula that would determine allocations. Fifty percent of the allocations would be distributed equally
among the agencies, and the remaining fifty percent would be determined by the formula. Within two years, the base amount would be
eliminated, and the entire funding would be outcome-based.
This compromise did not come easily. A debate over the mission
of the program ensued, and this debate linked assessment to the mission of the program. Program staff expressed frustration over a perceived lack of understanding about the program. They expressed
dismay over the emphasis placed on making loans. As one ETP staff
member stated, “I do not want to become a collection agency.”
Others emphasized the difficulty in applying the same measurements to different programs. Some programs served a large rural
area, while others were urban. Other key differences included
nascent versus established programs, a wide variety of training
approaches, and the use of peer lending by two of the programs.
Other ETP staff wanted a quick decision on the outcome measurements, so that they would be able to maximize their points. For
example, if primary emphasis would be placed on loans, then the
staff would wait to process loans until they could count for the
report period. These tensions were alleviated somewhat by the decision to let the agencies choose three of the six measurements. The
meeting ended without the measurements being chosen, but each
agency was told to send in its recommendations.
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Concerns about mission and vision were also addressed in the
in-depth interviews. ETP program staff were near unanimous in
articulating the goals of the program. They expressed that the general goals were to help people with low incomes start their own
businesses, create jobs, and become more self-reliant. Other goals
mentioned were operating a revolving loan fund, providing technical assistance and training, and helping people develop their businesses. The ETP staff expressed a desire that the funding agency
make clear its vision and mission for ETP, fund the agencies at a
viable level until the programs were established, and keep the flexibility in the ETP program.
The funding agency staff articulated a paradigm shift that needed
to occur before ETP would be successful. This paradigm shift
reflected the rationalization norm discussed previously:
[The agencies] do not take their program seriously enough. They
see it as a social service program and not an economic development, job creation program. They should have the goal that the
program should pay for itself. It might be hard, but they should
set it up that way. They should charge interest, get funds from
the community. Right now, it just sucks out money. They are
not running it like a business. They won’t entirely be able to,
but they should try because that’s how they will make good
loans, have better training, and client success.

Thus the emphasis on assessment measurements was tied to the
vision of the program. The funding agency wanted the ETP program
to be run more like a business, while the ETP staff wanted the funding agency to acknowledge that even though this program was different from their other programs (e.g., weatherization, emergency
food assistance, child care), it still had social service components to
it. Moreover the shift advocated by the funding agency was influenced by the rationalization pressures that had mounted in the nonprofit sector at large.
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In short, institutional isomorphism pressures moved the ETP program toward adopting rationalized outcome-assessment measurements, while the funding crisis affected the rate of change.

Implementation Issues
This final section covers implementation issues that occurred as the
agencies were faced with designing and implementing a funding formula that would determine their allocations from the state agency.
The directors of the ETP programs received a letter from the director of the funding agency with the outcome measurements attached.
They were informed that fifty percent of allocations for the funding
formula would be based on three mandatory outcome measurements, and the other fifty percent would be based on their choice of
five measurements from a list of thirteen. Two of the three mandatory measurements were based, at least partially, on loans, as were
nine of the thirteen optional measurements (e.g., average loan size,
% of loans repaid, % of repayments/installments on time, loan
approval rate). The measurements were classified according to
whether they were client-based outcomes, program-based outcomes,
or partnership-based outcomes. The funding agency advised that
these outcome measurements would be used for the next allocation
period, but after that, the report would be expanded to include
more client-based outcome measurements.
The executive director of the social service agencies responded
with a memo urging the ETP agencies to use five outcome-based categories: client, program, microbusiness, partnerships, and follow-up
monitoring. Attached to the memo was their list of outcome measurements.
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Despite an on-going debate over program goals and outcome measurements, the implementation proceeded. Below are some of the
responses during the process.
A common response was to go along and hope for the best. Several
agencies were largely silent during the debates or engaged in only
mild grumbling. At that point, it remained unclear if these agencies
would stay committed to the ETP program. Another approach was
to seek the best way to work the new system. For example, during
the meeting to decide on the funding formula, some agency staff
wanted to know as soon as possible which measurements would be
used and what time period would be covered. They wanted to use
this information to form a strategy to maximize their points. Staff
also expressed concern that the outcome measurements might influence them to recommend risky loans that would improve their
points in the short run, but that might prove to be poor decisions
in the long run.
Another response was to embrace outcome assessment. The director from one of the programs whose primary funding did not come
from the state agency was eager to see 100% of allocations based on
outcomes, because she thought this would make their program
stronger. She viewed outcome assessment as empowering, the way
towards a better program.
Another potential outcome of implementing a funding formula
would be the elimination of ineffective programs. Programs that
had low performance levels based on the outcome measurements
would not receive sufficient funds to remain viable. The funding
formula could provide a way to cut funding to programs with weak
performance.
Thus programs responded differently, depending on the type of
program they were, their strengths and weaknesses, and the meaVolume 1 Number 1
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surements used to evaluate them. When measurements are used to
make funding decisions rather than to improve program performance, a variety of outcomes are possible. For these agencies, the
likely outcomes were going along or working the system while trying to avoid unintended consequences, embracing outcome assessment as a way towards improvement, and eliminating ineffective
programs.

Conclusions
Social service agencies in the nonprofit sector moved toward a new
paradigm that emphasized maximizing program outcomes while
minimizing program costs. These outcomes centered on demonstrable changes in the lives of clients and their communities. Programs
were to focus on empowering clients to improve their lives, rather
than providing services on an ad hoc or crisis basis.
Microenterprise programs were especially affected by this new
paradigm because it fit especially well with the model of microenterprise programs. Microenterprise programs were designed with
the goal of empowering people to improve their lives. Thus from
the beginning, microenterprise programs focused on outcomes.
Moreover, they were different from social service programs in that
clients received loans that were to be repaid.
As the field of microenterprise programs expanded rapidly and
matured, so did the ability and desire to measure its impact. Various
evaluation practices were a regular and early part of microenterprise
programs. The programs of this case study experienced these trends
in an extreme fashion. Not only did they move towards outcomebased assessment, but these outcomes also determined allocation
levels by way of a funding formula.
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What can the experiences of these 11 programs teach us about outcome assessment? With allocations based on a funding formula, programs will receive different funding levels, and some might even be
eliminated. Ideally, the best programs will likely receive the most
funding, while unsatisfactory programs will receive much less.
However, if the outcome measurements are not valid and reliable
measures of program outcomes, then there will not necessarily be a
strong correlation between funding levels and program achievements. Therein lies the predicament of tightly coupling outcome
measurements to funding. It can only be successful to the extent
that the measurements reflect the program activities and goals accurately and reliably. To the degree that they do not match, unintended consequences are likely to result.
The intended consequence of outcome assessments is to measure
program success and efficiency. However, because of the diversity
of programs, it can be difficult to employ standardized measures.
Thus differences in program outcomes could indicate differences in
the programs themselves and not differences in success and efficiency. For example, standardized outcome assessments could have
the unintended consequence of labeling a new program as a failure,
when in fact it just has not had sufficient time to demonstrate success. It takes a while for outcomes to show, and this is especially
true for business development. Similarly, rural programs cannot use
the economies of scale that an urban program can, and thus might
be disadvantaged on certain measurements.
Unintended consequences could also occur if the measurements
are poor indicators of program activities and goals. For example,
one ETP program processed one to three loans for every 60 people
who participated in its business training. If outcome assessment
focused on loans, this active program would be measured as inacVolume 1 Number 1
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tive. It can be difficult to come up with valid measurements for
something as complex as changing people’s lives. The road from
poverty to self-employment is often a long, difficult haul. The social
service agencies in which the ETP programs are housed, recognizing
this, take a holistic, multifaceted approach to meet clients’ needs.
While it may be impossible to eliminate all unintended consequences, strategies can be used to decrease their likelihood.
Different outcomes could be chosen on the basis of program characteristics such as rural versus urban and nascent versus established
programs. In fact, as described previously, a variation of this strategy was used for the ETP programs when they were given a choice
for half of their outcome measurements. Another strategy would be
to use the same outcomes but assign them different weights. Thus a
new program might be evaluated more heavily on the number of
clients in the program, while long-term outcomes, such as number
of established businesses and loan repayment rates, would be
weighed more heavily for an established program.
To decrease unintended consequences, outcome assessment could
be implemented to inform rather than determine funding. Perhaps
the primary way to use outcome assessment is as a way to improve
program performance and to discover and document “best practices,” and as a tool to communicate to stakeholders the activities
and success of the program. For example, FIELD identifies as its mission “to identify, develop, and disseminate best practices, and to
broadly educate policy makers, funders, and others about microenterprise as an antipoverty intervention” (Request for Applications:
Institutional Models for Microenterprise Development Programs, p.
1). These uses help alleviate the problems of unintended consequences while maximizing the benefits of outcome assessment.
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Finally, it should be underscored that the issue is not whether outcome assessment is good or bad; the concern is its use and implementation. Microenterprise programs represent a paradigm shift,
and demonstrating the impact of the program on people’s lives is
part of it. Microenterprise programs are not “Band-Aid” or crisisintervention programs. Ideally, they seek to attach root causes of
poverty by helping people to create a business to leverage their way
out of a subsistence life by building and growing wealth. Outcome
assessment can be used as a way to keep an organization focused on
its goals and to help shift the orientation of social service providers.
These changes, though difficult, are important. They require
patience, understanding, and fortitude on the part of social service
providers and funders alike.
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ABSTRACT: There has been a significant interest in the microenterprise
movement regarding its effectiveness as a welfare-to-work strategy. A
decade’s worth of program results, demonstration projects, and
research strongly suggest that the benefits of microenterprise development for welfare recipients outweigh the costs and risks.
The state of Iowa has been a leader in promoting microenterprise
development as a welfare-to-work strategy. Iowa was the first state in
the US to incorporate microenterprise-development training as an eligible activity in its welfare-reform program. Since 1993, the Iowa
Department of Human Services (IDHS) has contracted with the Institute
for Social and Economic Development (ISED), a statewide microenterprise development organization, to help welfare recipients become selfsufficient through self-employment. IDHS requires an annual third-party
evaluation of the program. The purpose of the evaluation is twofold: (1)
to document program implementation and results, including goal attainment and participant characteristics; and (2) to analyze participants’
movement toward self-sufficiency, as compared to that of welfare participants not enrolled in the program. This article reviews ISED’s program and summarizes the findings of the first five years of the program.
Among other findings is the fact that the program has experienced a
three-year business survival rate of 56.4%.

Microenterprise Development in the Heartland
“These microcredit projects are proof of what we can unleash
if we invest in the economic and human potential of all our
citizens. It is becoming increasingly obvious that microenterprise not only transforms lives, but it lifts up communities and societies as well.”

~Hillary Rodham Clinton
Over the last decade, microenterprise development has become a
powerful nationwide movement. According to the 1999 Directory of
US Microenterprise Programs, 341 microenterprise programs operate
in 46 states and the District of Columbia. In 1997, 24,145 businesses
were assisted, of which 10,791 were existing (more than 12 months
old), 7,054 were start-ups (less than 12 months old), and 6,300 were
new (not yet operating when they came to the program). A total of
3,953 TANF (Temporary Assistance for Needy Families) recipients
were served in 1997 (Kays & Orwick 1999).
Microenterprise is a strategy that contributes to economic development, human capital development, and community development,
and that addresses needs not met by existing institutions. Unlike
other economic development strategies, the objective of microenterprise development is to reach into the poorest communities and
draw potential entrepreneurs from the ranks of women, people of
color, long-term welfare recipients and single heads of households.
Microenterprise programs build on the unique ideas and skills of
disadvantaged individuals and residents of economically distressed
communities, empowering them to create their own economic
opportunities and achieve self-sufficiency.
...........................................................................
Ms. Raheim is an associate professor and director of the University of Iowa School of
Social Work and serves as evaluator for two self-employment projects for low-income
people operated by the Institute for Social and Economic Development. Mr. Friedman
is the vice-president of the Institute for Social and Economic Development.
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Microenterprise-development organizations accomplish this by
providing training, counseling, technical assistance, and access to
small amounts of capital to support the development of small businesses. These services are delivered in a supportive environment
that conveys the message that people can improve their lives
through initiative and hard work.
There has been a significant amount of interest regarding the effectiveness of microenterprise development as a welfare-to-work strategy. A decade’s worth of program results, demonstration projects,
and research-to-date strongly suggest that the benefits of microenterprise development for welfare recipients outweigh the costs and
risks. Specifically, microenterprise development (1) works for a
small but significant percentage of welfare recipients, (2) reduces
welfare receipt, and (3) enables recipients to increase their income
and assets (Friedman, Grossman, & Sahay, 1995).
At the same time, microenterprise development yields variable
results for welfare recipients; it will produce economic independence
for some, supplemental income and assets for others, and simply not
work for still others (Boshara, Friedman, & Anderson, 1997).
The state of Iowa has been a leader in promoting microenterprise
development as a welfare-to-work strategy. Since 1993, the Iowa
Department of Human Services (IDHS) has contracted with the
Institute for Social and Economic Development (ISED) to help welfare recipients become self-sufficient through self-employment.
IDHS requires an annual third-party independent evaluation of the
program. The purpose of the evaluation is twofold: (1) to document
program implementation and results, including goal attainment and
participant

characteristics; and (2) to analyze participants’ move-

ment toward self-sufficiency as compared to welfare participants
not enrolled in the program. The following is a summary of five
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years of results on welfare recipients who participated in ISED’s
Entrepreneurial Training (ET) Program.

Background
The Institute for Social and Economic Development is a private,
nonprofit, microenterprise-development, technical assistance, and
research and evaluation organization based in Iowa City, Iowa. The
mission of its Economic Development Division is to help lowincome, unemployed, and underemployed Iowans achieve self-sufficiency through self-employment and to help revitalize economically
distressed urban neighborhoods and rural communities through
small business development. ISED operates branch offices in six of
the state’s largest cities and maintains a network of independent
contractors serving rural areas.
Since 1988, ISED has helped start or expand more than 1,200 businesses, 85% of which are low income, as defined by the US
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) guidelines.
With assistance from ISED, these entrepreneurs have obtained 510
loans and grants totaling over US$7.24 million. At a White House
ceremony last February, President Clinton awarded ISED the
Excellence in Microenterprise Development Award in the category
of Poverty Alleviation.
Since its inception, the focus and purpose of ISED’s microenterprise program has been to support low-income business owners and
potential entrepreneurs in their efforts to achieve and maintain economic self-sufficiency. At the core of ISED’s efforts is a comprehensive microenterprise development training program and curriculum
that has been developed and carefully refined to effectively meet the
business-related needs of low-income entrepreneurs and individuals
with limited business exposure.
Volume 1 Number 1

69

Journal of Microfinance

Program Components
ISED’s microenterprise development program consists of three basic
services: comprehensive formal business development training,
access to capital, and follow-up assistance. These services are
designed to provide low-income microentrepreneurs with the skills,
knowledge, and support they need in order to start and manage successfully a small business and to achieve self-sufficiency.
Formal Microenterprise Development Training. ISED offers a
formal, 13-week business training class to Family Investment
Program (FIP) participants interested in starting or expanding a
small business. The curriculum consists of the following components:
•
Orientation and preliminary assessment of business idea
and personal readiness. Clients attend one orientation session
and two assessment sessions, which are designed to introduce
them to ISED and the program. The objective of these sessions
is for clients to (1) understand how the program works (expectations, time schedule, and commitment required); (2) present
and discuss their business idea; (3) explore their skills, experiences, interests, and abilities to determine if they have the
qualities needed to start a microenterprise; and (4) understand
what business ownership is like—its advantages, disadvantages,
risks, and rewards. ISED’s small business development professionals help clients to complete preliminary assessments of
their business ideas and explore their personal readiness for
entrepreneurship.
•

Business Feasibility. The client assesses the business idea (feasibility, level of financing necessary to start the business, and
nature and amount of business assistance needed), their entre-
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preneurial experience (i.e., business-related background and
work experience), and the fit of their skills to the technical
skills required for a particular business.
•

Personal Readiness. The trainers help each client assess his or
her readiness to enter into entrepreneurship through examining (1) level of interest, energy, and enthusiasm for selfemployment as demonstrated through research and draft
documents he or she has prepared; (2) personal financial management skills and credit potential; (3) level of self-esteem and
self-confidence; and (4) readiness to start a business (i.e., the
extent to which a client’s current life situation either supports
or creates obstacles to committing the amount of time and
energy required to start or expand a small business).
At the conclusion of this component, each client has an individual

interview with the trainer/consultant to determine whether smallbusiness development is viable for them and whether it is an appropriate time in their life to take this step. Clients interested in
pursuing business ownership continue training toward development
of a quality business plan.
Business plan development training and technical assistance.
This component of ISED’s training focuses on preparing a business
plan. Clients conduct more extensive feasibility research in order to
define and test the viability of their proposed business and determine whether the business will produce profit. Business trainers
assist clients with developing an appropriate structure for their business, developing marketing and financial plans, and identifying
financial and capital needs.
At the conclusion of the business training component, clients have
drafted a business plan and loan application (if financing is needed).
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Frequently, extensive technical assistance is necessary to help clients
refine these documents.
Access to Business Financing. ISED’s approach to small-business
lending is to secure agreements with existing private and public
sources of capital in order to finance ISED-sponsored clients. ISED
has developed a strong working relationship with the banking sector and with state and federal government programs designed to
provide low-income individuals with access to business capital. ISED
clients use the following funding sources:
•
Commercial banks. ISED has developed strong linkages with
statewide and community-based banks throughout Iowa. Many
of these banks have agreed to set aside microloan funds for
ISED clients and to give priority consideration to financing
requests from individuals who complete the program and have
a final ISED-approved business plan.
•

Credit Enhancement. ISED has a Loan Guarantee Fund that
can be used to reduce the often high risk associated with loans
for start-up businesses. This fund provides a partial guarantee
for a bank loan when additional security is needed—up to 50%
of the loan, to a maximum value of US$10,000. This credit
enhancement feature serves to reduce the risk to the lender and
establishes a successful relationship between the client and the
bank, which can be built upon in the future.

•

Iowa Small Business Loan Programs. ISED has a strong
working relationship with the Iowa Department of Economic
Development (IDED), the state’s economic development
agency. IDED administers two loan programs targeted to lowincome minorities, women, and disabled individuals.

•

Self-Employment Loan Program (SELP). This program provides loans of up to US$10,000 for five years with an interest
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rate of 5%, and specifically targets low-income borrowers who
seek business start-up or expansion. ISED is the largest source
of SELP loan applicants in Iowa.
•

Targeted Small Business Financial Assistance Program.
This program provides up to US$25,000 in business financing
to low-income individuals—minorities, women, and persons
with disabilities—who seek to start or expand a small business.
Financing terms are five years at a 5% interest rate.

•

Private Funding Sources and Grants. ISED is the Iowa
administrator of the Trickle-Up program, a private foundation
in New York City that provides grants of US$700 to lowincome entrepreneurs. This program targets individuals who
have very small capital needs and little opportunity for financing.
Since 1988, ISED has helped clients who complete training and are

ready to launch or grow their own small businesses to secure nearly
US$7.2 million in capital.
Follow-up Assistance. Self-employed individuals are typically isolated following the start-up of their business. Without extensive
business experience and a strong support network, they may
encounter difficulties coping with the unexpected challenges that
arise during business operation. To counter this, ISED provides the
following assistance:
•
Post-Start Technical Assistance. To help these businesses
meet the challenges they face, ISED offers on-going technical
assistance to business owners for five years after the completion of training or for the life of the business loan—whichever
is longer. ISED business trainers meet with new business owners to help them prepare monthly financial statements, explore
marketing options, and solve specific problems, or generally
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help them build their capacity to understand their businesses
and solve problems. In addition, clients may require specialized assistance (i.e., accounting or legal help), which ISED provides through independent contractors.
•

Community Support Systems. To combat the isolation and
loneliness that many new microentrepreneurs face, ISED has
established formal support systems in several locations. These
support systems, called community business networks, provide
a forum in which low-income business owners meet on a continuing basis for group learning, networking, and discussing
their challenges in running a business.
As of this writing, all ISED businesses have a five-year survival rate

of 64%.

Microenterprise Development
and Welfare Reform in Iowa
Iowa has been a leader in implementing reforms and programs
designed to assist low-income persons in transitioning from welfare
to work. Iowa’s welfare reform initiative, called the Family
Investment Program (FIP), is the centerpiece of Iowa’s human
investment strategy, which blends education and training, economic
development, and employment services in order to provide a range
of choices for participants to better meet their needs and abilities.
In 1988, Iowa was one of five states that opted into the SelfEmployment Investment Demonstration (SEID), a national demonstration project to test microenterprise development as a
welfare-to-work strategy. The SEID program was designed to provide selected welfare recipients with business skills, loan financing,
and continuing technical assistance to enable them to establish or
expand small businesses. Through a Request for Proposals, ISED was
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selected to administer the program in twelve counties in eastern
Iowa.
In 1993, based on ISED’s success in the program, Iowa. included
microenterprise training to welfare recipients statewide as an eligible activity for participants in Iowa’s welfare reform program.
Named the Entrepreneurial Training (ET) Program, its goal was to
“stimulate self-employment, which will create sufficient revenue to
sustain families at a standard of living independent of public assistance.” Under the FIP program, self-employment activities count
toward participation requirements.
To help achieve this objective, IDHS grants waivers of certain
existing income, assets, and business expense policies to ET participants who are ready to start or expand their business. The waiver
period is for 12 consecutive months and is not required to commence with the first month of business start-up or expansion.
Clients pursuing self-employment in Iowa through ISED’s program
remain eligible for public assistance during their training and until
their income or assets from the business are sufficient to make them
ineligible for benefits. These clients also remain eligible for other
assistance available to FIP participants, such as child care, transportation, and health care services.

Research Methods
To document program implementation and results, data were collected at each milestone of the program: orientation, enrollment,
training completion, loan acquisition (when applicable), and business start. Data were collected from many sources, including interviews with ISED management and field staff, review of program
documents, and ISED’s management information system (MIS).
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To analyze ET participants’ movement toward self-sufficiency,
ISED analyzed participants’ welfare receipts after enrollment in the
program as well as that of a comparison group. For this analysis,
electronic data files from IDHS containing Family Investment
Program grant histories of all state recipients during the period
were used. FIP start dates and counties of residence were used to
select a pool of possible matches to ET participants, and a matched
comparison group was randomly selected from this pool of FIP
recipients. A one-to-one match for each ET participant was made.
Individuals who received no FIP benefits during the study period, as
well as their match in the ET or comparison group, were excluded
from the analysis. After their exclusion, 819 records for each group,
or 1,638 cases, were analyzed.
ET participants’ rates of FIP receipt and that of the comparison
group were examined from the date of enrollment in the ET program through June 30, 1998. Rates of FIP receipt for the two groups
were compared using two methods. One method was computing the
percent of each group not receiving FIP at each six-month interval
after enrollment. These percentages were compared in order to
determine if statistically significant differences exist between the
two groups. The second method was comparing months on and off
of FIP during the study period, using the following variables: (1)
total possible months of FIP receipt, (2) total actual months of FIP
receipt, (3) total months of no FIP receipt, (4)% of months off FIP
(total months of no FIP receipt), and (5) total possible months of FIP
receipt.
Means of these variables were compared for each group. Since we
assumed that effects of ISED’s business training on FIP receipt would
be evident only after one or more years of participation, ET participants enrolled for one year or less (and their match in the compar76
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ison group) were excluded from this portion of the analysis. After
this exclusion, 665 cases were analyzed in each group.

ET Program Outcomes
In our study, program results are defined as numeric outcomes
achieved at each critical milestone specified in ISED’s contract with
Iowa DHS: (1) orientation and assessment, (2) enrollment, (3) training completion, and (4) business start. Expected and actual cumulative outcomes through June 30, 1998 are shown in Table 1.
A comparison of expected and actual cumulative outcomes indicates that the ET Program exceeded its numeric targets for critical
program milestones. In five years of operation,
•

Recruitment/orientation was 133% (1,946) of the target goal of
1,466;

•

Enrollment was 132% (972) of the target goal of 739;

•

Training completion was 89% (472) of the target goal of 529; and

•

Business starts were 117% (234) of the target goal of 200.

These data show that 24% of enrolled participants successfully
started or expanded a business. However, business start rates for
participants that completed the entire training were substantially
higher, at 50%. While the program serves only an extremely small
number of welfare recipients per year, the data suggest that selfemployment appears to be an appropriate option for many of these
recipients.
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Five-Year Trends of Completing
Program Milestones
To identify trends in participants’ completion of program milestones, Table 2 details the percentages of those moving from each
milestone to the next for each year of the program studied. The following observations are noted:
•

During each year, the percentage of participants who enrolled
in training after orientation remained fairly constant, ranging
from 46% to 54%.

•

Movement from enrollment to completing training was constant during the last three years of the period studied, at about
50%. In contrast, during years one and two, the rate of enrollment to training completion was 70% and 37%, respectively.

•

With the exception of year one, 44% to 50% of participants
progressed from training completion to business starts each
year. During the first year, only 19% of participants started
businesses.

•

The three-year business survival rate for these businesses
is 56.0%.

Characteristics of ET Enrollees
and Those Who Started Businesses
Table 3 presents characteristics of ET participants who enrolled in
training. Microenterprise development attracts a diverse range of
people. Similar to the SEID program, welfare recipients who choose
self-employment in Iowa tend to be older, long-term recipients,
with higher than average educational levels and more extensive
work histories than typical TANF recipients. They are people lim-
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ited by lack of opportunity, not lack of capacity. The following are
the most notable characteristics:
Gender: 76% of enrollees were women, which is consistent
with the high proportion of women who receive FIP in Iowa
and in the nation.
Race: 81% were white, but 17% were persons of color, with
African-Americans accounting for 10% of the total. This is significant because persons of color represent only 12% of the
state’s population participating in public aid programs.
Marital status: 49% were separated, divorced, or widowed,
while 28% were married and 21% had never married.
Educational attainment: 58% completed high school or a GED,
24% had a technical certificate or 2-year college degree, and 5%
had a four-year college degree or higher. Only 7% had not
completed high school. One possible explanation for the high
educational attainment of ET enrollees is that Iowa’s high
school graduation rates are above the national average.
Age: Participants’ ages ranged from 18 to 58 years and averaged
33.7 years.
Dependents: On average, participants had two children under
18 years old living in the household and 3.4 people depending
on their income.
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•

Income: Most participants had monthly gross incomes
between US$501 and US$1,500 at the time of enrollment.
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FIP and Employment History
An on-going question regarding microenterprise in the United
States is whether programs are serving the poorest of the poor. As a
group, participants enrolled in the ET program had experienced
long-term welfare receipt as adults (see Table 4), the average length
of time being more than four years (51 months). However, the
median FIP receipt was 34 months, nearly three years. One-third
(33%) had received FIP for 36 months or more prior to enrollment.
Another third (35%) had received FIP for 12 to 35 of the 36 months
before enrollment. Slightly fewer (28%) had received FIP for less
than twelve months immediately prior to starting the program.
These data indicate that FIP had not been merely a temporary means
of financial support for most participants.
Consistent with the findings of the Self-Employment Learning
Project (SELP) conducted by the Aspen Institute and SEID program,
enrolled participants had substantial employment experience. Onethird of ET participants were employed at the time of enrollment,
12% full-time and 22% part-time. On average, participants had six
years of employment experience and 84% had prior full-time
employment experience and/or part-time experience (70%).
At the same time, the FIP and employment histories of these
enrollees show that most enrollees had relied on public assistance
for substantial periods of their adult lives, despite their efforts to
participate in the labor market. For those currently employed, FIP
provided a necessary part of their total subsistence income package.
Table 4 details participants’ FIP and employment histories.
Also noteworthy are enrollees’ previous entrepreneurial experiences. Forty-two percent had worked in a family-owned business,
and 29% had previously owned their own business (see Table 4).
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These data suggest that individuals who enroll in training are more
likely to have personal experience with operating a business than
the general FIP population.

Business Starts and Waivers
Of the 972 participants enrolled in ET, 234 (24%) had started a business by June 30, 1998 (see Table 1). More than half of those starting
a business (58%) received a waiver that permitted them to acquire a
business loan, receive business income, or accumulate business
assets without the reduction or loss of their FIP grant. The waiver is
an essential feature of the ET Program that makes pursuit of selfemployment a viable option for FIP recipients.
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Analysis of Factors Associated With Business Starts
A number of variables were analyzed to identify factors associated
with higher probabilities of business starts. Independent sample
t-tests and cross tabulations using chi-square analysis revealed that
the following factors are associated with higher probabilities of ETparticipant business starts (at a significance level of .05 or higher):
•
Business experience. It is logical that individuals who have
firsthand experience in business operation would more likely
start a business than those who do not.
•

Work experience. Work experience likely provides transferable knowledge and skills that are useful in self-employment.

•

Part-time employment. It is reasonable that participants who
have part-time employment have more flexibility to begin a
business than those who are employed full-time. These participants who work part-time may also have a greater network of
people to draw from for business contacts than those participants who are not employed.

•

Marital status: Being divorced or married and living with a
spouse (in contrast to being separated from a spouse or never
having been married) makes a difference. Participants who are
separated from a spouse may be in a period of transition that
requires their energy and attention. This may interfere with
their ability to meet the demands of business start-up.
Participants who have never been married and who are likely
to have children may be less likely to have the social network
or supports required to meet the demands of opening a business while single parenting.

No associations were found between the following variables and the
likelihood of business starts:

Volume 1 Number 1

83

Journal of Microfinance
•
•

Age
Gender

•

Number of children under 18 years of age in the household

•

Number of dependents

•

Having ever worked part-time or full-time prior to enrollment

•

Full-time employment at the time of enrollment

•

Type of business training received in the program (i.e., classroom vs. one-on-one)
This analysis may provide insight into positive influences on busi-

ness development and aid in program planning to increase the percentage of business starts. Knowledge of factors related to higher
probabilities of business starts may be useful if incorporated into
an assessment of individual participants’ strengths and needs for
support.

Characteristics of ET Businesses
During its first five years of operation, the ET program facilitated
the start or expansion of 225 businesses by 234 participants. Table 5
presents the characteristics of these businesses. Seventy-six percent
of these are female-owned businesses; this figure is consistent with
the high proportion of women who are FIP clients. Eleven percent
of ET businesses are minority-owned, indicating that the program
has been effective in recruiting and serving persons of color, who
represent only 12% of the state’s population participating in publicaid programs.

Types of Businesses
Most ET businesses were new ventures (88%), while 12% were
expansions. Types of businesses vary, slightly more than half being
service-oriented (57%), about one-third (30%) retail, and a small per84
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centage manufacturing (5%) and wholesale (1%). Most businesses are
home-based (61%), but almost one-third (31%) operate away from
the home.

Job Creation
In addition to creating jobs for themselves, ET participants’ businesses have created 70 additional jobs—26 full-time and 44 part-time
(see Table 7 below). Thirty-one of these 70 new jobs employ lowincome individuals. While these numbers are not very large, they do
indicate that these microbusinesses do generate some additional
employment opportunities.
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Loan Activity
As detailed in Table 6, 102 ET businesses received US$855,927 in
loans and grants for start-up or expansion. ISED’s experience with
low-income entrepreneurs is that only roughly 50% of clients
require capital to start a business. Of those that did need financing,
commercial loans accounted for 34% of these funds, totaling
US$93,210. Loans from the Iowa Department of Economic
Development’s Self-Employment Loan Program were the next
largest source of financing for ET businesses, accounting for 26% of
all funding received for a total of US$224,300. The remaining funds
came from private sources (14%), TSB (5%), grants (3%), and other
sources (19%). The average loan was approximately US$8,000. Table
6 details loan sources and amounts.

ET Participant’s Movement Toward Self-Sufficiency
Analysis of ET participants’ and the comparison group’s FIP receipt
at six-month intervals after program enrollment addresses two
important questions:
•
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•

What are participants’ rates of progress toward self-sufficiency
compared to those of FIP participants not enrolled in the
program?

Table 7 shows the results of this analysis for both groups. There is
a consistent increase in the percentage of both ET and comparison
group members, leaving FIP at successive six-month intervals of the
study period. Comparison group members are more likely to exit
FIP during the first twelve months than ET participants, These
results are consistent with the design of the ET program, in which
the first several months of the program are devoted to training,
acquiring financing, and business start-up activities. After business
opening, the FIP waiver allows twelve months of business operation
without interruption of the FIP grant. Continuation of FIP benefits
during the initial 12 months of business growth is critical to the viability of self-employment as a self-sufficiency strategy for welfare
recipients. Consequently, substantial decreases in FIP receipt cannot
reasonably be expected before 18 to 24 months after enrollment.
At 18 months after enrollment, there is no longer a significant difference in FIP exit rates for the two groups. However, at 36 months,
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ET participants surpass those in the comparison group in rates of
leaving FIP at a statistically significant level (p<.001). At 42
months, there is again no difference between these participants)
rates of FIP exit, but at 48 and 54 months, the percentage of ET participants leaving FIP is significantly higher than the comparison
group’s percentage.
The above analysis of the percentages of each group no longer
receiving FIP does not identify the rate of each groups’ FIP receipt
during the entire study period. Because individuals may exit FIP but
return, additional analysis was completed comparing each groups’
rate of FIP receipt after enrollment. Table 8 displays (1) the average

possible months of FIP receipt, (2) the average actual months of FIP
receipt, and (3) the average percent of months off FIP for ET participants and the comparison group.
As Table 8 shows, each group could have received FIP for an average of 36.43 months from the date of enrollment through June 30,
1998. Because the program has been operating since July 1, 1993,
and participants have enrolled at various times, the possible number
of months individuals could have received FIP after enrollment
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ranged from 13 to 60. The average months ET participants actually
received FIP was 20.19 months, in contrast to 20.60 for the comparison group members—a difference of only 0.41 months. ET participants’ average percent of months not receiving FIP during the study
period was 41.56%, while the comparison group’s was 41.44%, a difference of only 0.12%.
Means for the above variables were compared using t-tests for
independent samples. Significant differences were found for the
average months on FIP and the average percent of months on and
off FIP. On average, ET participants received FIP for 0.41 months
(about twelve days) more than the participants in the comparison
group and were on FIP for 0.12% more months during the study
period. These differences are statistically significant. However, their
practical significance is questionable.
A five-year independent evaluation of ISED’s Entrepreneurial
Training Program indicates that microenterprise development
works for a small but significant percentage of welfare recipients as
a strategy for self-sufficiency. Further, the data suggest that selfemployment is a self-sufficiency strategy that requires a greater initial investment of time than other self-sufficiency strategies require.
However, the long-term payoff in terms of rates of exiting FIP and
job creation, both for ET participants and employees they hire, suggests that this strategy merits the initial investment required.
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Village Banking
Dynamics Study:
Evidence from
Seven Programs
by Judith Painter
and Barbara MkNelly
ABSTRACT: The primary question examined in this study is whether
client loans grow or stagnate over time. Loan growth is important to
financial sustainability and is also a proxy for positive impact. The
relationship between loan growth and a variety of factors—program
loan and savings policies, site selection, membership dynamics—are
explored in the context of seven village bank programs. The study concludes that on average, loan size did not stagnant but increased
steadily, although at a rate lower than the original village bank model
projections. Only programs that allowed non-poverty level loans
(loans above US$300) approached the original loan growth rate. Other
factors positively associated with more rapid loan growth were urban
site selection and restricted internal fund policies. Membership turnover—influx of new clients and drop-out of original clients—was also
evident across all programs, dampening loan growth rates by approximately 25%. While factors external to the program affect these dynamics, program policies can play an important role in stemming the
drop-out rate. In early loan cycles, initial program promotion and orientations need to clearly articulate program requirements and terms.
In later loan cycles, policies pertaining to savings access, meeting frequency, and membership requirements may require flexing to enhance
clients’ incentives to remain.
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Introduction
The primary question examined in this study is whether client loans
grow or stagnate over time. Village bank programs are established
with the ultimate goal of reducing poverty and raising the income
and quality of life of their clientele. The ability of borrowers to
work and to repay progressively larger loans is a proxy indicator for
the viability of loan activities and poverty alleviation at the client
level. To accomplish these impact goals, programs recognize the
need for financially sustainable operations. Financial sustainability
of village bank programs presumes a declining cost per dollar loaned
as members’ loans grow and as new clientele join existing banks.
Therefore, if loan sizes are indeed stagnating, it is important to
understand why. The questions below set forth specific areas of
study in relation to loan-size growth:
1.

What is the average loan size in practice versus the original
model developed by FINCA International president John
Hatch, and what are the key factors affecting loan-size growth?

2.

Does program location—urban versus rural—affect loan-size
growth?

3.

What is the actual savings rate in practice versus the original
Hatch model? What key factors affect borrower savings and
how do borrower savings affect average loan size?

4.

What are the actual membership dynamics (dropout, drop-in,
and client retention rates) as compared to the original Hatch
model? What factors affect membership dynamics, and to what
degree do they affect loan-size growth rates?
.............................................................................

Ms. Painterformerly workedfor Catholic Relief Services and FINCA International and
is currently an independent consultant. Ms. MkNelly works for Freedom from Hunger
as a technical advisor for evaluation.
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5.

How does internal account lending affect average loan size (of
external loans)? What factors affect the degree of internal
account lending?

The intention here is not to assess the accuracy of the original
model, but rather to learn from the experiences and adaptations of
a number of organizations implementing village bank programs
since the model was introduced. Specifically, this study sought to
improve the understanding of village banking dynamics and identify
particularly influential factors affecting program performance over
time.
Box 1 summarizes the per borrower loan and savings projections
of the original Hatch model. Underlying the original model are a
number of basic assumptions:
•
First-cycle entrants will remain active borrowers for nine fourmonth cycles (three years).
•

Village banks will grow in size as new members, encouraged
by the example of others, join the program.

•

Clients will save 20% of their current loan size each cycle.
Loan sizes increase based on a formula of last loan plus accumulated savings (see Box 1).

•

Based on this formula, clients, primarily women, will borrow
a progression of loans starting at US$50 and reaching the
US$300 loan ceiling by the third year.
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•

The projected loan-size growth rate is 500% over a 28-month
period.

Methodology
Five nonprofit organizations, CARE, FINCA, Freedom from
Hunger, Women’s Opportunity Fund, and World Relief, all of
which are members of the Small Enterprise Education and
Promotion Network (SEEP) Poverty Lending Working Group, participated in the study. Each organization collected longitudinal
information from a sample of village banks in one or two of their
programs. Data were collected from a total of 26 village banks
(totaling more than 700 members) operating in Bolivia, Burkina
Faso, Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras (two programs, one rural
and one urban), and Uganda. Still, the sampled programs represent
only one or two sites of the participating agencies’ larger program
portfolios. In recognition of the lag-time since data collection, and
to encourage openness and objectivity, programs are identified in
this paper only by geographic areas rather than by implementing
agency.
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Village bank records were sampled to provide information about
member loans, savings, internal borrowing, and participation for
selected loan cycles (first, third, fifth, and last completed loan
cycle), using a protocol originally developed by Freedom from
Hunger. In order to conduct a comparison of actual program
dynamics to the original Hatch model, the village banks in the
study needed to have reached a certain maturity (of six cycles).
Across all the village banks sampled, the last completed loan cycle
occurred on average approximately 35 months into the program.
This average was calculated across village banks at each program
level and then across the seven programs for a cumulative average.
In addition, because programs had different loan-cycle lengths (fouror six-month cycles), information is presented by number of
months in the program at the end of the loan cycle, as well as the
loan cycle number, for uniform comparison purposes.

Findings
The study explores five major factors found to affect loan-size
growth: loan policies and practices, village bank location, savings
policies, internal account policies, and membership dynamics.
The first section presents information on the pattern of actual loan
growth for the seven programs, relative to the original Hatch
model. Subsequent sections examine how policies, setting, and
membership dynamics were related to the loan growth rates in various programs.

Loan Growth Patterns
What is the actual pattern of per borrower loan growth versus the
Hatch model?
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On average, loan size across all seven programs did not stagnate,
but increased steadily, although at a rate lower than the original
Hatch model projections.
On average, the loan growth in Figure 1 shows a steady increase
across the seven programs, although at a rate less than the original
model. The original model projected that loan sizes would grow by
500% (from US$50 to US$300) over an approximately three-year
period. For the seven programs examined here, the average per borrower loan size grew by 280% (from US$62 to US$173) over a similar period. While the growth rate was not as dramatic as projected,
a pattern of loan-size stagnation is not evident since, on average, the
per borrower loan size continues to climb.

Diversity in Average Loan Sizes by Program
There was tremendous variability in average program loan growth
rates and patterns across the seven sampled programs.
The averages presented in Figure 1 mask the tremendous variability in loan-size growth across the seven programs. As seen in Figure
2, two of the seven programs actually experienced relatively rapid
and high loan growth rates (Uganda and Colombia). One program,
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Guatemala, had high loan growth but over a longer, four-year
period; one program had modest but steady growth (Burkina Faso);
three had relatively flat loan-size patterns (Honduras-urban,
Bolivia, and Honduras-rural).

1

Key Factors Influencing Loan Size
Village banking programs typically select a maximum initial loan
size and a loan-size ceiling beyond which individual clients cannot
borrow regardless of their length of time in the program. Programs
also have various formulas by which individual clients can become
eligible for larger loans. The specifics of the loan policies, as well as
ancillary services such as internal loans and savings, influence loansize growth rates. In addition, the commercial development and
opportunity in the program area can influence a borrower’s ability
to use larger loans. Finally, the membership dynamics of longerterm clients leaving the program and new members joining can also
serve to dampen loan-size growth rates.
In order to facilitate comparison of how program policies and context might influence loan growth rates, the seven programs in the
study were divided into three groups based on third-year average
individual loan-size data from each village bank (see Table 1). The
high-range category (with an average loan size of more than
US$200) consists of the Colombia and Uganda programs; the midrange category (with an average loan of close to US$150) consists of
Honduras-urban and Guatemala; the low-range category (with an
average loan of less than US$100) consists of Burkina Faso, Bolivia,
and Honduras-rural.
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Loan-Size Policies
If consistently applied, the initial loan-size ceilings reduce average
loan size, especially for programs with a large influx of new members joining after the first loan cycle.
In five of the seven programs, initial loan sizes are more than the
US$50 projected by the original model. The range of initial loan
sizes span from US$50 to US$80 across the programs. Therefore, it
is not surprising that most programs equal or exceed original model
projections in the early cycles. Also influential to loan growth rates
was whether the initial loan-size policy was applied to first-time
borrowers joining after the first loan cycle. Guatemala showed 35%
of new entrants in the last reported loan cycle receiving loans
greater than US$100—raising the overall average in later months.
Uganda, on the other hand, experienced a sharp drop in loan size,
partly because of a large influx of new borrowers. If consistently
applied, the initial loan-size policy can reduce the overall average
loan size of a program with a large influx of new members who have
smaller loans.
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Maximum Loan Size
Programs with average loan sizes closer to the amounts predicted by
the original Hatch model had approximately 30% of their clients
taking loans of more than US$300. Program loan ceilings in some
cases were nonexistent or were as high as US$1,000 per borrower.
Programs with the lowest average loans consistently applied a
US$300 loan ceiling.
The maximum loan size or loan ceiling policy was even more
influential to the patterns of loan-size growth in the sampled programs. A commonly applied definition for poverty lending is loans
of US$300 or less. While the original model assumes all loans will
be US$300 or less, the three programs with the highest average loan
sizes—Uganda, Colombia, and Guatemala—had loan-ceiling policies
well above this amount. Table 2 shows the loan-ceiling policy and
the percentage of clients in each program receiving loans above
US$300 by the fifth and last reported cycles. It is interesting to note
that in three of the seven programs (Uganda, Guatemala and
Honduras-urban), borrowers were allowed to take loans larger than
the program’s stated loan-ceiling policy.
The relatively sharp climb in loan size during the first 20 months
of the Uganda program is related to the fact that initially, the program applied no loan ceiling. The later introduction of a maximum
loan size of US$600 and a major decline in retention of original borrowers between the fifth and last reported cycles, contributed to a
decline in the average loan size after the 20th month.2 Still, it is
important to note that approximately 30% of the borrowers in the
fifth and last completed loan cycles took loans in excess of US$300.
Only three of the seven programs had a policy of limiting loans to
a maximum of US$300. The two programs that did consistently
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apply the US$300 poverty-lending ceiling—Honduras-rural and
Bolivia—also had the most modest program growth rates. The fact
that only two programs have a poverty-lending ceiling of US$300
begs the question whether a certain portion of the loan portfolio
must be allocated to nonpoverty lending in order to achieve the
original loan growth-rate projections.

Rural vs. Urban Location and Average Loan-Size Growth
The urban programs had an average loan size of US$205 at 28
months, as compared to only US$98 at 32 months for the three
rural programs. An urbanization trend is apparent in village banking worldwide as more programs move to urban and peri-urban centers in order to facilitate fast portfolio growth and expansion.
As might be expected, the level of commercial economic activity
in the program area appears to impact per borrower loan size. All
the village banks in the lowest average loan-size category by year
three were in rural areas (see Table 1). An urbanization trend is
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apparent in village banking worldwide as more programs move to
urban and peri-urban centers in order to facilitate fast portfolio
growth and expansion (Nelson, et al., 1996). The programs in the
study sample mirror this trend: approximately half of the sampled
village banks were located in urban or peri-urban areas.
The dampening effect that less vibrant economic activity can have
on loan size is even more evident among the rural banks in Bolivia
and Honduras; those in less commercially developed areas have
average loan amounts of 2.5 times less than those in more developed
areas (MkNelly & Stack, 1996). This disparity was evident in the
Honduras-rural program, where none of the four village banks sampled were located in a town.
Locating banks in areas with more economic or commercial activity results in faster loan-growth rates and higher average loans.
Rurally oriented programs face the double challenge of working
with clientele more costly to reach who may have lower or inconsistent credit needs. Of course, one of the original goals of village
banking programs was to provide rural households with improved
access to credit. An overemphasis on the need for rapid loan-growth
rates and financial sustainability are likely to shift the focus away
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from the less profitable rural operations to areas with more active
economic development.

Savings
What is the savings rate in practice versus the original Hatch model?
Like average loan-size, savings rates fall short of the original Hatch
model by the third year. Perhaps more important than savings
requirements are the incentives inherent in savings policies, such as
access and return through dividends and interest.
Figure 3 illustrates that savings rates, like loan rates, fall short of
the original Hatch model by the third year. Since village bank programs no longer aim to “graduate,” there is less of an imperative to
require borrowers to save US$300 in order to replace their ninth
and final program loan. Still, most village bank programs link borrowers’ loan-size eligibility to the amount of savings they have on
deposit with their village bank. For this reason, it is possible that
clients’ ability or inability to save could act as a brake on loan-size
growth rates.
Table 3 groups programs by high, medium, and low average savings in year three. The Uganda program had the highest average savings per borrower (US$179), which at 28 months exceeded the
amount projected by the original Hatch model. It is interesting to
note that two of the programs in the highest savings grouping—
Bolivia and Honduras-urban—were categorized as low- to mid-range
in terms of average loan size. The Bolivia program, in particular,
had a high savings-to-loan ratio of 189%. Both the urban and rural
village banks in Honduras also had relatively high savings-to-loan
ratios approaching 100%.
In the original model, the savings-to-loan ratio was projected to be
nearly one-to-one by the eighth cycle, with savings at US$275 and
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the loan capped off at US$300. While most of the programs had relatively high savings-to-loan ratios (above 80%), those with the
smallest average loan sizes—Honduras-rural, Honduras-urban, and
Bolivia—are among the highest, at 96%, 99%, and 189%, respectively. These ratios indicate that many members can reach the point
where they could capitalize themselves and graduate from the program. Yet many clients continue to borrow because they value
building their savings while at the same time having access to credit.
Still, over time, these high savings to loan ratios might be expected
to lead to client dropout unless clients have liberal access to their
savings and they earn some return on their savings.
Savings requirements and policies linking loan-size eligibility to
savings do not hinder loan growth directly or even show close correlation to savings rates. However, restricted access to savings may
indirectly affect loan growth by causing member resignation.
Dividend payments based partly on borrowers’ savings and liberal
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access to internal loans is related to very high savings-to-loan ratios,
even when savings requirements are relatively small.
For the programs included in the study, the savings incentives
inherent in program policies were more influential to savings rates
than were the stated savings requirements. High internal account
access, along with guaranteed returns through dividends, culminated in high savings-to-loan ratios in those programs which offered
internal loans.

Internal Account Policies
Liberal internal lending policies did detract from external account
loan growth in three programs. This phenomenon was most evident
for programs in which external loan repayment installments were
included as part of the internal fund.
How does internal account lending affect the average loan size (of
the external account)?
Internal account loans were originally conceived as a source of
complementary short-term loans, which could serve consumption
and emergency needs or supplement external loan amounts for
those borrowers whose working capital needs exceeded the amount
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allowed by the program. In this scenario, the internal account does
not compete with the external account. The same is true when the
internal account is lent mainly to individuals outside the village
bank. The original long-range purpose of the internal account supplanting the external account through graduation is no longer followed. Therefore, programs are carefully examining their internal
account policies and the ways these policies will affect the program
goals of poverty alleviation and financial sustainability.
Figure 4 shows that internal account lending relative to external
borrowing was significant in only three programs—Bolivia,
Honduras-rural, and Guatemala. Among the programs surveyed,
unrestricted access to internal account loans seems to have detracted
from external-account activity, lowering external account loan size
(MkNelly & Stack, 1996). By the end of the third year in Bolivia,
the average internal loan was US$129, compared to the external
loan of US$82. Because members had ready access to internal, as
well as to external loans, a true picture of borrower demands for
and use of loan capital requires examination of the total amount of
loans borrowers took (internal plus external loans).
Comparing the average total loans (external plus internal) by program to the original Hatch model reveals an even more pronounced
pattern of loan growth rate over time. In Figure 2 and Table 1, the
external loan growth for the Bolivia and Honduras-rural programs
was relatively modest and flat, but the total loan amounts, US$211
and US$165 respectively, are much closer to the original model projections. The Guatemala program also had relatively active internal
borrowing and a total loan that was 40% greater than the average
program loan.
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Key Factors Affecting the Degree
of Internal Account Lending
Aspects of the internal account that borrowers find attractive are
instructive to village banking practitioners. In those programs
where internal and external loan terms differ, clients preferred the
lump sum rather than weekly repayment schedule. The requirements of weekly repayment and weekly meetings over time act as
disincentives to program participation and increased borrowing
from the external account.
The major factor affecting the degree of internal account lending
is the program policies dictating borrower access to internal loans.
There is considerable range in the internal loan policies. Two programs—Honduras-urban

and

Burkina

Faso—allowed

no

internal

account lending. At the other extreme, the Bolivia and Hondurasrural programs allowed unrestricted lending of the internal account,
which included repayment installments on the external loans. The
Guatemala program also allowed unrestricted internal lending of
member
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installments. The Colombia and Uganda programs had more restrictive and less flexible internal loan policies.
The relatively high internal loan amounts seen in the Bolivia and
Honduras-rural programs can also be explained by the fact that only
with these two programs did the external loan payments flow
through the internal account. This blending of external payments
into the internal account is the main distinguishing factor behind
the high internal account rates of Honduras-rural and Bolivia.
The programs with more active internal lending also offered terms
different from external loans, which terms borrowers found attractive. The Bolivia, Honduras-rural, and Guatemala programs all
allowed borrowers to repay their internal loans (principal plus
interest) in a lump sum rather than in regular weekly installments.
Borrowers also appreciated the fact that the interest they paid on
internal loans accrued to the village bank itself and was paid out to
members as dividends.
Due to restrictive internal-account policies, programs such as
Uganda and Colombia had little internal-account lending. The
Uganda program required a 30% cash reserve, forbade internal lending until the third cycle, and limited internal lending to 5% of the
external loan amount. The Colombia program limited the amount
of internal lending allowed, with greater emphasis on lending to
nonembers than members. In addition, the internal account terms
were similar to those of the external loans, in that weekly repayment
was required and a limit was put on the amount that could be lent.

Participation Rates
Sustained borrowers make up only 65% of the membership by the
end of the first year, approximately 50% by the end of the second
year, and only 35% by the end of the third year. Inconsistent borVolume 1 Number 1
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rowing and late joiners dampen loan-size growth. The average loan
size of sustained borrowers was approximately 25% higher than the
loan-size averages for the general village bank membership at the
end of the third year.
What are the membership dynamics in practice as compared to the
original Hatch model? The Hatch model projects that membership
starts at approximately 30 and increases to no more than 50 after the
first few cycles (Hatch, 1989). While it is expected that new members will join in later cycles, the model does not account for the
financial implications of original members leaving the program.
Figure 5 illustrates the actual membership dynamics by comparing
the average number of active borrowers per village bank to the average number of borrowers sustained from the first to the last completed loan cycles. Average membership per bank remains at
approximately 28, while the number of sustained borrowers who
joined in the first cycle decreases to 10, or about one-third of the
original membership, by month 35.
By the end of the first year, 65% of the first-cycle borrowers were
still active in their village banks and had consistently borrowed in
each of the first three loan cycles. Near the end of year two, 53% of
the borrowers had consistently borrowed since the first loan cycle.
This number dropped to 35% by the end of year three. It is not possible to say whether these numbers represent relatively high or low
rates of sustained borrowing as compared to other credit methodologies, because little empirical evidence is available to make such a
comparison. In any case, these membership dynamics run counter
to the original model’s assumption that clients will demand steadily
increasing loans every four to six months over a three-year period.
The most dramatic exit of first-cycle borrowers occurs in the village bank’s first year. One theory behind this fact is that the first
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three cycles are a period of “weeding out,” as clients come to better
understand the requirements of the system and the premium placed
on on-time repayment. Members with other options for acquiring
working capital, perhaps the wealthier members, may decide to
resign completely or suspend loans temporarily. Despite this lack of
consistent clientele, overall program loan growth rates do show
steady increases for most of the programs.
The number of members joining after the first cycle is also dramatic. By the end of the first year, 35% of the active borrowers had
joined after the first loan cycle. As the village banks approach the
end of their second year, the percentage of borrowers who joined
after the first loan cycle rises to 54%, and to a little more than 70%
by the end of year three. This phenomenon of late joiners is consistent with Hatch’s original theory that those more risk-averse (usually the very poor) will join after having the opportunity to observe
the program for some time. The risk takers (usually those with
more income) tend to join first, but they also leave more quickly if
the requirements of the village bank are too taxing on their time.
Discussions with late joiners in the Honduras-rural program
revealed that some had not heard about the program, some did not
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join at the time because they had young children, and others were
afraid to join because they did not fully understand how the program worked or they were hesitant to assume a loan.
Also evident in the data were those individuals who enter and exit
the program numerous times for various reasons. Some of these
individuals joined as of the first loan cycle, left in a later cycle, and
then rejoined. Others joined after the first loan cycle and followed
a similar pattern of leaving and returning in later cycles. These
intermittent borrowers represented only approximately 10% of the
entire sample, and therefore did not have a significant effect on the
overall trends. However, this dynamic of suspending borrowing for
one or more cycles at a time does have programmatic implications.
Practitioners should be aware of this element in planning projections, and program loan policies should accommodate inconsistent
borrowing while not penalizing the member.
The dropout of longer-term consistent borrowers and the drop-in
of new borrowers both have the same effect—a reduction in average
loan size. First-time borrowers commonly start at the initial maximum loan size, which averages US$62. Thus, a program with a low
resignation rate but a high late joiner or drop-in rate will also experience a dampening of average loan-size growth. Figure 6 plots the
average loan size of sustained borrowers, relative to that of all borrowers as well as to the original Hatch model projections. By the
end of year three, the sustained borrowers’ average loan size was
US$218 as compared to US$173 for all borrowers, and was 73% of
the model projection as compared to only 60% for all borrowers.
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Sustained Participation and Average Loan Size
Among Individual Programs
The program with the highest sustained borrower rate (Guatemala)
had relatively flexible program policies—high loan ceilings, liberal
access to internal loans, and lump-sum rather than weekly repayment—that may have been sufficient incentive to keep borrowers
active in the program.
If client drop-out was a major cause for slow loan-growth rates,
programs with high rates of sustained borrowing should have relatively high average loan sizes. However, this relationship was not
consistently found among the programs included in the study.
Programs in Colombia, Guatemala, and Burkina Faso had the highest retention rate (40% or higher) of first-cycle borrowers in the
third year of operation. These programs represented all three different average loan-size categories: high (Colombia), medium
(Guatemala), and low (Burkina Faso).3 Those with the lowest retention rate, Honduras-rural and Bolivia (30% and 17% respectively),
show higher savings rates and relatively low program loans but
midrange total loan amounts.
Guatemala had the highest retention rate of sustained borrowers
at month 30 (67%). Its relatively high loan ceilings, liberal access to
internal account lending, and more flexible repayment requirements
may have been sufficient incentive to keep borrowers active in the
program. The Guatemala program allowed borrowers to repay program loans in lump sum payments at the end of the loan cycle rather
than weekly. After the fifth loan cycle, required meetings are
biweekly rather than weekly. In addition, refresher training is given
periodically in Guatemala regarding bank regulations that may also
contribute to higher sustained participation.
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In Burkina Faso, the program’s initial policy of graduating village
banks after the ninth loan cycle may have contributed to a relatively high drop-out rate toward the end of year three. Colombia’s
retention rate, 48% in month 24, was close to the overall average of
53% in month 22. It is difficult to tell if this trend would have continued into the third year because later data are unavailable.

Causes of Resignation
Resignations are attributed to factors both internal and external to
program policy and practice. External factors include migration, illness, and inconsistent economic activity. Early-cycle resignation is
more tied to lack of compliance with group regulations, whereas
late-cycle resignation is linked with inconvenience of weekly meetings and limited savings access.
Several of the programs participating in the study conducted
informal discussion groups with staff and clients on the major reasons why clients leave the village bank programs. 4 Based on this
feedback, the following factors were the most common causes of
resignation.
1.

Expulsion by fellow members for delinquency or default. This
group includes members who did not fully appreciate the regulations when they joined, and consequently resigned early.
This may be one reason behind the rapid reduction in sustained membership (35%) between the first and third cycles.

2.

Seasonality, migration, or poor market or economic activity.
Inconsistent commercial or economic activity was cited in four
out of seven programs as causing resignation or, more often,
intermittent borrowing.

3.

Dissatisfaction with weekly payments. Not only did borrowers see weekly meetings and payments as time-consuming, but
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the meetings also reduced the amount of time borrowers had
to use the loan as working capital, and increased the real interest rate of loans.
4.

Access to savings. Savings access only through the internal
account, which was limited in some programs, coupled with
no return shown in some programs, appeared to be a disincentive for continued participation. This was especially true in the
later cycles when savings amounts were more significant.

5.

Illness. Health problems often caused members to leave the
program or to halt borrowing temporarily.

Many of the causes behind resignation are outside program control and influence. Still, program policies can influence borrower
incentives to remain or to leave the program. Policies regarding earlier orientation and training are likely to have a greater effect on the
early dropouts, while greater programmatic flexibility will affect
the later-cycle member withdrawals.
Strategies that may increase loan size by increasing the sustained
participation of members include better orientation and follow-up
on regulations, reduced frequency of meetings and repayment
installment, more flexibility with inconsistent borrowing, and an
increase in savings access.

Conclusions
The experiences of these seven programs indicate that village banking clients are able to absorb loans of increasing size. In general,
average loan sizes, especially for sustained borrowers, do not stagnate at least for the first two to four years. When trends in average
total loans (external plus internal loans) are considered, six of the
seven programs exhibit patterns of variable but steady growth.
Although loan growth rates were slower than the 500% projected
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by the original Hatch model, average loan sizes do increase on average by 280% over an approximately three-year period. Without
comparable empirical data, it is not possible to say whether this represents relatively high or low growth rates relative to other credit
methodologies. The variability in loan growth rates for the seven
programs provides useful insight into the effect of various policies,
services, membership dynamics, and context on loan growth rates:
•

The Guatemala village banks demonstrated the most pronounced loan growth rates, perhaps in part due to their relatively longer program experience. But this good growth is also
likely explained by the program’s relatively flexible policies—
longer loan period, less-frequent repayment installments,
access to internal funds, and relatively high loan ceilings—and
its subsequently high rates of sustained client participation.

•

The Uganda program started off in its first two years with very
rapidly escalating loan growth rates, partly because no loan
ceilings were applied and some borrowers take relatively large
loans. However, this period of rapid growth is followed by a
decline in loan size when more restrictive policies, such as loan
ceilings, were put in place to better control loan-size growth
and repayment problems. These problems and new policies
were associated with major membership turnover, which
dampens average loan size.

•

The Bolivia and Honduras-rural programs are examples of the
dampening effect that unrestricted internal borrowing can
have on external loan growth rates.

•

The village banks from the Burkina Faso program illustrate
how the anticipation of graduation with its cessation of program services can lead to relatively high rates of program exit.
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The fact that poverty-lending programs usually cater to lowincome women, often mothers, indicates that the clientele profile
does not lend itself to rapid loan growth at the proposed rate of the
original model. Instead, this profile shows steady but modest loan
increases. Time frames for expected self-sufficiency may be skewed,
given client demand for loans. Although an examination of each
programs’ financial sustainability performance on the relationship
to loan-size growth rates is outside the scope of this study, it should
be considered for further review. As the pressures for sustainability
increase, so will the challenges for practitioners to continue to
evolve and innovate village bank programs to serve this clientele
with programs that are financially and institutionally sustainable.

Notes
1.

The Bolivia and Honduras-rural programs show a much more dramatic
increase in loan size when the total borrowing (external plus internal
loans) is taken into account (see Figure 6).

2.

3.
4.

The Uganda program also changed its loan eligibility formula from the
original model’s last loan plus total savings to first loan plus total savings
in an effort to better control loan amounts following a period of repayment problems.
As mentioned earlier, the devaluation of the FCFA in Burkina Faso deflates
the dollar average loan size.
Feedback from programs was not uniformly gathered on this issue. In
addition, the discussions were conducted primarily with current clients
rather than with members who had left the program.
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Are Grameen
Replications
Sustainable, and Do
They Reach the Poor?
The Case of CARD Rural
Bank in the Philippines
by Hans Dieter Seibel
and Dolores Torres
Abstract: The Grameen Bank in Bangladesh is known worldwide for
its success in providing credit to the poor. However, subsequent replications of its methodology in other parts of the world have been less
successful. Is there really an infallible solution that works everywhere,
and is outreach to the poor compatible with sustainability? A
Grameen replicator in the Philippines, the Center for Agriculture and
Rural Development (CARD), has recently set itself firmly on the path
to sustainability by becoming a formal sector, rural bank—the first
credit NGO in the country to do so. During the period, from 1993 to
June 1999, CARD’s all-female outreach soared from 1,711 to 26,369. Its
operational self-sufficiency ratio increased from 0.46 to 1.09. At the
end of June 1999, CARD’s loan portfolio stood at US$2.7 million, its
repayment rate was 99.9%, and its financial self-sufficiency ratio was
0.85. The principal lesson to be learned from the CARD’s success is
that Grameen-type microfinance institutions (MFIs) can be sustainable
and can substantially increase their outreach. CARD’s social capital
comprises (a) a core of good Grameen practices, such as high moral
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commitment on the part of the leaders, based on values instilled
through training; peer control, to preclude adverse selection and moral
hazard; and a strict credit discipline; (b) innovative adaptations to suit
the Philippine context, such as the adoption of rural bank status under
central bank supervision; vigorous mobilization of voluntary savings;
the provision of differentiated, profit-making loan and insurance products; and a broadening of the clientele to include poor and nonpoor
depositors, while adhering to its mission of lending to poor women
only.

Grameen Replicators in the Philippines
The Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, formally established in 1979, is
widely considered one of the world’s most successful financial institutions banking with the poor. In an effort to alleviate poverty,
donors have supported replication programs in numerous countries,
including the United States. The International Fund for
Agricultural Development (IFAD) of the United Nations was the
first major supporter of the Grameen Bank and has subsequently
assisted capacity-building in many replication programs. Assuming
that the only institutions capable in the long-run of reaching large
numbers of poor people are those that mobilize their own resources
and cover the costs from their income, donors are becoming increasingly concerned about the viability and sustainability of the
Grameen replicators. 1
The Philippines was one of the first countries to replicate Grameen
banking on a large scale. When the government program’s executing
agency—the Agricultural Credit Policy Council (ACPC)—examined
..........................................................................
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its experience with 27 replicators, 23 of which were still in existence
in June 1993, there were mixed conclusions. The repayment performance was impressive, averaging a rate of 96.8%, but the overall picture was dismal. The replication program was found to be
donor-driven. Internal resource mobilization appeared to be minimal. Interest rates were inadequate and administrative costs exorbitant, amounting to 47% of every peso lent and 170% of every peso
saved.’ The operational self-sufficiency ratio averaged 0.24. Noting
that “excessive brokering of low-cost funds may discourage savings
mobilization,” ACPC (1995) warned that “any attempt . . . to replicate or expand . . . should be carried out with great caution.” The
replicators were not sustainable, nor did they reach a significant
number of poor people, in a country with over 800 rural banks and
3,000 credit cooperatives (Seibel 1998).
In 1996, the Asian and Pacific Development Centre (APDC)—an
intergovernmental body of Asian-Pacific countries, based in Kuala
Lumpur—carried out an assessment of microfinance institutions
(MFIs) in 11 of these countries, with the support of UNDP. Included
in the study were seven MFIs from the Philippines, six of which
used the Grameen technique. By the end of 1995, the situation of
the sample replicators had improved generally, but the gap between
good and poor performers had widened. Transaction costs per peso
lent ranged from 0.19% to 1.30%, the operational self-sufficiency
ratio from 0.08% to 1.34%, and the full financial self-sufficiency
ratio (adjusted for subsidies received and for inflation) from 0.07%
to 1.18% (Getubig, Remenyi, & Quiñones, 1997; Seibel et al., 1998).
The only fully viable and sustainable institution among the seven
was a rural cooperative bank. The two best performers among the
credit NGOs quickly learned their lesson and decided to vie for sustainability and outreach. In order to mobilize savings legally, they
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applied for rural banking licenses, which would also bring them
under the supervision of the central bank and its prudent standards.
When the central bank raised the level of minimum capital requirements, one of the two applicants was forced to withdraw. The
remaining applicant, the Centre for Agriculture and Rural
Development (CARD), then received the required license to establish the rural bank. How did this event impact CARD’s outreach and
viability, and what were the innovations introduced by CARD in
order to meet the required standards of a rural bank? Behind these
questions lies a broader question: Is sustainability compatible with
outreach to the poor?

CARD: Unsustainable Beginnings as a Credit NGO
CARD was established in 1986 as one of many new NGOs inspired
by the onset of a new era in the Philippines after the downfall of the
Marcos regime. In January 1988, with the support of two small
grants, CARD began organizing the poor into mixed groups of 15 to
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45 members, then registered them as associations and channeled
standardized short-term microloans to each member, offering negotiable repayment schedules. This turned out to be a false start. After
eight months of operation, the only groups that had repaid their
loans were the two that had opted for monthly installments. The
remaining five, committed to lump sum repayment upon maturity,
defaulted. The overall repayment rate during the year was 68%.
Under pressure from international donors, CARD had to either
revamp its operations or close.
In late 1988, the president of CARD visited the Grameen Bank in
Bangladesh. Deeply impressed by the ability of the poor to engage
in income-generating activities and repay their loans on time, he
decided to adopt the Grameen approach for CARD and reorganized
the members of the various associations into groups of 5 and centers
of 30 members each. However, this change met with considerable
opposition. The complex Grameen discipline—which included
weekly meetings and the payment of weekly installments—was
greatly disliked, particularly by the men, and four of the associations left the project. However, 89 poor women agreed to participate in a pilot venture from January to December 1989. The results
were very positive. The credit discipline, which is one of the most
outstanding achievements of the Grameen approach, has produced
repayment rates of between 98% and 100% since 1994. This impressed the central bank so much that it consented to fully noncollateralized lending when CARD established itself as a rural bank
Because the rigid criteria enabled only the poor to gain access,
growth in active membership was slow initially, increasing from 89
members in 1989 to 1,711 in 1993. The years 1990-96 represented a
period of experimentation to modify the Grameen technology.
CARD developed its own training system and operations manual.
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Basically, it substituted six-month first-loans with one-year loans,
requested a minimum self-financing ratio of 25% from repeat borrowers, introduced a mutual life and accident insurance fund,
replaced group funds by center funds, offered multipurpose loans
for prime borrowers, added voluntary withdrawable savings (ignoring the law which prevents NGOs from collecting deposits), and
finally, provided a staff-incentive scheme. Active membership grew
from 1,711 in 1993 to 6,844 in 1996. By 1996, nonwithdrawable
compulsory savings stood at PHP12m, and voluntary savings at
PHP1m. The ratio of operational self-sufficiency, or viability, which
had declined from 0.31 in 1991 to 0.25 in 1992, increased to 0.46 in
1993 and rose to 0.77 in 1996.

Transformation into a Rural Bank
In May 1996, CARD submitted its application to establish a rural
bank,

and received approval in December of that year.

Consequently, CARD Rural Bank now falls under the regulations
and supervision of the central bank, which mobilizes an entirely
new quality of social capital.
CARD Rural Bank deposited PHP5m as paid-up capital with
Landbank, and formally opened on September 1, 1997. There are
now two separate institutions: CARD Rural Bank (five branches) for
full-fledged financial intermediation, and CARD NGO for group formation and guidance, including financial intermediation in areas
not covered by CARD Rural Bank. CARD NGO has 16 branches,
covering the island provinces of Masbate, Marinduque, and
Mindoro. An application for branching out has been submitted to
the central bank in order to bring all financial activities under the
umbrella of CARD Rural Bank (RB). Due to legal restrictions, CARD
NGO owns only 25% of CARD RB; the rest is owned by five board
122

Volume 1 Number 1

Are Grameen Replications Sustainable?
members and staff, who have entered into a trust agreement with
the NGO.
CARD’s transformation into a bank appears to have greatly facilitated its growth in outreach, which soared to 10,868 in 1997 and to
26,369 in June 1999. CARD RB has ambitious goals: 50,000 active
members by 2000 and 150,000 by 2002.
CARD Rural Bank offers passbook savings at 5% and fixed
deposits that range from a minimum of PHP10,000 for one month at
7% interest, to PHP500,000 for 12 months at 15%—all of which is
above the usual rates of commercial banks. As of July 1998, the savings deposit balance was PHP14m. There are five loan products, all
with weekly installments: regular loans, increasing from a first loan
of PHP2,000 to a fourth loan of PHP10,000; asset acquisition loans
up to PHP50,000; housing loans up to PHP20,000; short-term, multipurpose loans up to PHP5,000; and prime-borrower loans up to
PHP100,000. Maturity ranges from 12 to 75 weeks, but most are 50
weeks. Interest rates are a flat 20% plus an upfront service fee of
4%. Effective annual interest rates are approximately 45.6% to
53.8%.
In July 1998, CARD Rural Bank’s loan portfolio amounted to
PHP32m, and that of CARD NGO to PHP38m. By December 1998,
the portfolios had increased to PHP39m (6,530 borrowers) and
PHP44.3m (14,087 borrowers), respectively, a combined total of
PHP83.3m (20,617 borrow-ers). In June 1999, the total portfolio of
loans outstanding amounted to PHP2.7m. Deposits in December
1998 amounted to PHP14.8m (38.0% of loans outstanding) in CARD
Rural Bank and PHP10.9m (24.7% of loans outstanding) in CARD
NGO, totaling PHP25.8m (30.9% loans out-standing). Equity and
deposits together accounted for 37.0% of loans outstanding. In 1998,
both entities obtained a loan of PHP15m from the People’s Credit
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and Finance Corporation (PCFC), which is funded by the Asian
Development Bank (AsDB) and IFAD, with a 12% interest per
annum and a 1% annual service fee on the outstanding balance.
Other donors include CGAP and Grameen Trust.
CARD’s transformation into a rural bank, which included a
preparatory phase in 1996-97, provided the legal foundation for vigorous voluntary savings mobilization and put it quickly on the road
toward its desired goal of self-reliance and sustainability. The cost
efficiency ratio (cost per peso lent) improved from 0.69 in 1995 to
0.33 in 1997. The operational self-sufficiency ratio went from 0.46
in 1995 to 0.77 in 1996, 1.22 in 1997, 1.00 in 1998 (a decline due to
the addition of new branches), and 1.09 in June 1999. The financial
self-sufficiency ratio (adjusted for subsidies and inflation) grew from
0.38 in 1995 to 0.52 in 1996, 0.70 in 1997, and 0.85 in June 1999.
CARD’s branch viability (operational self-sufficiency ratio of at least
1.0) increased rapidly, from 1 out of 8 branches in 1995 to 4 out of
10 in 1996 and 8 out of 13 in 1997.
CARD Rural Bank has proven that outreach to the poor and viability are not only compatible but are mutually reinforcing. This is
also confirmed by Rojahn & Osner (1998), who observed that when
Grameen replicators are low in operational viability, they are also
low in outreach, while replicators high in viability are also high in
outreach. With regard to financial self-reliance and full financial
self-sufficiency, the Bank has made great progress in recent years.
However, continuous access to “easy” donor money might hamper
its vigorous efforts toward self-reliance and sustainability. This
issue may require some careful monitoring over the next few years.
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The Social Capital of a Successful Grameen
Replicator
Is the Grameen approach a type of social capital that can be
exported worldwide and meet with a success similar to that of the
Grameen Bank in Bangladesh? Does the Grameen approach provide
an optimal solution to the problem of how to provide financial services to the poor? Social capital is defined here, in the context of
microfinance, as the shared normative system of a group or an organization that shapes people’s capacity to work together and produce results according to the group’s—or organization’s—purpose.
The specific norms of a group or an organization are, in turn,
rooted in the more general norms and values of a society or a subsector. CARD Rural Bank, now part of the financial sector, falls
under the regulations and supervision of the central bank as the
norm enforcement agency. The consequent performance standards
imposed on it will support its drive toward sustainability and
economies of scale and scope, or wider outreach and product diversity. Such standards are missing among unregulated credit NGOs
and are not always enforced by soft-hearted donors. This social capital perspective is being pursued further in a separate study
(Quiñones, Seibel, & Llanto, 1999).
The outreach of some 30 Grameen replicators in the Philippines
(Seibel, 1998) has been negligible compared to the totality of financial services provided by other microfinance institutions. The replications were found to be donor-driven, and donor dependency has
undermined their viability. Only a few of the institutions were
found to be operationally self-sufficient, covering the costs directly
from their incomes. In some cases, even effective annual interest
rates of around 50% (or real rates, adjusted for inflation, of around
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40%) were not sufficient to cover the costs of the Grameen technology. However, all the institutions examined-the only ones that
have survived-have made some progress in this respect.
Nonetheless, sustainability, as measured by the financial self-sufficiency ratio, is in sight for only one of the replicating institutions
to date: CARD Rural Bank. The other replicators we looked at did
not even remotely approach an adequate level of internal resource
mobilization; nor had they earned sufficient revenue to cover the
costs of all their operating, financial, and loan loss expenses, and the
value of adjustments for subsidies and inflation. Paradoxically, the
biggest obstacle in the development of the Grameen replicators has
been donor support, a powerful incentive to substitute external
resources for local savings. 5 Only savings and other domestic
resources have a chance to grow dynamically: dole-outs do not. It
seems speculative at this point to predict whether or not financial
self-sufficiency might be reached by the other Grameen replicators.
Those who adhere to the pure and unadjusted Grameen technology
are, in the long-run, unlikely to withstand the growing competition
from other MFIs.
Do the Grameen replicators reach the poor, and are they sustainable? According to the limited evidence available to date, the answer
is that with the exception of one case, all the replicators are unsustainable and consequently are unable to reach a significant number
of poor people. It appears that the Grameen approach has no magic
formula and no best practice or unique and optimal solution that
may be applied around the world in order to alleviate poverty.
Perhaps no such optimal solution or best practice ever existed, or
may ever be found. However, some good practices may work for a
limited time under certain conditions and may compete with other
good practices.
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Several good practices contribute to the success of the one successful replicator: some are closely related to the basic Grameen
approach, and some are innovative. It appears that three good practices in particular constitute the hard core social capital of the original Grameen approach:
•

high moral commitment of leaders, based on values enforced
through training

•

peer selection and peer enforcement, precluding adverse selection and moral hazard

•

credit discipline, including weekly installments, rigid insistence on timely repayment, and repeat loans of increasing
amounts, contingent on repayment performance.
It further appears that some innovative features, which are modi-

fications of the classical replication model, constitute additional
core social capital dimensions:
•

local rural bank status

•

deposit mobilization from the poor and nonpoor through differentiated products with attractive interest rates

•

demand-driven, differentiated loan and insurance products
which cover all costs and risks

•

client differentiation through different-size loan and deposit
products.
We may hypothesize that Grameen-type MFIs in the Philippines

are likely to be successful only to the extent that they implement
criteria like those above—and unsuccessful to the extent they fail to
do so. We tentatively consider the good practices listed above as
being the essence of the social capital of Grameen-type institutions,
at least in the Philippines. Whether or not this is the case worldwide
remains to be seen. Depending on the policy environment, legal
framework, microfinance infrastructure, and particular circumVolume 1 Number 1
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stances, most of these practices may be recommended for emulation, both by Grameen and non-Grameen MFIs, albeit not mechanically.

Conclusion
The principal lesson is that if a Grameen-type MFI registers as a
bank, mobilizes its own re-sources through differentiated savings
products, offers differentiated loan and insurance products which
cover all costs and risks, and provides larger-size loan and deposit
products to its poor and near-poor members, it has a good chance of
becoming viable and financially self-sufficient. At the same time, it
can continue to adhere to its mission and substantially increase its
outreach to poor women. However, whether or not an MFI will do
all of this depends on its management and board. According to
CARD’s experience, funding from donors can contribute to outreach and sustainability, but only if these donors refrain from interference and respect the institution’s autonomy. To date, no
regulatory authority supervises and enforces these good Grameen
banking requirements in the Philippines. The lack of a definition of
prudential norms and good practices for Grameen replicators in the
Philippines, and of an effective delegated system of supervision
under the ultimate authority of the central bank, is perhaps the
greatest weakness of the Grameen replication program. The establishment of such a regulatory system might be a new field for donor
support.

Notes
1

Viability is measured by the operational self-sufficiency ratio: Financial
Income (Financial Costs + Operating Costs + Loan Loss Provision).
Sustainability has two aspects: (a) measured by the financial self-sufficiency ratio, it refers to the extent to which an institution not only covers
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its operational costs but also preserves the value of its resources by
accounting for subsidies and the effects of inflation: Financial Income
(Financial Costs + Operating Costs + Loan Loss Provision + Imputed
Cost of Capital); (b) measured by the internal resources ratio, it refers to
the extent to which an MFI mobilizes its own financial resources internally
instead of depending on government, donor, or commercial funding:
(Equity + Retained Earnings + Deposits)/Average Performing Assets. In
donor-driven MFIs, the donations and grants ratio is more popular:
(Donation + Grants)/Average Performing Assets (SEEP 1995).
Conversion of pesos into US dollar has been somewhat problematic since
1997. From 1991 to mid-1997, exchange rates were fairly steady, fluctuating between PHP25.7 and PHP27.5. Affected by the Asian financial crisis,
the peso depreciated from a monthly average of PHP27.6 in July 1997 to
PHP37.5 in December 1997, with an annual average of PHP28.6. During
1998, monthly averages fluctuated between PHP38.4 and a peak PHP43.6
in September, ending with PHP39.0 in December, and an annual average of
PHP40.7.
CARD received support from IFAD through a training grant to CASHPOR
in 1998 to establish a Grameen Bank Replica-tion Training Methodology
within the Philippines. Recently CARD has gained access to PCFC, a
national apex organization for the refinancing of MFIs, which is funded by
AsDB and IFAD. Other donors include CGAP and Grameen Bank.
CARD (1998) is prepared to share its experience (card@msc.net.ph). Since
1996, it has trained 2,500 people in courses of one to two weeks’ length.
Training is conducted in English, at PHP500 (US$11.50) per day.
This conclusion is shared by the authors of a GTZ study of the financial
sector in the Philippines, who “do not recommend promoting Grameen
Bank replicators at the institutional level because the model is not currently implemented in a sustainable manner in the Philippines.” This is
seen in the context of “the need to revise the system of incentives created
by national and international donors. These have accorded precedence to
disbursing short-term credit to target groups over the institutional and
financial sustainability of the programs and institutions” (Bieding et al.
1998:79).
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The Microcredit
Summit’s Challenge:
Working Toward
Institutional Financial SelfSufficiency While Maintaining
a Commitment to Serving the
Poorest Families
by David S. Gibbons
and Jennifer W. Meehan
ABSTRACT: Institutional financial self-sufficiency (IFS) is necessary for
a microfinance institution (MFI) to obtain the large amount of funds
required to reach and benefit truly large numbers of the poor and
poorest households. There is no necessary trade-off between serving
large numbers of the poorest households and the attainment of IFS by
an MFI, as proven by the case studies in this paper.
Cost-effective identification of the poor and the poorest women is
essential to maximizing the effectiveness and efficiency of providing
microfinance services to them. If the service is not exclusively for the
poor and the poorest, it should be operated separately for them to
minimize leakage to the nonpoor.
The total cost of efficient microcredit to the poor, i.e., the appropriate interest rate, will vary between 35% and 51% of their average
loans outstanding, depending on the conditions under which it is provided, and on the quality of the loan portfolio.
The poorest women in Asia, Africa, and Latin America are proving
that they can and will pay the required cost of this opportunity to
reduce their poverty and to provide a better future for their children.
This is made possible by the impressive returns to their microenterprises, averaging normally more than 100%.

Journal of Microfinance
Introduction
Working toward institutional financial self-sufficiency (IFS) is essential for microfinance institutions (MFIs) to reach and benefit significant numbers of the poorest households—those living in the
4

bottom 50% of the poverty group —with financial services for
poverty reduction. IFS reflects an MFI’s “ability to operate at a level
of profitability that allows sustained service delivery with minimum
or no dependence on donor inputs” (Christen, Rhyne, Vogel, &
McKean, 1995, p. vi), international agencies, or charitable organizations. We believe that only by pursuing commercially motivated,
for-profit strategies will MFIs, particularly those working with the
poorest, achieve our primary goal of reducing poverty among truly
large numbers of the poor and poorest. The argument for IFS is well
known:
As MF[I]s begin to wean themselves away from their dependence
on subsidies and start to adopt the practices of good banking
they will be forced to further innovate and lower costs. Not
only may this ultimately mean better service for poor borrowers, but more importantly, it is argued that as MF[I]s become
profitable they will be able to increasing[ly] tap into the vast
ocean of private capital funding. If this happens the microfinance sector as a whole will soon be greatly leveraging the limited pool of donor funds and massively increasing the scale of
outreach in ways that it is hoped could begin to make a truly significant dent on world poverty. 5 (Conning, 1998, p. 2)

IFS is defined as the ability of an MFI to cover all actual operating
expenses, as well as adjustments for inflation and subsidies, with
adjusted income generated through its financial services operations.
Inflation adjustments are twofold: (1) to account for the negative
impact, or cost of inflation, on the value of your equity and (2) to
account for the positive impact of the revaluation of nonfinancial
................................................................................
Mr. Gibbons is managing director of CASHPOR Financial and Technical Seruices. Ms.
Meehan is financial advisor for the same organization.
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assets and liabilities for the effects of inflation. Similarly, there are
two types of subsidies which must be adjusted for (1) explicit subsidies to properly account for direct donations received by an MFI to
cover operating expenses, and (2) implicit subsidies to account for
loans received by an MFI at below market rates, and in-kind donations such as rent-free facilities, staff paid by third-parties, technical
assistance, and the use of a third party infrastructure (e.g., commu6

nication facilities, etc.). In analyzing an MFI’s performance, such
adjustments are necessary, since MFIs often operate in highly inflationary environments and receive significant support from third
parties—such as government or donors—in the form of implicit subsidies. The adjustments take this support into account and allow an
MFI to understand the potential commercial viability of its financial
services operations. This is done by comparing adjusted operating
income to adjusted operating expenses. If the figure is greater than
1.0, we say an MFI has reached IFS. If IFS has not been achieved, the
withdrawal of such “support” could ultimately result in the failure
of an MFI, with potentially disastrous effects on the poor clients
being served.
So MFIs wanting to reach and benefit truly large numbers should
consciously work toward IFS. This does not, of course, mean that
IFS should be attained at the cost of the overriding goal of poverty
reduction. That would defeat the purpose for which we are working—which is not profit as an end in itself, but poverty reduction.
Rather it means that IFS should be pursued at a rate that is consistent with substantial poverty reduction. Attainment of both goals
must be monitored so as to ensure that IFS does not displace the
more important goal of poverty reduction.
Even with this qualification, many may disagree with the need to
work towards IFS. Perhaps most would argue that nongovernmental
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organizations (NGOs) have important social objectives that cannot
be executed in a financially sustainable manner. Requiring that an
institution do so would result in goal displacement. Outreach and
service to the poor and poorest are more important, some might
well argue, than making profits. A major purpose of this paper is to
try to convince those who want to reach and benefit truly large
numbers, say at least 500,000, of the poorest households with microfinance, aim for IFS, and support, rather than displace, their efforts
in poverty reduction.
The most important reason is funding. Reducing poverty significantly, that is, reaching and benefiting truly large numbers of poor
and poorest households, even the 500,000 mentioned above,
requires vast amounts of funds. Assuming an average loan outstanding per client of only US$150, for example, the total annual loan
fund requirement alone would be US$75 million.7 Add to that the
equity requirements to cover operating losses in the early years of
operations and large-scale expansion, and the figure rises further.
Attainment of the Microcredit Summit goal of reaching 100 million
of the poorest households is estimated to cost around US$21 billion.
From where are such vast amounts of funds going to come? Not
from donors, whose funds for supporting microfinance are limited,
and probably not from governments either, because of competing
claims on their funds: though in countries where funds are made
available by governments, MFIs should take advantage of them—
provided they can do so without incurring crippling interference in
their operations.
Grants and soft loans have played, and continue to play, major
roles in financing MFI start-ups. They are particularly useful at that
early stage when equity is usually nonexistent and deficits are large.
Guarantees and quasi-equity, which are themselves soft loans, can
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also be of critical importance when the MFI seeks to establish relations with banks. However, grants and soft loans are always limited
in supply and time-consuming to secure. For these reasons they are
likely to be insufficient for financing the scaling-up of MFIs to reach
truly large numbers and IFS.
In the likely event that grants and soft loans do not meet funding
requirements for scaling-up, MFIs must search elsewhere. Only formal financial institutions are likely to be able to provide the vast
financial resources required to reach large numbers of the poor and
poorest with microfinance.8
If profit-oriented, formal, financial institutions are to be interested in entering business partnerships with MFIs, the latter will
have to convince these institutions of the strength of the MFI’s operational and financial management, in other words, that the MFIs
operate as commercially minded, for-profit entities, just like the
other clients of the financial institutions. In order to maximize the
potential of this partnership, MFIs will have to build their equity,
because it serves as a lever to obtain debt from formal financial
institutions and savings deposits (where appropriate) from members. Currently, for MFIs, the most reliable long-term source of
such equity is retained earnings. To build retained earnings, MFIs
will have to make profits from their outreach to the poor and poorest by reaching truly large numbers. Making profits, in the medium
to long term, means the attainment of a sufficient degree of IFS and
reasonable adjusted, return on assets (AROA). There is no other
way.
So it is not a question whether or not we need to pursue IFS so as
to be able to reduce extreme poverty in a big way, but rather how
best to go about it without losing sight of our overriding concern
for poverty reduction. The rest of the paper focuses on this point.
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Trade-off between Working with the Poorest and IFS?
A few years ago, an influential book that included case studies of 12
MFIs in Asia, Africa, and Latin America argued that MFIs working
with the poorest would experience a trade-off with IFS. Specifically,
it concluded that “at a given point in time [MFIs] can either go for
growth and put their resources into underpinning the success of
established and rapidly growing institutions, or go for poverty
impact . . . and put their resources into poverty-focused operations
with a higher risk of failure and a lower expected return” (Hulme &
Mosley, 1996, p. 206). Lending to the poorest requires very small
loans and results in a small average loan size. Achieving IFS however, the book argued, would require a much larger average loan
size. The Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest (CGAP) of the
World Bank publicized this argument in its Focus Note No. 5.
Many practitioners of microfinance with the poor and the poorest
disagreed. We felt from our experience that there was no necessary
medium to long-term trade-off, for even among the poorest loan
clients, average loan size tends to increase considerably over the
years9 as clients prove their ability to repay and consequently have
access to larger and/or multiple loans. Indeed, it is this “progressive” lending to large numbers of the poor and the poorest, coupled
with efficiency and other initiatives at the program level, that
makes the attainment of IFS possible while serving the poorest.
Despite the influence of Hulme and Mosley’s study, it is now recognized by many that the alleged trade-off is not inevitable
(Christen, 1997; Christen, et al., 1995; and Gulli, 1998, p. 28). A
study of 11 successful microfinance programs in three continents
found that “among high-performing programs, no clear trade-off
exists between reaching the very poor and reaching large numbers
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of people” (Christen et al., 1995, p. viii), and concluded that their
results showed that “full self-sufficiency can be achieved by institutions serving the very poor.” (Christen et al., 1995, p. 27). Thus it is
not the clientele served that determines an MFI’s potential for IFS,
but the degree to which its financial services program is welldesigned and managed.

Learning from Successful MFIs Working with the Poorest
In choosing case study MFIs for this paper, we were able to identify
several in Asia, Africa, and Latin America that are working with
substantial numbers of the poorest households in their countries
and are also on a clear path toward institutional financial self-sufficiency. Of these, we chose one from each continent for illustrative
purposes,10 as follows:
•
The Center for Agriculture and Rural Development (CARD), a
Grameen

Bank replication/adaptation based in the

Philippines;
•

Credito con Education Rural (CRECER), a Freedom from
Hunger Credit with Education affiliate and village-banking
program based in Bolivia; and

•

The Foundation for International Community Assistance
(FINCA Uganda), a village banking program based in Uganda.

These case study MFIs, from three different continents, operating in
three distinct environments, and employing varied lending methodologies, provide empirical evidence that the trade-off is not
inevitable.
Where appropriate, we will also draw on the experience of CASHPOR Financial & Technical Services Private Limited (CFTS), which
began disbursing loans in September 1997 as a fast-track commercial
approach to providing microfinance services to the poor and poorVolume 1 Number 1
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est in India, using the Grameen Bank methodology. It has the
explicit goal of maximizing outreach to the poorest women while
achieving IFS within five years. The purpose of referring to CFTS,
although it is still very small, is to show that IFS can be achieved relatively quickly while serving the poorest clients if it is systematically planned for and implemented from the beginning.
A brief statistical overview of the three case study MFIs is provided in Table 1; all data have been supplied directly by the case
study MFIs. Given the dangers of comparing MFIs working in such
different environments, we ask that readers analyze the case study
MFIs on an individual basis.

Outreach and Benefit to the Poorest
Among our case study MFIs, each is committed to working with the
poor and poorest households. In figure 1 we can see that all three
case studies actually are serving substantial numbers of the poorest
house-holds in their areas of operation: CARD has over 11,000,
CRECER more than 6,300, and FINCA Uganda approximately
11,500.
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Of the three case studies, only CARD is using one of the cost-effective poverty targeting strategies outlined below (Becoming a CostEffective MFI, Cost-Effective Targeting). It identifies its potential
clients on the ground by using the CASHPOR House Index (CHI) as
adapted to conditions in south Luzon and the offshore islands in the
Philippines, followed by a Net Worth test for those living in houses
between four and six points on their Index. However, CARD does
not subdivide its clients into poor and poorest. For purposes of this
paper, CARD took two samples of 100 new clients. The clients in
one of the samples had joined the Landless Peoples Association (the
official name of the CARD NGO) before the CARD Bank was established in 1997, while those in the other had joined after. It was
found that 53% of those who joined before CARD became a bank
were living in the poorest category of houses, whereas 63% of those
who entered after the bank had been established lived in the poorest houses. It would be safe to conclude, therefore, that CARD
becoming a Bank has not adversely affected its outreach to the poorest, and that probably at least half of its clients were in that category
when they entered the program.
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In 1997, an independent impact evaluation of CARD’s microfinance program for the poor was commissioned by the Grameen
Trust, its main funder up until that time (Hossain & Diaz, 1997).
The results showed that CARD had succeeded in reaching the poorest, since “nearly 70% of its borrowers have no access to land and
have very poor housing worth less than PHP25,000 (about US$650;
note: PHP = Philippine Peso), and they received a share of loans proportional to their numbers” (Hossain & Diaz, 1997, p. 19). In addition, “The average labor productivity in enterprises financed by the
loan was PHP107 per day, 34% higher than the market wage rate of
PHP80 per day. The rate of return on capital was 117% compared to
46% (effective) rate of interest charged by CARD on the amount of
outstanding loan. Employment, income and labor productivity
increase with the number of repeat loans taken from CARD”
(Hossain & Diaz, 1997, p. 20). The data show poverty was being
reduced, even among many of the poorest clients.
Although CRECER does not have a specific poverty yardstick, it
operates in the poorest areas of rural Bolivia. Recently, a study by
Freedom From Hunger evaluated the poverty level of the clients
being served by CRECER. A summary of this study concluded that
“these results indicate that even within provinces with very high
rates of poverty, the CRECER Credit with Education program is
successfully reaching the relatively poorer households and not
skewing program services to the relatively better-off in the program
area” (Bresnick & MkNelly, 1999, p. 7). A comparison of CRECER
participants with randomly selected nonparticipants showed no statistically significant difference in poverty status. The study therefore concludes that “given that on average 84% of the population in
the 20 provinces in which CRECER is active were classified as poor,
with 49% of the total population classified as ‘extremely poor,’ it is
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likely that the CRECER clients have a similar breakdown in poverty
levels” (Bresnick & MkNelly, 1999, p. 5). We do not have any impact evaluation data on CRECER, but we can assume from the small
proportion (2.5%) of its portfolio that is at risk, that poverty is
being reduced among its poorest clients. Otherwise, how could they
repay so faithfully?
FINCA Uganda’s outreach was evaluated in a recent study commissioned by the FINCA Head Office in Washington DC. It concluded that “67% of FINCA Uganda’s new clients enter the program
in ‘severe poverty’—i.e., with a daily per-capita income (DPCI) of
less than US$1. The average DPCI of this category was US$0.56. A
further 22% of new clients were moderately poor (DPCI of US$1-2),
with an average DPCI of US$1.39. Finally, 10% of clients were nonpoor (DPCI >US$2+) with an average DPCI of US$3.44.”11 As in
the case of CRECER, we do not have any impact evaluation data on
FINCA Uganda, but can also assume from the even smaller proportion (0.1%) of its portfolio which is at risk, that poverty also is
being reduced among its poorest clients.
From its beginning CFTS has identified potential clients as poor
and poorest according to their score on the CASHPOR House Index
(CHI), their ownership and operation of agricultural land, and their
possession of large farm animals. Poor households are those with
three points on the CHI, owning/operating no more than twothirds of an acre of irrigated agricultural land and possessing large
farm animals worth less than Rs.8,000 (about US$190). The poorest
households are those with two or less marks on the CHI, owning/operating no agricultural land and possessing no large farm animals. Poor households tend to live in medium-sized houses with
reinforced mud walls of between five and eight feet in height and a
permanent roof of used tiles. The poorest households live in small
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huts with mud walls of less than five feet with an impermanent roof
of thatch. In retrospect, the poorest have been defined too low and
have been found to make up only about 20%, instead of 50%, of the
total poor. Not surprisingly, these extremely poor households are
currently underrepresented among CFTS clients, all of whom are
poor. As of the end of the first 1.5 years of work in Mirzapur, the
poorest accounted for only 13% of the active savers. More time for
demonstration will help the poorest overcome their fears, and more
suitable loan products for them will be required before larger proportions of these households at the bottom of the poverty group
take advantage of the financial services being offered. Probably
CFTS should relax somewhat its operational definition of the poorest so that it corresponds to the bottom 50% of the poor in
Mirzapur. Regardless whether or not they do this, however, the fact
that they are tracking the poorest potential clients means that they
will know what proportion of these clients have entered the program and will be able to approach them with more suitable loan
products.

Sustainability and Profitability
While CARD serves substantial numbers of the poorest households
in their areas of operation, trend analysis shows that CARD also has
achieved operational self-sufficiency (OSS) for the last two years,
and CRECER and FINCA Uganda are nearing that goal. The three
are moving towards IFS, and Adjusted Return on Assets (AROA) is
also improving, though it remains negative among all factors, since
IFS has not been achieved.
While the trends for the most part are consistently improving,
CARD’s OSS and IFS from 12/31/97 to 12/31/98 are virtually flat,
worrying any observer at first sight. However, the figure for
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Figure 1

12/31/98 has been reduced by rapid expansion during that year,
including the opening of three new branches. Rapid expansion,
especially the opening of new branches, increases operating
expenses faster than interest income because of large start-up costs
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for salaries of new staff and capital expenditure to equip the
branches; these are costs which are incurred well before new loan
disbursements are generating much new income. The effect of such
expansion therefore, is to lower OSS and IFS temporarily until the
interest income in the new branches surpasses the additional expenditures that were made to generate it. Since 12/31/96, CARD’s outreach has increased by 230%.
FINCA Uganda increased its outreach to the poor by an impressive
301% since 12/31/96, and for the reasons highlighted above, its OSS
has leveled off during that period. It is important to note, however,
that the annualized OSS on 12/31/98 of 83.9% masks the fact that in
the last quarter of the year (and the first quarter of 1999), FINCA
Uganda has achieved OSS, while IFS is approximately 84%12. This is
due to two factors: (1) increased interest income from new clients is
offsetting the start-up costs incurred for expansion, and (2) rapid
expansion of the prior years was slowed to a halt in August 1998,
allowing FINCA Uganda to upgrade its management systems to
accommodate its growing size. CRECER has had more modest rates
of expansion than the other two programs, growing by 118% since
6/30/96, and its OSS and IFS have climbed fairly steadily.
It is clear that MFIs serving and benefiting substantial numbers of
the poorest clients in their countries can be at or near operational
self-sufficiency, not too far from IFS, and making progress toward
both. They need not experience a trade-off between working with
the poorest and reaching institutional financial sustainability. The
rest of the paper shows how this is being done.

Becoming a Cost-Effective MFI
Most MFIs operate in environments where their only competitors
are local moneylenders, who charge rates significantly above mar144
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ket, often between 5% and 10% per month, to their clients—including the poorest. MFIs thus have much liberty in setting interest rates
before they would be out-priced by local supply. Because MFIs’
effective interest rates are set not by the free market forces of supply and demand, but rather by monopolistic or oligopolistic institutions, there is a grave danger that inefficiencies and delinquencies
can flourish but remain hidden under “appropriate interest rates,”
and that innovation can be stifled. While there is no doubt that the
poorest should pay full cost for their financial services, they should
not be asked to bear the burden of incompetent MFI management
and inefficient operations.13
From this perspective, achieving IFS is a cost issue rather than a
pricing issue, which is particularly relevant if an MFI is interested in
serving the poorest. An article by Elisabeth Rhyne summarizing the
results of the 1995 paper by Christen et al. recognizes that
“undoubtedly it is more challenging to serve people with very small
loans or to reach remote rural clients. However, even in relatively
unfavorable settings [MFIs] had developed service delivery methods
so tailored to their clientele and so efficient that clients could afford
to pay the full cost of the services, making the institutions financially viable” (Rhyne, 1998, p. 6).
Because cost is the key to IFS, then an MFI must consistently evaluate whether or not it serves as many clients as possible with its
resources at the lowest possible costs. In other words, does it operate efficiently? By definition, the concept of efficiency is simple: to
maximize output from a set amount of inputs. In practice it is much
more complex, particularly since tracking sustainability and efficiency indicators is fairly new to MFIs, and consequently industry
standards, which serve as guidelines in the business world, do not
yet exist.14 How efficient a microfinance institution can become
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before it sacrifices the quality of its operations is not yet absolutely
defined. Some guidelines are suggested later in the paper, but the
only clear guiding principle is to ensure that as great a proportion
of available funding as possible reaches the hands of the poorest.
The key to attaining IFS while working with substantial numbers
of the poorest is, therefore, to become a cost-effective MFI. The first
step in this direction is the adoption of a cost-effective poverty
yardstick to identify poor and poorest households in the villages.

Cost-Effective Targeting
In order to do business with the poor and poorest, we must identify
and motivate them on the ground in a cost-effective manner. This
process of identification and motivation is often referred to as “targeting the poor.” Normally, the poorest will not come forward by
themselves to apply for financial services, because they will not
know or believe that the services are actually for them. Even when
informed, many likely feel that it would be too risky for them to
borrow. Only patient motivation and convincing demonstrations of
neighboring poor and poorest households that do participate and
benefit will encourage them to take advantage of the opportunity.
While targeting the poorest is critical to our ultimate goal of
poverty reduction, if a program is not able to undertake this activity in a cost-effective manner, the potential to achieve IFS might be
greatly reduced or even eliminated, jeopardizing the long-term viability of a program. Hulme and Mosley raise the concern that “targeting on the poor of credit . . . imposes costs of research (finding
out who is eligible), communication with the eligible and monitoring to prevent access by the ineligible, which may if pushed too far,
outweigh the benefits of poverty reduction” (Hulme & Mosley,
1996, p. 36). Fortunately, proven, cost-effective strategies have been
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developed and refined which enable programs to identify the poorest while also maintaining the quality measures necessary to ensure
that only the poor and poorest are admitted to the program.
While the goal of this paper is not to describe nor debate the costs
and benefits of targeting strategies,

15

given their acknowledged

potential to reduce the ability of an MFI to achieve IFS, we believe
these effects warrant a brief discussion. We are aware of two existing approaches used to target the poor and poorest that are proven
and cost-effective: the CASHPOR House Index (CHI) and the Small
Enterprise Foundation Participatory Wealth Ranking (PWR) system.16 The CHI uses the house and compound of the household, in
place of the more traditional costly and time-consuming household
interview, as crude indicators to show which nonpoor households
to eliminate from initial consideration as potential members. Only
after the CHI identifies potentially poor and poorest households do
field staff visit house-to-house to verify the eligibility of the occupant households through a short interview that focuses on the value
of their productive assets.
Instead of using the house, PWR relies on the knowledge of the villagers themselves to identify the poor and poorest among them,
again eliminating the initial interview process. Villagers are called
on to map the village and to rank households into groups by
poverty status, and only then do field staff interview those who
have been identified as eligible. On average, both methodologies
take about five minutes per poor and poorest household.
The targeting method one chooses either CHI or PWR should
depend on local conditions and expertise. Whichever is chosen,
however, it will be cost effective because care has been put into
designing both methods in order to eliminate unnecessary expenditures. Time-consuming, costly interviews used to determine houseVolume 1 Number 1
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hold income or expenditure, which are of dubious validity and reliability anyway, are not used in the initial stages. They are replaced
by a quick survey of household productive assets, which takes only
about five minutes on average, and these more lengthy asset interviews are done at the final stage of targeting, only after most nonpoor households have been eliminated. Because most of the
households identified through the CHI and PWR turn out to be eligible, the interview doubles as the first step in motivating poor and
poorest households to take advantage of the financial services being
offered.

Exclusive Focus on the Poor and Poorest?
By focusing their efforts exclusively on the poor and the poorest,
MFIs can use funds allocated for their use most effectively and efficiently. Given that these funds are normally limited in supply, it is
vital to ensure they get into the hands of the intended beneficiaries.
Leakage to the nonpoor should be minimized.
There is a counterargument, however, that, “It is scale, not exclusive focus, that determines whether significant outreach to the poor
is achieved” (Christen et al., 1995, p. 24). Programs serving several
strata of clients, not just the poor and the poorest, may be able to
expand faster and reach larger numbers. If they do, large numbers of
the poor and the poorest may benefit. Moreover, such programs
have the possibility of cross-subsidizing lending to the poorest from
their more profitable lending to the nonpoor, due to larger initial
average loan size. Thus they could achieve IFS more rapidly.
Whether or not such mixed programs benefit large numbers of the
poor and the poorest is an empirical question. If they do, they are
surely welcome; but they should not, under any circumstances,
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channel funds meant for the poor and poorest into the hands of the
nonpoor.

Administrative Efficiency
Most managers focus heavily on one component of institutional
efficiency: administrative efficiency. This figure reveals how much
17

it costs your institution to keep one dollar”

of credit in the hands

of your loan clients. Current “best practice” assumes that wellmanaged MFIs should be able to achieve levels of between 15% and
25%, or administrative costs of 15 to 25 cents for every dollar outstanding, regardless of the lending methodology (Christen, 1997, p.
172). Trend analysis in the figure 2 shows that none of the case studies have reached Christen’s standard, although CARD and CRECER
are approaching best practice standards.
Only CRECER, however, shows a clear downward trend in administrative expense per average dollar outstanding, while the trends
for FINCA Uganda and CARD are less clear. With respect to the latter two MFIs, this uncertainty is likely due to the higher rates of
recent expansion of these two programs as compared to CRECER.
We have seen that rapid rates of expansion, particularly in the opening of new branches, result in large increases in administrative
expense before any additional loans are disbursed. Thus, administrative efficiency would fall temporarily until counteracted by an
increase in loans outstanding. That being said, FINCA Uganda’s
administrative efficiency ratio (unadjusted) of 71.8% is very high.
This figure indicates that it is costing nearly 72 cents to get one dollar in the hands of the poor, which signals low levels of efficiency.
FINCA Uganda blames this low efficiency on its rapid growth strategy, achieved through up-front investment in capacity building.
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Field Staff Efficiency
Salary and salary-related expenses represent the significant bulk,
often between 50% and 70%, of total administrative costs. Field
staff, sometimes referred to as “directly productive staff,” usually
make up about 80% of an MFI’s total staff. Given the field staff’s disproportionate representation in the overall expense mix, managers
must carefully monitor and measure field staff performance and
productivity. Two basic measures are consistently employed to
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monitor MFI field staff efficiency: (1) average number of active loan
clients per field staff, and (2) average loan portfolio per field staff.
These two measures work closely together to determine how much
revenue individual field staff generate in relation to their costs. For
example, if loan sizes are low, field staff will need to manage as
many loan clients as possible, without sacrificing quality, in order
to generate revenue.
With respect to the first measure, average number of loan clients
per field staff, best practice ranges for MFIs worldwide fall between
300 and 500 clients18, regardless of the lending methodology
employed (e.g., individual, solidarity group, village banking).
Developing a best practice range for average loan portfolio per field
staff, however, is more difficult because it relies more heavily on the
lending methodology used, the level of poverty of participating
borrowers, and the local operating environment (e.g., inflation). In
the Grameen Bank methodology, best practice yields a loan portfolio per field staff of more than US$25,000.
In Figure 3, we see that while CRECER has a loan client to field
staff ratio of less than 300 clients, at 274, it has a high loan portfolio per field staff of more than US$45,000, which, from an incomegenerating perspective, more than compensates for the lower levels
of loan clients per field staff. CARD is nearing the first efficiency
standard, with 279 active loan clients per field staff, and exceeds
US$25,000 loan portfolio per field staff, at US$28,584, and seems
well on track toward achieving best practice levels in the near
future. FINCA Uganda, on the other hand, has the highest loan
client to field-staff ratio among our case study MFIs, with 331 clients
per field staff, but it falls well short in terms of loan portfolio per
field staff at only US$16,424. This reflects both the high proportion
of borrowers in early loan cycles and the fact that it has the lowest
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average loan outstanding per loan client of US$49.60, compared to
US$102.60 and US$164.60 for CARD and CRECER, respectively.
FINCA’s low average loan outstanding is credited to the large number of poorest borrowers in the program as well the requirement
that borrowers must save 20% of their borrowings in each cycle.
This latter policy is currently being reconsidered. If savings requirements are eased, the average loan outstanding should grow and thus

152

Volume 1 Number 1

The Microcredit Summit’s Challenge
improve the loan portfolio per field staff measure as well as overall
administrative efficiency.

New Management Tools for MFIs
Efficiency is a dynamic, not a static, process. Though there is a tendency to rely primarily on specific output measures—administrative
expenses and field staff productivity—in order to understand the
efficiency achievements of MFIs, alone they certainly do not tell the
full story. Each of the MFIs analyzed in this paper have exhibited a
willingness to tailor their services to their local environment and to
embrace new operational and financial management techniques,
which have dramatically increased their efficiency, and thus their
ability to achieve IFS. They have paved the way for other MFIs
working with the poor and poorest to follow this lead so that IFS
becomes an achievable standard for all.

Monitoring Financial and Operational Performance:
Management Information Systems 19
Access to timely, accurate, and detailed information on the overall
performance of an MFI is required if efficiency and IFS are to be
achieved. Management information systems (MIS)—whether manual, computerized through spreadsheet, or computerized through
advanced computer-programming software—must be introduced
and then updated as both financial and operational management
techniques become more sophisticated. Though costs are involved
in developing such systems, they are absolutely required by all to
reach and serve with quality large numbers of poor and poorest
households.
A cost-effective MIS should generate both financial and operational information. On the financial side, full financial statements,
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including the Income Statement, the Cash Flow Statement and the
Balance Sheet should be prepared regularly, at least on a quarterly
basis, though monthly statements would be preferable. Financial
20

statement monitoring report formats that facilitate the analysis of
IFS and efficiency, among other important performance indicators,
are now available to MFIs worldwide. As these new tools greatly
enhance the ability of MFIs to monitor financial performance, they
should be adopted.
On the operational side, in recent years portfolio-at-risk has
replaced the repayment rate as the leading measure of loan portfolio quality, following the lead of traditional commercial banks. This
relatively new and valuable measure of loan portfolio quality compares the remaining outstanding balance of loans with at least one
installment overdue for a specified period (e.g., one week, one
month, 90 days) to the total loan portfolio. It is an indication of the
proportion of loans outstanding that may not be able to be recovered in the future. It does not replace the repayment rate (amount
collected over the amount due for a specified period), a historical
measure, which shows what proportion of principal and interest
due during a specified period actually was collected. Portfolio-atrisk should be monitored on a weekly basis at the branch level and
on a monthly basis for each field staff. In addition, the aging of
arrears is done to calculate portfolio at different levels of risk (i.e.,
with arrears overdue for different lengths of time, e.g., number of
days or weeks), and can be used also for calculating MFI-specific
loan loss provisions.21
With such information, managers are able to make informed and
timely decisions about performance, allowing for identification of
areas where performance improvements must be made before small
problems become crises. Without such information, and verifica154
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tion of this data through both internal and external audits, MFIs will
not be in a position to make decisions that can facilitate efficiency
and IFS.
CRECER introduced a computerized monitoring system (through
Excel spreadsheets) back in 1995, well before it became a leading
topic of microfinance “best practice.” Though they are currently
looking to develop and implement a more sophisticated, integrated
MIS, the existing system has certainly served them well, to which its
financial results attest. CRECER produces monitoring statements,
including operational data and full financial statements, on a
monthly basis. Results are monitored in formats (as described
above) that facilitate the measurement of best practice indicators.
These results are compared quarterly to planned targets for the same
period, and senior managers are provided bonuses and incentives
accordingly.
Over the years, CARD has also been monitoring its quarterly
results through spreadsheets. Since becoming a bank in 1997, it has
recognized the importance of a more sophisticated MIS and has
hired a local computer-programming firm to design an integrated
system for them. Meanwhile, CARD continues to monitor its performance through Excel spreadsheets in a format that facilitates
their analysis of IFS, efficiency, and loan portfolio quality. Like
CRECER, CARD compares actual performance to planned targets.
Like the other case study MFIs, reflecting a critical theme to achieve
IFS, FINCA Uganda monitors both its operational and financial performance, including the full income statement, balance sheet, and
cash flow statement, on a monthly basis through Excel spreadsheets.
Actual financial and operational performance is measured against
planned targets during each period. Given their rapid growth over
the last few years, however, the limitations of the manual system
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have become obvious. In June 1999, FINCA Uganda will automate
its

MIS,

installing a customized, off-the-shelf, loan-tracking software.

Monitoring results carefully and frequently is particularly important for new MFIs like CFTS, established with IFS as a primary goal.
Through its monthly monitoring CFTS has become aware that dormancy is a problem among its active savers. Although eligible for
loans, some clients do not apply for them. Because microlending is
the primary means of reducing poverty, the reluctance of clients to
borrow means that CFTS is not helping them much. This is not
intended, however, to discount the critical contribution of savings,
nor to suggest in any way that dormant clients should be required
to borrow. But their failure to borrow does make it difficult for
CFTS to meet its loan disbursement targets, and therefore its
expected income from interest payments. Discussions with the dormant clients on their reluctance to borrow has revealed that fear of
not being able to repay weekly is a major cause of their dormancy.
Most dormant clients would like to borrow for income generation,
but they are not confident in their ability to repay weekly and benefit from the loans. Perhaps some of these dormant clients are
among those for whom microlending is not a way out of poverty;
but experience has shown that others will get a good investment
idea in time and benefit from it. What CFTS must do is ensure that
its loan products are conducive to this.19

Business Planning to IFS
Working in tandem with a strong MIS system should be the business
planning process. Historically, business planning, undertaken by all
commercial ventures, has not been at the forefront of MFI management. Where such efforts have been undertaken, they have often
consisted of senior managers guesstimating important figures, such
156
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as outreach and funding requirements, in order to determine their
goals for the following year. This is extremely unfortunate, because
such a process ignores the underlying dynamics of an MFI’s business. By undertaking the business planning process, and specifically
financial modeling, managers can begin to understand how different
financial and operational decisions affect various aspects of the business, and more important, the extent to which this impact is posi22

tive or negative.

While it was once often necessary for programs to bring in specialists to develop detailed financial models, MFI-friendly tools have
recently developed detailed five-year financial forecasts.23 One of
these tools is requisite management training. With these tools, management will be able to better understand the dynamics of their
business and to make the critical and often difficult decisions
required to plan for efficiency and IFS. With planned targets developed that map the path to IFS, managers can compare these with
actual performance so they can determine where adjustments need
to be made within the organization in order to stay on track toward
achieving IFS.24 As indicated above, CARD and CRECER are already
doing this.
In the past, neither CARD nor CRECER prepared detailed three- to
five-year financial models. They did, however, develop annual operating budgets revised and updated each year based on historical performance. In the case of CRECER, this not only led to planned
targets for key operational and financial data, but also to the development of full financial statements. Measuring their actual performance against these well-thought-out annual budgets allowed
managers at both CARD and CRECER to make changes to their
operations (or, when necessary, to the financial model) in order to
meet their primary goals. Looking forward, CRECER intends to
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introduce a more sophisticated planning tool. Last summer, CARD
introduced and is now using CGAP’s Microfin model, a sophisticated yet user-friendly financial modeling tool.
Before 1997, FINCA Uganda , like CARD and CRECER, prepared
an annual operating plan and budget against which actual performance was measured. This included detailed operational and financial performance indicators, including full financial statements. In
1997, FINCA Uganda developed a three-year strategic plan, augmenting the annual operating plan and providing a medium-term
forecast of the MFI’s goals. In 1999, like CARD, FINCA Uganda has
adopted CGAP’s more sophisticated Microfin model.

CFTS after 1.5 Years
The basic design and path forward for CFTS were formed from the
results of detailed spreadsheet modeling. Created with the dual goals
of achieving IFS and rapidly expanding outreach, an optimum program size was identified—six branches to reach 18,000 poor and
poorest women in the Mirzapur District of Uttar Pradesh State,
India—which would allow for achievement of both goals within five
years. Thus, from the outset, CFTS had clearly defined objectives,
for both financial and operational achievement of which all managers are aware. Comparing these targets to actual performance will
allow CFTS to consistently track where it under- and over-performs
and to make the necessary changes on the road to IFS.
After 1.5 years, CFTS is basically on track for the attainment of its
goals of providing financial services to 18,000 poor households
(with the poorest at least proportionately covered) and thereby
attaining institutional financial self-sufficiency in five years. This is
shown in Table 3.
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With plus or minus 10% of planned targets considered to be good
performance, CFTS can be said to have performed well on all four
key indicators. Achievement on active loan clients, however, just
barely made it into the acceptable range and is still some cause for
concern. Overall, however, these results show that IFS can be systematically planned for and implemented, while still keeping a focus
on the poorest. These results also illustrate the importance of being
able to evaluate actual achievement as related to planned targets.

Maintaining Loan Portfolio Quality: Client Incentives
In the face of progressive lending, and thus a growing loan portfolio, as well as expanding numbers of loan clients, innovations in
maintaining loan portfolio quality can be referred to as client incentives. As argued earlier, progressive lending, which provides for
increasing maximum loan sizes as borrowers progress from one loan
cycle to another, is critical for both poverty reduction and the
attainment of IFS, because it allows for important economies of
scale. But if the quality of the growing loan portfolio is not maintained, the net result to the MFI could be negative, and in a worst
case, disastrous.
In addition to the “carrot” of progressive lending, an innovative
“stick” has been introduced at some MFIs. Both CARD and CFTS
link the maximum loan size of subsequent lending cycles to repayment performance in the existing cycle. In other words, the subsequent loan size declines by a predetermined amount for each
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dropped repayment; after a certain number of dropped repayments,
four in the case of CARD and five for CFTS, the borrower is no
longer eligible for a subsequent loan. CARD adds a further twist to
this formula by linking subsequent loan size to attendance as well;
one absence (or two late arrivals) is equivalent to one dropped
installment. CFTS delays subsequent loan disbursement by one
week for every absence from or tardiness at weekly meetings. Not
only does this allow CARD and CFTS to track those borrowers who
may have trouble repaying subsequent loans, it also reduces the
amount at risk in those loans. At the same time, credit discipline is
strengthened.
CRECER uses progressive lending as its primary incentive to
induce their members to repay, though they also include its health
and nutrition education services as further client incentives. On
strong repayment performance and solid self-management, CRECER
also provides members at the beginning of the fourth loan cycle
with the option to increase their loan term from four to six months,
with biweekly rather than weekly repayment. Management is also
considering offering preferred rates in the future—like any other
bank—to its stronger clients, but will await achievement of IFS.
Like CRECER, FINCA Uganda uses progressive lending as its primary incentive for repayment.
The following trend analysis shows the progressive lending among
the three case studies and compares this to loan portfolio quality, as
measured by portfolio-at-risk:
Of the case studies, both CRECER and CARD have shown significant increases in average loan size outstanding per loan client over
the short period being measured: CRECER from just over US$100 at
6/30/96 to nearly US$165 at 12/31/98, and CARD from US$78 to
US$103 during that same period. However, FINCA Uganda’s aver160
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age loan outstanding has stayed basically flat at around US$50.
These differences are inversely associated with the rates of growth
of the three MFIs since 12/31/96, in terms of the number of clients
served. FINCA Uganda has grown over 300% since then, CARD
230%, and CRECER more modestly at 118%. As highlighted in the
discussion of field staff efficiency, in the case of FINCA Uganda,
many early cycle borrowers take smaller loans and thus draw the
average figures down, resulting in a flat average loans size outstanding. That being said, in the face of increasing loan size outstanding
and client growth, all programs have been able to maintain strong
loan portfolio quality, as measured by portfolio-at-risk. Only CRE-
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CER, at 2.3%, but still within reasonable best practice ranges, is
above 1%. These MFIs, particularly FINCA Uganda and CARD, will
have to continue to focus on increasing the average loan size outstanding. Without progressive lending, their progress in reducing
poverty will be slow, as will be their attainment of IFS.

Staff Incentives
As highlighted in the discussion of field staff efficiency, salary and
salary-related expenses represent more than half of the total administrative expenses in nearly all MFIs worldwide. In order to stay on
track to achieve IFS, staff must perform as productively and efficiently as possible, while still maintaining the quality of their work.
Motivation of staff through incentives is a practice frequently
employed in the business world. Many innovative MFIs are now
experimenting with staff incentives that link a percentage of the
field staff’s total compensation to predetermined performance targets tailored to the realities of microfinance, and are finding increasingly positive results.
CARD and CFTS both actively employ staff incentives in their
MFIs. Those incentives targeted at field staff focus on two key areas.
First, incentives are linked to bringing new members into the program, particularly relevant if the MFI has just been established or is
expanding. Second, in order to discourage the approval of high-risk
members,25 staff are also rewarded for high loan portfolio quality, as
measured by low portfolio-at-risk, and can be penalized in the event
the portfolio-at-risk of the clients for whom they are responsible
remains high for prolonged periods of time. Thus, in addition to
encouraging greater labor productivity, staff incentives also reinforce the critical importance of strong portfolio quality management.
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CRECER provides similar incentives to its field staff, zonal coordinators, and regional administrators. The incentives are related to
the number of borrowers (not necessarily new borrowers), the total
loan portfolio, and percent delinquency. Because it is a credit with
education program, incentives are also provided for the number of
learning sessions and the quality of learning sessions facilitated, as
measured by a monthly evaluation of each field staff’s performance
as a learning session facilitator.
FINCA Uganda introduced incentives for its field staff in late 1996.
The program is based on three pillars, differing somewhat from
those described above. First, incentives are linked to the repayment
performance (measured by the repayment rate of amount collected
divided by the amount due) of a field staff’s clients during any given
month. Second, FINCA Uganda compensates field staff according to
the gross loan portfolio managed (adjusted for arrears). Finally, to
encourage field staff to turn the loan portfolio over quickly, thus
improving annual yields, there is a “Week 17 Recapitalization”
incentive. With a loan term of 16 weeks, this incentive provides a
set of cash benefits to those field staff who are able to receive client
loan applications in Week 16 and then disburse the new loan in
Week 17, meaning that funds do not linger unproductively in low
interest bearing bank accounts. Unlike the other case study MFIs,
FINCA Uganda sets an eligibility requirement for field staff to be
able to participate in the incentive scheme. Specifically, field staff
must have an average of 30 clients per village banking group before
qualifying. While this incentive scheme has served them well,
FINCA Uganda is seeking to simplify the process. The new scheme,
to be introduced this year, will be based entirely on the loan portfolio (adjusted for arrears) managed by the field staff, and is thus
indirectly based on the assumption of a certain yield level from the
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portfolio and the income required for the institution to meet its IFS
goals. Where field staff can surpass the portfolio requirements, the
incentive payment will be a portion of the additional income earned
by FINCA.
CFTS has innovated further on the incentive structure for field
staff. It provides differing rewards for bringing the poorest versus
the poor households into the program. In fact, the compensation is
33% more for recruiting the poorest.
CARD has been a leader among CASHPOR Grameen Bank replications in providing incentives for its field staff to increase their productivity. For example, it pioneered “fast-track” promotion for new
field staff. Those on the first three-month basic training can be promoted to probationary status after two months if they have
recruited and trained at least 20 “quality members” (i.e., clients who
have passed the Group Recognition Test). The target for probationary field staff is 60 quality members in six months, but they are confirmed as a member of CARD staff as soon as they reach
probationary status. CFTS has used the fast-track confirmation in
Mirzapur, India with good results in terms of group formation and
staff satisfaction.
CRECER goes beyond the other case studies in its economic incentive structure for senior managers. On a quarterly basis, actual
results are compared to planned targets for the period, and regional
administrators are provided bonuses accordingly.

Know What Clients Want: Customizing Financial
Products
Underlying the strategy for achievement of IFS is the implicit
assumption that an MFI can attract new clients and maintain the
commitment and participation of existing clients. Financial prod164
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ucts being offered, including both loans and savings products, must
be designed especially to meet the needs of the poorest women. The
first loan must be small enough to be easily repayable in frequent,
small installments, but not

SO

small as to be insufficient for gener-

ating additional income quickly. Study of local income-generating
activities of the poor and poorest women will reveal a suitable band
and term for first loans. In Asia, the principal amount will typically
range from US$25 to US$75 and the term from six months to one
year. Subsequent loan and savings products of the MFI must be
designed to facilitate a rise out of poverty.26 Subsequent loan size
must increase with the demand from clients and their (increasing)
ability to repay. Not all clients will progress at the same speed.
There should be different loan and savings products for clients of
differing abilities and with different demands. The overall result,
however, will be an increase in average loans outstanding and average savings balances as time passes. This offers the prospect of
increased profits and income to the poor and poorest women and a
steady growth in depth of outreach to the poorest. It also provides
the conditions for the attainment of financial self-sufficiency by the
MFIs serving the poorest and attractive profits to the banks that provide bulk loans to them. 27
These general guidelines, however, sometimes do not fit closely
with the reality of the operating environment. MFIs committed to
working with the poorest must be flexible in designing their credit
and savings products.
CARD

discovered very early in its adaptation that a one-year first

loan term, like that of the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh, was not
suitable for most of its clients, who were involved in tertiary activities, like petty trading, which has shorter business cycles. It
reduced the term of its first loan to six months. In recent years,
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CARD has also introduced new loan products, such as the
Multipurpose Loan Product, available to clients for any purpose
after six months of membership in an amount up to PHP5,000
(approximately US$132). This product is intended to discourage
clients from turning to the traditional moneylender in times of
trouble, as they had been doing, and it has become popular. CARD
has also recently introduced the CARD Loan Accelerated Program
(CLAP) for those very successful members who have been with the
program for many years. Qualifying members are given an identification number that allows them to draw on an overdraft account
based on the needs of their business. Such members are still required
to attend weekly center meetings.
CRECER, unlike the other case study MFIs, operates in a highly
competitive environment. While CRECER has avoided some of this
competition by targeting the poor and poorest rural and semirural
households (often not the primary target group for the majority of
MFIs operating in Bolivia), they still must operate efficiently, maintain competitive interest rates, and provide services that their
clients consider attractive compared to those of other MFIs. This is
where credit with education comes in. It integrates the weekly
credit delivery service at the village level with health, nutrition,
family planning, and better business education services. While this
definitely adds to the cost of the program, it is clear from the efficiency and sustainability measures provided above that the services
can be delivered competitively. Recent innovations include community-based distribution of contraceptives, including condoms and
vaginal tablets, as a for-profit venture. CRECER also works closely
with NGOs and the government’s health representatives to provide
discounted health services—including referrals—to its clients.
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Since commencing operations six years ago, FINCA Uganda has
not introduced any new loan products, and this is recognized as a
limitation of the program; ordinary credit will not keep FINCA
Uganda competitive in the future. As a result, focus groups with
borrowers have been held recently to receive their input on potential new loan products. Currently, the head office is also carrying
out a marketing study. Although new loan products have not been
introduced, FINCA Uganda has added peripheral products for its
clients, including credit, life, and disability insurance. It is also
exploring options for introducing health insurance to their clients.
At CFTS, loan products were redesigned after six months of fieldwork when the one-year income-generating loan of Rs.2000 was
found to be too rigid for client requirements. Recognizing this, a
workshop was held with the center chiefs, the elected leaders of
each village-based center, after which the now popular, shorterterm, smaller, petty trading loans were introduced. At the same
workshop, management was told that some clients on one-year term
loans needed more capital during the year. As a result, two additional types of loans were hammered out and introduced: (1) the
Additional Balance-Based Loan (ABBL), allowing clients who did
not borrow the maximum for their loan cycle (but have a perfect
repayment record) to borrow the balance, and (2) the Additional
Savings-Based Loan (ABSL), allowing those who did borrow the maximum (and who have perfect repayment records) to take an additional
loan after six months in an amount up to 50 times their running average weekly voluntary savings. The response has been positive.

Efficiency is Not Easy
What has just been written on the attainment of administrative and
field staff efficiency targets is not intended to give the false impresVolume 1 Number 1
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sion that it is easy. As of December 31, 1998, none of the three case
study MFIs had attained all the target efficiency levels. CRECER’s
administrative efficiency of 33.7% is nearing the upper. level of the
target range of 15% to 25% and appears on track to attain it, but
CARD (at 38.7% and with no clear downward trend) and FINCA
Uganda (at over 71.8% and with no clear downward trend) are not
near nor clearly on track to achieve the target.
With respect to field staff efficiency, only FINCA Uganda has
exceeded the minimum best practice target of 300 loan clients per
field staff target, at 331, but CARD and CRECER, at 279 and 274
loan clients per field staff, respectively, are close to the minimum
target and show a clear trend toward achieving it. The minimum
average loan outstanding per field staff of US$25,000 has been surpassed by both CRECER, at US$45,149, and CARD, at US$28,584.
FINCA Uganda is well below the target, at US$16,424, and appears
to have leveled off. As discussed above, however, FINCA Uganda is
currently reconsidering a savings policy, which would restrict loan
size; a change in the policy should improve this efficiency measure.
With respect to portfolio-at-risk, which is a measure of the efficiency of loan recovery, all three case studies are performing
extremely well; CRECER reports the highest level of portfolio-atrisk of 2.3%, well within the acceptable band of 0% to 10%.
There is a lesson to be learned here. Even though our case study
MFIs illustrate that there is no necessary trade-off between attainment of IFS and serving large numbers of poor and poorest households, they also show that there is still much room for improving
efficiency—even among top-performing MFIs. CARD, CRECER, and
FINCA Uganda will have to work harder to raise their efficiency to
levels required for IFS, particularly as the threat of competition,
which would drive interest rates down, looms over MFIs. The good
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news is that tools and training necessary for improving efficiency
levels, as outlined above, are available today to all practitioners.
These must be taken advantage of as we seek to achieve our primary
28

goal of poverty reduction.

Efficiency and Expansion of Outreach: a Paradox
Administrative efficiency tends to decline initially as expansion of
outreach takes place, if the expansion involves opening new
branches and/or hiring trainee staff. The main reasons for this are
(1) the up-front costs of opening new branches, (2) the fact that new
field staff have to be trained (and thus paid), often for many
months, before they become productive, and (3) that following the
staff’s training, it takes time for productivity in bringing clients
into the MFI to reach levels of experienced field staff. In our experience, it often takes more than five years for new field staff to meet
the target of 300 clients and US$25,000 in loan outstanding. It is
only after three to four years that a new staff member should be
earning enough interest income from the loan portfolio they manage to cover their salary.
There is no running away from the fact that expansion of outreach
to the poor will require the opening of new branches and the hiring
and training of new field staff. Both administrative and field staff
efficiency levels will drop as soon as the new field staff are included
in the MFI’s ongoing performance evaluation. It will take considerable time for the economies of scale that eventually come about
from expansion of outreach to be acheived. So rapidly expanding
MFIs will not be able to meet the levels of efficiency that allow for
achievement of IFS in a reasonable time-frame, and thus allow for
receiving funding from commercial banks or taking savings from
the general public. Rapidly expanding MFIs will show increasing
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losses until the expansion levels-off and then begin to enjoy
economies of scale.
There is definitely a trade-off between expansion of outreach and
achieving IFS, as long as the expansion involves the opening of new
branches and the hiring and training of new field staff. The decline
in financial sustainability that accompanies rapid expansion of outreach makes the ongoing financing of that expansion difficult. This
difficulty can be called the “paradox of poverty reduction through
microfinance”: expansion of outreach is necessary for more poverty
reduction, but the expansion itself lowers IFS, which, in turn, makes
commercial financing of the expansion more difficult, if not impossible.

Breaking the Paradox
Strategic planning and financial modelling can help to break the
paradox. The maximum period that social investors and donors will
wait for IFS is thought to be about five years. So, based on realistic
assumptions concerning client build-up, loan products, average loan
sizes by cycle, repayment rates, repeat loan rates, savings products
and savings mobilisation, staff salaries and allowances, other administrative costs, the cost of funds, likely leverage ratios, and the cost
of additional capital, we can use financial modelling to calculate the
number of clients that can be served and the appropriate interest
rate to be charged to allow for IFS and the covering of all accumulated losses within five years. If the poor can pay the required interest rate, then MFIs can do business with them. In the case of CFTS,
modelling told MFIs that the appropriate interest rate would be 20%
(flat), and it is doing business with the poorest at that rate.
To attract sufficient funding to implement the Five-Year Business
Plan, the plan should be promoted as a “package financing” to IFS.
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If social investors and donors can provide grants and soft loans, contingent on the attainment of planned annual performance targets, to
finance the operating deficits prior to IFS, then commercial banks
should be willing to provide the required onlending funds at commercial rates. Thus the paradox can be broken.

Can the Poorest Afford Microcredit?
As defined previously, an “appropriate” interest rate is one that will
allow an MFI to cover all its adjusted operating costs from its
adjusted operating income within a reasonable period of time. Four
to five years is thought to be the maximum time available because
the patience of donors/investors providing grants and other subsidized funding is not likely to extend beyond that. As a cost plus
measure (designed to cover costs and provide a reasonable profit) in
its most fundamental state, an appropriate interest rate will be
determined primarily by how efficiently the organization is able to
operate its business. But that is not to discount the critical importance of the final component in calculating appropriate interest
rates: profit, as measured by the capitalization rate. Without profit,
continuation of IFS will be impossible. Earning a profit allows MFIs
to build their equity—a source of funding—in order to expand their
outreach to the poor and poorest. And as the equity position grows,
the MFI will then be able to further leverage funds by raising debt
or taking deposits from clients (or the general public if the MFI is
regulated) and increase outreach even further, driving the program
toward IFS and beyond.
Setting appropriate interest rates is therefore a matter of estimating unit costs of administration, loan loss, funds, and capital. A
good set of guidelines is found in CGAP Occasional Paper No. 1.
This paper notes that “the annualized effective interest rate (R)
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charged on loans will be a function of five elements, each expressed
as a percentage of average outstanding loan portfolio: administrative
expenses (AE), loan losses (LL), the cost of funds (CF), the desired
capitalization rate (K), and investment income (II)” (Rosenburg,
1996, p. 1):
R = [(AE + LL + CF + K) / (1 - LL)] - II
Typical ranges for MFIs in Asia on these items are shown in Table 4.
Based on the above formula, this means that appropriate interest
rates for MFIs that work with the poor in Asia range between 35%
and 51% per annum.
A note of caution should be added here. For all the reasons outlined above, achieving IFS is of critical importance to MFIs if they
seek to expand outreach to large numbers of poor households.
However, because MFIs work with the poor and poorest, a balance
must be struck when setting an appropriate interest rate. This balance lies between early achievement of IFS and the institutional benefits this brings, and keeping the interest rate charged to clients
manageable for them. This means that the interest rate must not be
so high as to rule out adequate profitability on the main incomegenerating activities open to the poor; that is to say, the pace of

planned achievement of IFS for an MFI must be consistent with the
attainment of the overriding goal of poverty reduction. Most
important, an impossible burden must not be placed on the shoulders of the early clients.29

172

Volume 1 Number 1

The Microcredit Summit’s Challenge
Gap Analysis—Ensuring an MFI Receives the Income It
Expects
Setting an appropriate interest rate is a key step in getting on the
path toward IFS, but ensuring that the loan portfolio and assets
30

yield the expected rate of return is another challenge.

Up to this

point in the paper we have focused on managing expenses as a way
to increase efficiency. However three tools are available to measure
efficiency in managing income. In other words, is an MFI generating
the expected level of income from the loan portfolio, as measured
by the appropriate interest rate? If this is the case, it can be assured
of overall strong management. If not, regardless of how well the
MFI manages its costs, it will be very difficult to achieve IFS.
The best way to measure income efficiency is to compare annual
effective interest rate, also known as the Annual Percentage Rate
(APR), the total cost the borrower must pay for credit services in a
year, with the actual portfolio yield. The portfolio yield attempts to
measure how well an MFI is collecting from its clients by comparing
interest and fees received from loan clients during a specific period
of time (up to one year) to the average loan portfolio for the same
period. Differences between the APR and the portfolio yield can
imply poor loan portfolio quality or difficulty in collecting interest.
Particularly for MFIs with loan cycles of less than one year, any differences can also imply slow administrative roll-over of the lending
product(s), due to increasing dormancy among clients on subsequent loans, among other factors, or inefficient management techniques leading to delays in subsequent loan disbursements. Taking
the gap analysis one step further, an MFI should also compare interest and fee income received from loan clients during a specific
period of time (up to one year) to the average total assets for the
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same period, referred to as the asset yield. The difference between
the portfolio yield and the asset yield indicates how well an MFI has
invested its other funds, those not out in the hands of the borrowers via loans and those in income producing activities. For example,
are other funds being kept in non-interest bearing bank accounts, or
have they been placed in interest-bearing investments such as cash
deposits (CDs) or savings accounts. A large difference between the
best portfolio and asset yields can indicate that assets other than
loans are not being managed properly.
The best-managed MFIs will show very little difference between
each of these measurement tools. Institutions with moderate to
large differences will note that administrative changes may be necessary—of which they may already be aware, based on their cost
management techniques. Tracking efficiency in managing both
expenses and income allows an MFI to ensure that it does not stray
from the path toward IFS.
The annualized effective interest rates, portfolio yields, and asset
yields of our case study MFIs are shown in figure 5. Here we see that
of the three, FINCA Uganda has the smallest gap between the APR
and the loan yield, with a spread of approximately 1.8% at
12/31/98. This dramatic reduction in the gap reflects FINCA
Uganda’s specific efforts to improve turnover of its loan portfolio
by introducing the “Week 17 Recapitalization” incentive to field
staff, described in the Staff Incentive section above. However, the
difference between FINCA Uganda’s loan portfolio and asset yields
was the largest among our case study MFIs, a spread of 25.2%,
reflecting high liquidity at FINCA Uganda. As of 12/31/98, nearly
34% of FINCA Uganda’s total assets were held in cash and cash
equivalents; as FINCA Uganda gets this money into the hands of the
poor, the gap should shrink. CARD’s yield gap at 12/31/98 was
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approximately 5.6%, which it credits to dormancy among general
loan and other basic loan products, which has, in turn, slowed
turnover of the loan portfolio. While improvements can be made in
financial efficiency, particularly at CARD, both MFIs are performing
well.
CRECER’s yield gap31, of approximately 47%, however is not
acceptable and needs to be addressed by management immediately.
As loan portfolio quality is very strong, as measured by portfolioat-risk at 12/31/98 of 2.3%, the dramatic gap is likely caused by an
extremely slow turnover of CRECER’s 16-week loans. CRECER
should consider introducing a staff incentive, as FINCA Uganda has
Volume 1 Number 1

175

Journal of Microfinance
done, to encourage rapid portfolio turnover, among other potential
initiatives to reduce the gap. Of course, the intention is not to force
the poor to borrow if they are not prepared to do so.
Based on this analysis, FINCA Uganda will not be able to consider
lowering its high effective interest rate of 62.3% until it can be sure
that its low administrative efficiency of 71.8% can improve substantially. Given CARD’s current administrative efficiency of
38.7%, there appears to be no case for reducing its effective interest
rate of 42.8%. The situation with CRECER, charging the highest
APR among our case study MFIs at 82.4%, is different. CRECER is
the lowest cost program among our case study MFIs, with administrative efficiency of 33.7% and institutional efficiency (which
includes interest expenses and loan losses) of 38.4%. Thus, even
with its low portfolio yield of 35.4%, it is nearly able to cover all its
costs! Once CRECER improves loan portfolio yield, thus reducing
its yield gap, it should re-evaluate the interest rate it charges to its
borrowers; we are sure they would not want their borrowers bearing this cost.

Can the Poorest Pay Appropriate Interest Rates?
This is a sensitive issue. Politicians are fond of defending the poor
and poorest by insisting that interest rates charged to them on loans
should be subsidized and low. It is now known that subsidized
credit rarely gets into the hands of those for whom it was
announced, yet politicians persist. In several countries, governments still cap interest rates on small loans in the mistaken belief
that it helps the poor and poorest. In fact, such an action has the
opposite and unintended result of depriving them of access to any
credit at all, because the scarce, subsidized credit is taken by those
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with more influence and better connections than the poor and
poorest at the local level.
NGOs and companies that offer sustainable financial services
directly to the poor and poorest at appropriate interest rates are,
ironically, in constant danger of being accused of usury by politicians, bureaucrats, and intellectuals—but notably, not by their
clients. It is necessary to defuse the issue.
In microfinance, as it is known, loans are small. Even relatively
high interest rates on them still result in relatively small (in amount
payable) installments, especially if these are paid frequently, say
weekly. For example, a PHP2,000 loan for hog fattening at CARD,
payable over six months, will require weekly installments of PHP88
(about US$2.32), of which PHP8 (about US$0.21) will be for interest. Two piglets will be purchased at around PHP1000 each. After
about six months, the fattened (mainly on household scraps, vegetables planted in the house garden for that purpose, and commercial feed supplement) pigs can be sold for about PHP4,000 each,
giving an attractive lump-sum return and net profit estimated at
around 100% on average. Weekly repayment is made from the
household cash flow, which payment sometimes requires its members to tighten their belts. Here is a classic form of savings based on
self-denial for future gain.
For households too poor to tighten their belts, loan activities like
petty trading or small shop-keeping that result in the quick and frequent generation of additional income are more appropriate. To
minimize the repayment burden, such loans can be for small
amounts. For example, petty trading of bangles and cosmetics by
poor women at CFTS India requires a working capital of only about
Rs.1,000 (about US$24; note Rs. = Indian rupies). If this is borrowed
at an interest rate of 20% (flat) f or a term of 20 weeks, with princiVolume 1 Number 1
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pal and interest repaid in equal amounts weekly, then the required
weekly repayment is Rs.60 (about US$1.42), of which Rs.50
(US$1.18) is principal and Rs.10 (US$0.24) interest. Usually the
women sell house-to-house and village-to-village, carrying their
wares in a basket on their heads, and working six days a week, grossing about Rs.100 a day or 600 per week, of which about Rs.120
(about US$2.83) are net profit, half of which goes for repayment.
For larger loan amounts, the weekly repayments can be kept small
and manageable by lengthening the loan term. In India, a popular
loan activity among the poor is the purchase of a moderately yielding, say three kilo per day, milch buffalo, which can be purchased
pregnant for around Rs.6,000 (about US$150). If a loan of the whole
amount is made available for that purpose to a very poor woman at
20% interest (flat), with an effective rate of around 40%, on a declining annual rest for a term of two years with 100 equal weekly
installments of principal and interest, each payment would amount
to [(6000 + (6000x0.2)) + (3000 + (3000x0.2)) = 7,800/100 =Rs.78 (just
under US$2)]. The three kilos of milk could be sold daily for
approximately Rs.12 per kilo. This means that the weekly repayment money of Rs.78 could be earned in two to three days, leaving
the income from the other four to five days to reduce the poverty
of the household. The risk of the buffalo dying can be covered by
livestock insurance at a premium of four rupees per week, or Rs.100
per year. Over the two-year period, the total cost would be Rs.160,
which could be paid from the sale of the milk. However, because
the buffalo will produce milk for only about nine out of twelve
months, the clients have to save or engage in some other incomegenerating effort for the remaining three months. To fill the gap,
clients in India purchase a second buffalo as soon as they can. With
two milch buffalo they can have a good, steady income throughout
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the year, with which they can pull themselves and their families out
of poverty within a few years. A good example of this can be seen
at the SHARE (Society for Helping Awaken the Rural Poor through
Education) branch in Dachepalli, Gunter District, Andhra Pradesh,
where more than half of the loans disbursed over the past five years
have been for milch buffalo, and many of the original clients are
now living in large concrete houses of their own design.
The examples above hint at a second important factor that makes
it possible for the poor and the poorest to pay appropriate interest
rates. The returns to capital in their microenterprises tend to average more than 100%. This was the finding of a recent, careful
impact-evaluation study of CARD done by Mahabub Hossain.32
Returns to capital in his random sample of clients averaged 117%.
As CARD’s effective interest rate on loans to clients is approximately 39% per annum, this leaves, on average, 78% in the hands of
clients to reduce their poverty. It can, of course, be argued that if
CARD’s interest rate were significantly lower, its clients could come
out of poverty faster. But from where would they get their loans? If
CARD does not charge an appropriate interest rate, it may not be
able, in the short-term and long-term, to earn a profit, thus making
it dependent on donor and government largesse. In a worst case scenario, it might no longer be able to meet the financial needs of its
clients. There is no certainty that another MFI would not fill the
gap. The only alternative for the moderately poor and poorest may
then be the traditional moneylender. A recent study of the returns
to capital in microenterprises in India and Kenya (Harper, 1998)
found the returns to be even higher on average than Hossain and
Diaz found at CARD.
The consistent, near perfect repayment rates, which are characteristic of MFIs around the world, are empirical evidence that the modVolume 1 Number 1
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erately poor and poorest can pay appropriate interest rates charged
by efficient microfinance institutions. Working in an area of India
where repayment of IRDP loans is said to have been less than 10%,
CFTS has been able to collect 97% of weekly repayments due since
it began operations 18 months ago; and SHARE in Andra Pradesh,
India has been recording perfect repayment performance since it
started. CARD has maintained near perfect repayment for years,
with about half of its clients coming from the poorest category.
CRECER and FINCA Uganda have had the same experience while
dealing with substantial numbers of the poorest. It is our impression that if anything, the poorest clients have a higher repayment
rate than the poor clients. Probable reasons are the strength of the
desire of the poorest women to rise out of poverty and provide a
better life for their children, as well as their relative lack of alternatives for earning cash income.
The 16 CASHPOR-member MFIs, who together had US$34 million
in loans outstanding to over 200,000 poor and poorest households
throughout Asia at the end of 1998, had a combined portfolio-atrisk of only 1.13%. The millions of weekly payments made in full
and on time that lie behind that figure are eloquent evidence of the
ability of the poor and the poorest to pay appropriate interest rates
for their financial services.33
So it is clear that the poor and the poorest can pay much higher
effective interest rates on loans for income generation than has been
presumed by many.

What about Savings?
Very little has been said in this paper about the tedious topic of savings. Few other issues in microfinance have sparked so much debate
or aroused such emotions. Our relative silence on savings is not
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meant to deny the importance of promoting the practice among the
poor, on which most microfinance practitioners agree.
Savings are needed to provide a safety net for the poor so that in
times of emergency (e.g., food shortage or illness) they have funds
to meet their needs and to smooth deficit months so that they do
not have to turn to exploitative moneylenders. Appropriate savings
facilities are of particular importance to poor women who need a
secure place to keep surplus funds, but also a place to which they
themselves have easy access. Weekly meetings of an MFI with its
clients in their villages provide the opportunity to supply such savings services. Through these services, clients can also build up their
savings so as to be able to purchase the productive assets that can
make their progress out of poverty sustainable, or to perform
important social obligations. There is no doubt about the importance of savings to the poor.
Most MFIs also recognize the importance of savings for the institution and its business. Client savings, if partially blocked, can
reduce the risk of lending to the poor. More important, savings can
be a relatively cheap source of funds for MFIs, because interest rates
that have to be paid to attract savings are usually less than those that
have to be paid to borrow funds commercially.
Major differences exist among MFIs, however, on the relative
emphasis to be given to savings as compared to credit as tools for
poverty-reduction, and on the timing of the emphasis. These differences are illustrated by the three case studies in this paper. CARD,
being a Grameen Bank replication/adaptation, gives primary
emphasis to credit and only secondary attention to savings. Only
small amounts of compulsory savings are required for the Group
Fund to make clients eligible for much larger loans to finance
income generation, the amount of which is not related to the
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amount saved. As its clients progress, however, CARD increases the
amount of compulsory group savings and promotes individual, voluntary savings. FINCA Uganda and CRECER, using the village banking approach, on the other hand, put primary emphasis on savings.
Only after saving regularly for several months does a poor household become eligible for a loan, and the maximum that can be borrowed is restricted, at least in the case of FINCA Uganda, by times
the amount saved.
The three case studies differ, as expected, in their average client
savings balance, CARD having the lowest at US$35 (even after nine
years), followed by CRECER at US$41 (five years) and FINCA
Uganda at US$49 (six years). We are surprised, however, to find that
CRECER has the lowest savings to outstanding loans ratio at 25%,
compared to CARD at 38% and FINCA Uganda at 99%. Notice that
the ranking of the MFIs in terms of average loan outstanding is the
reverse, CRECER having the highest at US$165, followed by CARD
at US$103, and FINCA Uganda at only US$50. FINCA Uganda’s
strict linking of loan amounts to savings may have limited the
amounts that could be borrowed by the poor.
In addition to these differences among MFIs in terms of relative
emphasis on credit and savings as instruments for poverty-reduction
and their timing, there are major moral and legal issues involved
with savings. The moral issue has to do with the need for adequate
protection of the savings of the poor, and the legal issue revolves
around the responsibility that governments usually take, through
their central banks or other regulatory agencies, to provide this protection. As a result, NGO-based MFIs usually cannot legally mobilize deposits, even from their clients, not to mention from the
public. However, many governments and regulators close their eyes
to NGO-MFIs mobilizing deposits from their members, because they
182

Volume 1 Number 1

The Microcredit Summit’s Challenge
realize that most are sincerely trying to help the poor. But, the
question whether there is adequate protection for the deposits of
the poor remains. And the possibility of legal action against deposittaking NGOs is always there. Ultimately, such protection can come
only from the capital adequacy of an MFI, but NGOs do not usually
have any equity. For this reason, the amount of savings MFIs can
mobilize will, and should be, restricted. So if NGO-MFIs want to
offer progressive lending to large numbers of poor households, savings cannot be expected to be their major source of funds nor of
institutional financial self-sufficiency. Savings could still be an
important source of funds, however, and should not be neglected.
Once an MFI becomes financially self-sufficient and builds up its
equity through retained earnings, mobilizing deposits from the public could become its major source of funds for further poverty
reduction.

Conclusion and Recommendations
Large numbers of the poorest households in Asia and growing numbers in Africa and Latin America are already being provided with
financial services in a sustainable way. A close look at the case study
MFIs has shown not only that this is being done, but also how to go
about it. The key is increasing cost effectiveness so that the appropriate interest rate to the poor and the poorest can be minimized.
Comparison with CFTS has revealed how this can be systematically
planned and implemented in order to reduce significantly the period
of time required to attain IFS, by maximizing the scope and depth
of outreach to the poor and the poorest—provided adequate funding
is available for a financial break-even for the MFI.
The key steps to increasing institutional efficiency are 1) costeffective targeting, 2) maximizing both institutional and field staff
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efficiency through management information systems, formal business
planning, maintenance of loan portfolio quality with client incentives, and staff incentives, and 3) customizing financial products.
Once an MFI has planned for high levels of efficiency and managed
its costs in such a way as to achieve those goals, the next step is to
charge an appropriate interest rate and ensure that the rate is
yielded by its portfolio.

Mainstreaming
For mainstreaming to occur in some of the poorest countries, key
policy changes will have to take place. First, interest rate caps on
loans to the poor and poorest must be removed where they still
exist. Second, a suitable legal identity for providing microfinance to
the poor and poorest (perhaps exclusively, to minimize leakage to
the nonpoor) has to be created and provided with a regulatory system to support the overriding objective of reducing poverty by providing microfinance to the poor and poorest.
Attitudes also must change. Concerns remain within the microfinance community, and perhaps elsewhere, that IFS is not an achievable goal for many MFIs—particularly those which began as NGOs.
Our case study MFIs provide empirical evidence that this is not true.
Many NGO managers came into microfinance because of the
promise it had shown through the success of the Grameen Bank of
Bangladesh and other similar microcredit innovators, for large-scale
reduction of poverty. Many are gradually transforming their multiprogram NGOs into de facto financial institutions because microfinance has become their most effective program for poverty
reduction. They are retraining to become competent managers of
their microfinance institutions. Their motivation and job satisfaction do not come from banking per se, but from seeing with their
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own eyes the increasing numbers of poor women lifting their families out of poverty and providing better lives for their children
through the opportunities provided by the microfinance that the
NGOs have delivered. It is hard to imagine a higher level of job satisfaction than is obtainable through providing microfinance to the
poor and poorest in an efficient and financially sustainable way.
We hope that this paper has removed much of the mystique that
has surrounded OSS, IFS, and AROA, and shown them to be attainable by MFIs managed by normal human beings who are motivated
to reduce poverty through the provision of microfinance to the
poor and the poorest, and who will take the trouble to learn how to
do it in an efficient and financially sustainable way.

Leveraging
MFIs, provided with the suitable legal identity mentioned above,
should begin to establish track records with commercial banks in
their countries as soon as possible. Guarantee funds and quasiequity in the form of subordinated soft loans provided by responsive donors or government agencies could help initially attract the
banks. Once a relationship is established, however, the reliability of
the loan recovery and the soundness of the financial management of
the MFIs will determine to what degree to which banks are allowed
to leverage their equity to obtain the huge amount of funds required
to reach and benefit truly large numbers of the poorest households.
Five-year business plans and effective monitoring of them, which
show an MFI is on track to achieve planned targets, can attract the
interest of banks even before an MFI begins to make profits.
Although only 18 months old, CFTS has received credit lines from
a commercial bank, the Oriental Bank of Commerce, at a market
rate of 14.8% per annum: and from an apex bank, the Small
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Industries Development Bank of India (SIDBI), at a near market rate
of 11% per annum, because CFTS has an attractive business plan and
can show that it is meeting its targets. Both banks are financing
CFTS as a financial intermediary with the poor. Each bank has been
given a 10% margin of the sanctioned amount in the form of a fixed
deposit, and both have accepted loans with the poor as security. A
rating by an independent microfinance institution rating agency
that gave CFTS “alpha minus” status, meaning “recommended
because of reasonable security and good systems,” was helpful in
securing the line of credit from SIDBI.

Franchising to the Poor and the Poorest
To maximize their benefits to the poor and the poorest, MFIs could
be sold34 (franchised) to their clients once they attain IFS. In this
way, the poor and the poorest would be able to enjoy some of the
profits of their being provided with financial services. Also, this
should remove any remaining concern about charging them “high”
interest rates. Finally, it would free the franchiser to establish more
franchises to reach and benefit more of the poor and poorest households, although it would have to ensure that quality was maintained
in the franchises according to the franchise agreement. In this way,
truly large numbers could be reached and assisted out of poverty.

Notes
1.

2.
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For the purpose of this paper, the 1997 Microcredit Summit, and the
Summit’s nine-year fulfillment campaign, any reference to microcredit
should be understood to refer to programs that provide credit for selfemployment and other financial and business services (including savings
and technical assistance) to very poor persons.
We would like to thank the Microcredit Summit for inviting us to write
this paper and for extending full cooperation in the process. Rob Gailey of
the Secretariat deserves special mention for his hard work on our behalf.
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The commitment of our case study MFIs to providing requested information in a timely and accurate manner, particularly given their commit-

4.

5.
6.

7.
8.

9.

ments in the field, was very much appreciated. We would specifically like
to thank Dolores Torres, Robert Ridgley, Stuart Bresnick, Barbara
MkNelly, John Hatch, Michael McCord, and Paul Ssegawa. Valuable comments were received from a large number of readers to whom an earlier
draft was circulated by the Summit Secretariat. Particularly valuable comments were received from Sam Daley-Harris, Alex Counts, Charles
Waterfield, Howard Brady, Gary Woller, Bill Gheen, and Hartmut
Schneider. We thank all commentators for the time they have taken out of
their busy schedules. We have done our best to incorporate your suggestions, and feel the paper is much stronger because of them. Helen Todd
proofread the final draft and made valuable suggestions. Nevertheless, we
take final responsibility for what we have written. Comments are welcomed by both authors, whose e-mail addresses are as follows: gibbons@pc.jaring.my and jmeehan@asiaonline.net.
Here we follow the Microcredit Summit definition of the “poorest” families as those who live in households with incomes that place them in the
bottom 50% of the poverty group as defined officially in each country.
Households in the top 50% of a country’s poverty group are termed
“poor.”
Jonathan Conning (1998, p.2), referring to Christen, 1997; Microfinance
Network, 1998; and Otero & Rhyne, 1994.
The inflation and subsidy adjustments are calculated based on the method
outlined in Chapter 2, “Evaluating MFI Financial Sustainability,” of
Christen’s Banking Services for the Poor: Managing for Financial Success.
This is a very simplified assumption, which does not address the maintenance of principal value against inflation, among other considerations.
In some cases, apparently unlimited amounts of subsidized funds for onlending to the poor may be available in the form of refinancing as “priority sector lending” from central or apex banks. The conditions required to
obtain such funding, however, are likely to be similar to those for receiving commercial funding from formal financial institutions. Moreover, such
subsidized lending may not be sustainable in poor economies.
A rejoinder was submitted to CGAP for publication, but rejected on
grounds that many other contributions awaited publication that had to be
dealt with first, before a “new issue” could be published. See Gibbons
(1998) “Can the ‘Core Poor’ Benefit from Microcredit” in CASHPOR’s
newsletter Credit for the Poor, Issue No. 20.
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10.

11.
12.
13.

14.

15.
16.

17.

18.
19.

20.
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We have been asked why we did not choose better-known MFIs, like
BancoSol, K-Rep, BRI, and Grameen Bank as case studies. The first three,
BancoSol, K-Rep, and BRI, do not meet one of our key selection criteria:
working with a substantial number of the poorest in their countries. The
Grameen Bank, of course, has many clients among the poorest households
in Bangladesh, but we thought our case would be stronger if demonstrated
with a replication/adaptation. In this way we can avoid the sui generis
argument.
E-mail communication from John Hatch, Founder and Director of
Research, FINCA, March 8, 1999.
The figures quoted here are quarterly figures.
It is important to note that as the competitive environment among MFIs
increases worldwide, as is currently being experienced in Bangladesh and
many parts of Latin America, MFIs will be forced to reduce interest rates
in order to retain their clients and remain competitive. Under such conditions, the impact on the long-term viability of inefficient and poorly managed institutions would be devastating.
Increasingly, efforts are being made globally to compile comparable operational and financial data on MFIs. One of the most comprehensive examples of this so far is the Microbanking Bulletin, produced originally by the
Microfinance Program at the Economics Institute, Boulder, CO, and now
by Calmeadow, which is distributed biannually. Efforts to develop rating
agencies for MFIs, such as Private Sector Initiatives and EDA Rural
Systems, and independently developed analyses, such as ACCION’s
CAMEL, will also contribute to these efforts going forward.
A separate paper at the Microcredit Summit Campaign’s 1999 Meeting of
Councils in Abidjan will address this topic in significant detail.
For more information, please refer to the manual Cost-Effective Targeting:
Two Tools to Identify the Poor by David Gibbons and Anton Simanowitz
with Ben Nkuna. CASHPOR: Seremban, Malaysia (Fax(606)7642307 & email: gibbons@pc.jaring.my)
Any local currency unit can be included here. In cases where 1 unit of a
currency is not a meaningful measure, 100 units or 1000 units (a multiple
of ten) can be used.
E-mail communication from Chuck Waterfield, March 26, 1999.
For more details, please refer to the CGAP’s Handbook for Management
Information Systems for Microfinance Institutions, February 1998, prepared
by Nick Ramsing and Chuck Waterfield.
See the final version of the CGAP’s Format for the Appraisal of Microfinance
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Institutions (1997), the SEEP Network’s paper Financial Ratio Analysis for
Microfinance Institutions (1995), and CASHPOR’s recently revised manual
21.
22.

23.

24.

25.
26.
27.
28.

29.

30.

31.

32.

Tracking Financial and Operational Performance (1999).
For guidelines on calculating portfolio-at-risk and using it to determine the
appropriate loan loss provision, see CGAP (1997) and Christen (1997).
This is understood by changing assumptions such as amount of funding,
administrative costs, etc. to gauge their impact on other key indicators,
such as efficiency, OSS, and IFS. This is often called variance or sensitivity
analysis.
See, for example, the new CGAP Business Planning and Financial Modeling
for Microfinance Institutions: A Handbook, (November 1998), prepared by
Tony Sheldon and Chuck Waterfield.
The 5-Year Business Plan is not, of course, fixed for a period of five years.
It will have to be updated and amended several times in light of varying
actual experience during the period. The updated financial model will
show the likely impact of such changes on the triple goals of maximizing
the delivery of financial services to the poor in an efficient and financially
sustainable way.
“High risk” would be the nonpoor, or those known in the village not to
be trustworthy in matters of money.
This is earning enough additional income to put the household above the
official poverty-line income.
For fuller development of this point, see Gibbons (1998b).
The authors are grateful to Ismail Serageldin, vice president of the World
Bank, for ensuring that this section and the following two sections were
included in the paper.
We are grateful to Huguette Labelle, president of the Canadian
International Development Agency, for bringing this danger to our attention.
We are grateful to Howard Brady of Global Partnerships in Seattle for
specifically recommending this analysis be included here. It has greatly
added to the strength of the paper.
For the version of this paper presented at the Microcredit Summit Meeting
of Councils in Abidjan in June 1999, an incorrect figure of 42%, representing CRECER’s APR, was reported to us. This version of the paper
includes the corrected figure of 82.4%. The Gap Analysis section has been
adjusted accordingly.
Director of the Social Science Division at the International Institute for
Rice Research (IRRI), Los Banos, Philippines. (Hossain & Diaz, 1997)
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33.

34.

We have been informed of a Tagalog saying among the poor in the
Philippines: “In extreme need, one will hold on even to the sharp edge of
a knife.” But we do not think it is relevant to microcredit for the poor.
What is convincing about the near perfect repayment rates in microfinance
for the poor is their persistence over decades, which can be taken as evidence that they are benefiting from the opportunity. Otherwise, how
would they be able to repay in full so consistently?
The Grameen Bank, which is majority-owned by its clients, shows that
this is possible.
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Book Review
Defying the Odds:
Bunking for the Poor,
by Eugene Versluysen
by Shad Morris
Books written about the microfinance industry tend to focus disproportionately on its technical or social aspects. One reads over
and over about the importance of sustainability and reaching the
truly poor, but the position microfinance takes in the context of a
dynamic world economy is often overlooked. Microfinance does
not exist in a vacuum. The political and structural reforms undertaken by many of the developing countries not only affect the informal economy, but also affect the manner in which microfinance is
administered.
In a world of financial deregulation and trade liberalization,
Defying the Odds is long overdue. Author, and former World Bank
economist, Eugene Versluysen offers a big-picture analysis of microfinance throughout the developing economies, using case studies of
classical microfinance programs and a systemic analysis of these various organizations. Defying the Odds is a perceptive analysis of
macroeconomic policies’ effects on the informal sector. It appeals to
the policy analyst and maker while providing students, academics,
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Journal of

and practitioners a broad-scope understanding of the importance of
accounting for economic and political context in microfinance.
Versluysen builds his book on four main objectives. The first sets
the conditions of macroeconomic policy as the key actor in
microenterprise development. The second is to prove how microenterprise is used as a tool to fight marginalization caused by modernization-policy reform. The third is the importance of savings with
credit. And the fourth shows the shortcomings and successes of various microfinance programs through case studies.
Despite heavy reliance on World Bank sources, Versluysen is able
to offer a critical analysis of the structural reforms in developing
economies. He concludes that while many of these reform measures
may help to stabilize an economy, most are misguided and therefore
marginalize the poor.
Understanding how people on the edge of an economy are marginalized helps lead into the second objective of how banking for
the poor can stave off some of the effects of economic reform.
Microlending not only provides financial opportunity, but also provides self-reliance, confidence, and empowerment.
While credit and debt are integral aspects of microfinance, the
principle of savings should be key to its goals. Versluysen’s third
objective is to prove that savings should be the primary focus of
borrowers. It is savings that allows a family to pay for children’s
education, insurance, or medical emergencies.
Versluysen’s fourth objective, though broad in scope, looks at the
leading microfinance programs in three of the world’s poorest areas:
Asia, Latin America, and West Africa. The analysis of the programs
lack technical and in-depth focus; however, covering the geo...........................................................................
Mr. Morris is a candidate for both the Masters of International Development and Masters
of Organizational Leadership and Strategy degrees at Brigham Young University.
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graphic, economic, social, and cultural environment in which these
programs operate offers a unique view that most microfinance
analyses do not cover. Versluysen’s analysis steps back ‘and looks
not only at the picture, but the frame as well. Viewing the theoretical frame of microfinance allows practitioners to suitably conform
to the conditions of a particular region.
Eugene Versluysen extends all the insight and knowledge of a
mainstream economist, with the caring and compassion of a true
humanitarian. Defying the Odds is a brilliant analysis of both macroeconomics and microfinance, and their mutual necessity in the
development of any nation.
Kumarian Press, Inc. (1999). 255 pp. $24.95 paper back, $65.00 hardcover. Available through Kumarian Press, 14 Oakwood Avenue, West
Hartford, CT 06119. Phone: (800) 289-2664, Fax: (860) 233-6072,
Internet: www.kpbooks.com.
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Freedom from Hunger’s how-to
series provides practitioners with a
practical overview of group-based
poverty lending, integrated with
simple, relevant and high-impact
learning sessions. The information
contained in these implementation
manuals is easily adapted to the local
context for integrated microfinance/education
programming.
The Field Agent Operations Manual is the anchor of
the series and is packed with tools for organizing a
Credit with Education
program. Also available
are the Credit with
Education

learning

Game and the Credit
Association Training
Manual.
Order now, through
PACT Publications.
1644 DaVinci Court
Davis, CA 95616
800.708.2555
Fax: 530.758.6200
info@freefromhungef.org
www.freefromhunger.org
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